THE

# MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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## OUR TWENTY-FIRST YEAR

By the Editor.

WITH this number the *Modern Churchman* enters on its twenty-first year. Ecclesiastical and theological magazines have an average length of life much below that of a human being. That we have survived is somewhat surprising when so many of our contemporaries have expired, including such well-known magazines as *The Expositor*, edited by Sir Robertson Nicholl and afterwards by Professor Moffatt, *The Interpreter* by Dean Hewlett Johnson, *The Pilgrim* by Archbishop William Temple. We came into existence because it seemed that we were needed in the Church situation of that day. We were founded to support the policy of the Churchmen's Union, which maintained the authority of truth as superior to that of tradition, and desired freedom of research and freedom of utterance for Christian teachers. It sought to banish from the English Church the spirit of obscurantism, fanaticism, intolerance and superstition, and to encourage better relations with the Nonconformist bodies. In short, we desired to promote the ideal of a truth-seeking, freedom-loving, comprehensive national Church.

There seem to be three reasons for our survival. First, we received generous support from such eminent scholars as Dean Rashdall, Professor Percy Gardner, Canon Sanday, Dean Inge, Professor Bethune-Baker, Professor Kirsopp Lake, Dr. Coulton, and many others. Whilst the Church of England is characterized, as Bishop Creighton held, by reverence for sound learning, the utterances of such men as these must carry weight

with our Church authorities. As a consequence, their contributions to our pages secured for us attention and circulation, especially as they wrote in a direct and popular style.

Another reason for our survival is that the tide was with us, not in clerical circles perhaps, but certainly among the educated laity. The treatment meted out to those three outspoken clergymen, Mr. Beeby, Mr. E. A. Edgehill, Mr. J. M. Thompson—the two latter distinguished scholars—and the ecclesiastical outburst after the Girton Conference on Christology, indicate that the temper in Church circles was far from tolerant in those days.

Perhaps the third reason for our survival is that we have stuck steadily to our principles. We have made no effort to trim our sails to catch every ecclesiastical wind that was blowing strongly. Those who pursue that policy certainly secure temporary advantages, but failure follows. In the end neither God nor man is mocked.

Progress has not been either easy or rapid. Powerful bodies of Churchmen, strongly organized, have strenuously opposed the policy we supported. Whilst the struggle has been going on, many Churchmen have deserted the Church whom a triumphant modernist policy would have retained. Many younger men of liberal views, who were sorely needed there, have been lost to the ministry. No modernist observer of these things could fail to feel the force of the charges made against the Church of England by John Henry Newman in his famous sermon on 'The Parting of Friends':

> 'O my mother, whence is this unto thee, that thou hast good things poured upon thee and canst not keep them, and bearest children, yet darest not own them? Why hast thou not the skill to use their services, nor the heart to rejoice in their love? . . . Who hath put this note upon thee to have "a miscarrying womb, and dry breasts"?'

In striving to keep wolves out of her ministry she frequently admitted rabbits; zealous to exclude sceptics, she encouraged sophists; fearful of heretics, she suppressed prophets.

The growing ecclesiastical self-consciousness promoted among the clergy by the Oxford Movement was not only separating the clergy from the laity, but was also creating in clerical circles a deep dissatisfaction with the Establishment of the Church of England. This was gratifying to Romanists and to

Protestant Dissenters, but disconcerting to the laity, for the Englishman is as naturally Erastian as the Scot and Kelt are naturally ultramontane. If the bulk of the normal English laity are to retain their membership in the Church, it will only be because of its national character, not because of its ecclesiastical pretensions. Moreover, a not uninfluential portion of her ministry should be, as were Dean Stanley and Charles Kingsley, 'laymen in clerical collars.' The steady loss of this kind of man from the English ministry owing to the increasing ecclesiasticism of the Church, and his replacement by the server-priestling type, is a serious menace to the Church's influence among any normal English population. Reverence, order, and beauty in worship, cheerful, self-denying parish work, are highly appreciated by Englishmen, but ecclesiastical pretensions, especially of the 'Catholic' kind, lose far more adherents than they gain. What Macaulay called 'That august and fascinating superstition—the Church of Rome' will always have adherents in England, but they will never be more than a minority. There is no room, as there is no need, for another Church of England which is but a small and emasculated counterpart of the Roman Church. If the Church of England be Catholic, as indeed she is, it must be, and is, in quite a different way from the Church of Rome. The model for the Church of England is neither the Church of Rome nor the continental Protestant Churches. Our ideal was laid down in the *Ecclesiastical Polity* of Richard Hooker, and our steady lapse in recent years from that ideal and temper in certain Church circles threatens disaster in the near future. Some Churchmen of eminence, under the leadership of Archbishop William Temple, seem to wish to substitute for Hooker's ideal one based upon Gierke's theory of corporations, imported from Germany into England by Maitland, and worked up for purposes of Anglo-Catholic propaganda by the late Dr. Figgis of the Community of the Resurrection—as Dr. Rashdall has pointed out.

For the Modernist, with his love of freedom both in Church and State, Cavour's policy, *Libera Chiesa in Libero Stato*—a free Church in a free State—has a very attractive sound, but it does not give as much freedom as it promises. It has broken down in the land of its birth. Neither under the Pope nor under

Mussolini is there very much freedom in either State or Church. The Englishman has learnt the difficult lesson that the subjection of all directly to the law of the land as administered in the courts of justice is the only safeguard of freedom.

There is a sentence in that remarkable early Christian Apology, the *Ad Diognetum*, which suggests what ought to be the relation of the Church to the Nation: 'What the soul is in a body, the Christians are in the world.' The Church of England should be the soul of England. It should be the supreme moral and spiritual influence in the national life. It is not necessary for a National Church that all members of the nation should belong to it. Each citizen should be free to decide this for himself. The function of a National Church is to enshrine the nation's spiritual and moral ideals and to propagate them. It is the duty of the National Church to minister to the nation in the Name of Christ and to recognize gladly that all may claim its services. It is important, therefore, that the Church should not make all sorts of regulations which, by restricting its comprehensiveness and adaptability, reduce its power of national service. Yet the universal tendency of ecclesiasticism is to multiply regulations so that the state of Christian men becomes worse than that of the Jews, as St. Augustine declared. The close relation of Church and State tends to promote and preserve a lay tone and temper in the Church itself, for the normal English layman is opposed to the increase of restrictive regulations. Thus, in England, with its love of freedom, the relation of Church and State tends to the preservation of that freedom and simplicity of religious life which is essentially Christian. It is not without significance that a number of the bitterest opponents of the close relation of Church and State in England are opposed to this Christian freedom and simplicity in Church life. We say *some* of its strongest opponents, for, strange as it may seem, others of its strongest opponents are those who do most heartily believe in this simplicity and freedom in Church life. The reason for their opposition is that they have added the conviction that it is the duty of the Church to be *exclusive*. It must exclude sinners. The Church should be a *communio sanctorum* —a society of saints. It is called unto holiness. But to be 'called unto holiness' does not, we would point out, entail the obligation to exclude sinners from such a society. What it does

entail is the duty of trying to win the sinners to holiness. This will be done by keeping them within the Church and by methods of teaching, fellowship, example, atmosphere, and in many other ways—more often indirect than direct—not by restrictions and exclusiveness. A National Christian Church in order to do its duty must be what St. Augustine said the Catholic Church was —a *corpus permixtum*—a mixed multitude. This *corpus permixtum* in the case of the Church of England aims at becoming a *communio sanctorum*—a fellowship of saints—not by excommunicating the sinners, but by changing their characters, and that not by restrictive regulations but by association with the good. Free and friendly, humble and serviceable, benign and intelligent, patient and persevering, there the National Church stands with open doors. *Hinc lumina et pocula sacra.* Men may enter if they will: they may depart if they will—there is no compulsion. All may claim the Church's offices in their need.

This broad, national, deeply Christian conception of the Church of England is being deliberately exchanged for that of a small and elect body of pietists, organized in accordance with a definite system of government, discipline, doctrine and practice. It represents a Catharist and really sectarian conception of the Church, although it often calls itself Catholic.

We were unable to support the Life and Liberty Movement because we recognized that for a 'mess of pottage'—the swift and easy removal of certain administrative and financial weaknesses in the Church of England—it might easily be lured into selling its birthright and exchanging the status of a National Church for that of a Puritan denomination or a Catholic sect. This temptation is strong to-day owing to the irritation caused to the self-conscious type of Churchman who regards the position as intolerable, because Parliament, acting in accordance with constitutional rights, to the exercise of which the Church had consented a few years previously, refused to legalize a revised Prayer-Book, because it believed that the Book was not desired by the laity, and would promote Romanizing.

Our policy as Modernists requires us to stand firmly for the maintenance of the union of Church and State in this land as the most influential and promising form of Church organization. At the present time, with the Archbishops' Commission on Church and State re-opening the issue, it is most important for

all Churchmen to 'view the landscape that they love with unbeclouded eyes.' The future advance of a reasonable, reverent Modernism in the Church of England is more dependent upon maintaining the national constitution of the Church than upon anything else. Should the Church become an *imperium in imperio*, with a strictly restricted Church membership, with bishops elected by a majority of the dominant ecclesiastical party, with the polity of the Church entirely determined by ecclesiastical assemblies, with no appeal in ecclesiastical causes to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the national character of the Church will have been sacrificed, and much of the Church's power to influence for good the life of the nation will have been diminished.

Reasonable freedom of research and reasonable freedom of teaching have of late been secured within the Church of England. Archbishop Frederick Temple's famous *dictum*: 'If the conclusions are prescribed, the study is precluded,' has sunk into the mind of the Church. The need for intellectual freedom and even freedom of teaching is generally recognized to-day. When distinguished Anglo-Catholic contributors to *Lux Mundi* followed the line blazed in this matter by the not less distinguished authors of *Essays and Reviews*, the more intelligent members of the Anglo-Catholic school followed. *Essays Catholic and Critical* are more critical than Catholic. The essayists shrink from the term Modernist, but not from the thing. Their conclusions about 'shadow Eucharists' and other matters may differ from those of the Modernists, but not their methods. The Evangelicals who opposed the Deposited Book, and who constituted a powerful part of the 'Protestant underworld,' were described by the Bishop of Durham as an 'army of illiterates generalled by octogenarians.' The Anglican Evangelical Group Movement, under the able leadership of Canon Vernon Storr and other Liberal Evangelicals, does not differ from Modernism in its attitude towards obscurantism, intolerance, and superstition.

Professor Kirsopp Lake said at one of the Modern Churchmen's Conferences in Oxford that 'Modernists have to choose whether they will be the leaven or the loaf. I hold,' said he, 'that their policy is to be the leaven.' Certainly the leaven of

Modernism is permeating the whole Church of England, except some very fanatical and ignorant elements. Modernism has much to do yet, for there is the Anglican Communion beyond the seas, which stands in need of simple, practical, Modernist teaching.

In the great mission fields of the Far East the Catholic and Evangelical educational missions are being steadily modernized. Nothing else is possible. Modern education and Modernist Christianity, if there is to be religion in education (and education without religion is defective education), must go hand in hand.

The future is full of hope. Modernist Christian literature is steadily becoming more convincing, more simple, more practical. It is increasing in range and improving in quality of appeal.

The task which still awaits accomplishment by English Modernists is the conforming of our doctrines and services, our creeds and liturgies, to truth as Modernism sees it. Much education—and the Modernist movement is largely an educational movement—must be imparted before reforms can be carried out. Modernists need greatly, by co-operation and self-sacrifice, to organize and support all varieties and methods of Modernist religious education. The Modernist is too ready to despise all forms of practical organization and public propaganda, and to believe in the silent power of thought. That was not the view of the Founder of Christianity in His training of the Twelve, nor of St. Paul, who regarded 'the foolishness of preaching' as a powerful means of salvation.

The *Modern Churchman* was founded to draw together into fellowship and conference those isolated and secret Modernists who, themselves driven by force of truth into Modernism, yet despaired of ever seeing their private convictions accepted by the Church. We know from the testimony of many letters that our magazine has inspired and helped these secret and lonely disciples. It has given them, as they have said, 'hope for the Church of England.' It has kept them within her membership, but surely not for themselves alone, but that they may help others.

*'Non nobis, Domine, non nobis,*
*Sed Nomini Tuo da gloriam,*
*Super misericordia tua et veritate tua.'* (*Psalm* cxv, 1.)

# IN MEMORIAM

## JAMES MAURICE WILSON.

ON the 15th of April, at the age of 94, Dr. J. M. Wilson, scientist and schoolmaster, preacher and pastor, theologian and antiquary, the intimate friend of Archbishop Temple, of Canterbury, and of Bishop John Percival, of Hereford, died, after a strenuous, many-sided life full of noble influence. Senior Wrangler in 1859, elected a Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, in 1860, he became the same year mathematical and science master at Rugby, and so continued until he succeeded Dr. Percival as Headmaster of Clifton in 1878.

Then in 1890, at the invitation of Bishop Moorhouse, he became Vicar of Rochdale and Archdeacon of Manchester, and finally, in 1905, by the appointment of Mr. A. J. Balfour, Canon of Worcester. In 1926 he retired from active work at the age of 89. Though varied, there was nothing desultory in his career: he stayed long enough in each post to do enduring and successful work in it: moreover, he only left one kind of work to take up another at the earnest solicitation of those whose judgment he trusted. In his old age he was offered the bishopric of his native island—for he was by birth a Manxman—but declined it. We could have wished that in his prime he had been made the Bishop of some great industrial and commercial centre, for in this age of transition he had the power of speaking on moral and spiritual issues to 'men's business and bosoms' in a degree that few of his contemporaries possessed. He was in profound and understanding sympathy with the deeper needs of the Church and Nation. He recognized the need for education, but education of the kind which also inspired as well as disciplined and enlightened: he recognized the need for a reconciliation between science and religion that each should contribute its peculiar treasure to the enrichment of the other: he recognized the need for social reform, but reform which, while it ameliorated and humanized the conditions of our poorer classes, deprived them neither of their self-respect nor moral worth: he recognized the

need for a growing comprehensiveness in the bounds of the National Church by which the great bodies of Protestant Nonconformists might welcome it as their warm friend and loyal ally, and might in the end find in it their true home : he recognized the need for a modern theology and made brave and notable efforts towards its formulation, particularly in the spheres of the doctrine of God and the Atonement : he recognized the need for reformed Church Services, which while retaining all that is true and beautiful in our present Prayer Book services, eliminated false and antiquated conceptions and teaching : yet while recognizing the need for all these essential reforms in our Church life, he was no iconoclastic or doctrinaire Church reformer. The Church's ancient institutions, which enshrine the story of her historic experience, he had no mind to change. What Churchmen needed in his judgment was to understand their significance. Ecclesiastical anomalies which fret small and logical clerical minds troubled him not at all, provided they did not hamper practical efficiency. In many cases it was apparent to his deep insight that they contributed to practical efficiency, where the logical doctrinaire schemes of the would-be ecclesiastical reformers would end by reducing the Church's influence for good on the Nation's life. Hence he was an ardent believer in the partnership of Church and State effected by the Establishment. His last public utterance on ecclesiastical affairs was his protest, published in this magazine, against the present movement to separate Church and State on the plea that while the Church is Christian, the State is unchristian. To his discerning eye the State as represented by Parliament was at least as Christian as the Church, if the test of Christianity be not pretensions and professions, but spirit and works. What manner of Churchman J. M. Wilson was is easily recognized. He was an understanding, reverent, Modernist. Like his predecessor, Percival, the founder of Clifton College, and his successor in the headmastership, M. G. Glazebrook, he was a warm supporter of the Modern Churchmen's Union, and on one occasion, when he feared financial difficulties might interfere with the continuance of our Modern Churchmen's Conferences (a fear happily unfounded), he sent on his own initiative (privately to the writer of this notice) a monetary contribution to its support.

Cambridge honoured him. He was Hulsean Lecturer in 1898, Lady Margaret Preacher 1899, Lecturer in Pastoral Theology 1902-3. Although not a prolific writer, he produced a number of volumes of a pleasantly diversified character. *Clifton College Sermons*, 1883; Second Series 1891; *Essays and Addresses*, 1887; *Contributions to the Religious Thought of our Times*, 1891; *Rochdale Sermons*, 1894; *The Gospel of the Atonement* (Hulsean Lectures), 1899; *Truths New and Old*, 1901; *St. Theresa*, 1912; *Cambridge Lectures on Pastoral Theology*, 1903; joint author, *Handbook of Double Stars*, 1879; *Memoirs of Archbishop Temple*, 1906; *Accounts of Priory of Worcester*, A.D. 1521-2, 1907; *Early Compotus Rolls*, A.D. 1278, etc., 1908; *Origins and Aims of the Four Gospels*, 1910; *Origin and Aim of Acts of the Apostles*, 1912; *Christ's Thought of God*, 1920; *Worcester Liber Albus*, 1920; *Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, 1925; *Affirmations*, 1925.

Some of our readers may think that because most of them were written some years age, Canon J. M. Wilson's books are out of date. This is far from being the case. There is a prophetic quality in his teaching, as well as a modernity of tone and a scientific lucidity of exposition—he had an expository gift equal to that of T. H. Huxley—which give them great educative value for modern men and women, who cannot embrace either superstition or secularism, and yet have neither the temperament nor training for the study of theological subtleties and ecclesiastical controversies. Theological inhibitions and ecclesiastical complexes had no place in his mental make-up. Every candidate for Holy Orders should read his *Cambridge Lectures on Pastoral Theology*. The lectures seek to disabuse the ordinand's mind of the conception of Church authority expounded by the Dean in Ibsen's *Brand*:

> It's all so easy: Faith you see
> Broad-based upon authority;
> Which being upon learning stayed,
> May be implicitly obeyed:
> While rule and ritual leave no doubt
> How faith ought to be acted out.

The volume is suffused with a sane and kindly optimism and

practical good sense. It makes the better type of University man, who has not seriously considered Holy Orders as a possibility for his life's work, realize what he may have missed.

There are two other books of his well worth reading. We place first his Hulseans on the Atonement. They form an interesting parallel to Rashdall's Bamptons on the same theme. They have none of Rashdall's great scholastic and patristic learning. They are based on the modern conception of the universe and the modern view of Holy Scripture: they speak with the assured conviction of one who does not argue, but explains. For him the doctrine of the Atonement was an extremely simple affair. He writes:—

> 'The doctrine of the Incarnation is replacing the doctrine of the Atonement. This is the great work of Bishop Westcott. We must understand what this means and implies. It implies that to the doctrine of the Incarnation, not to any theory of vicarious and equivalent sacrifice, and not to any transaction between the Persons of the Blessed Trinity; we are looking for an explanation of the process how Jesus Christ saves us from our sins and redeems all mankind.
>
> 'Let us say boldly that the Incarnation, that is, the life and death of the Christ—for the life and death were equally necessary—is the identification of the human and the divine Life. There is no other' (pp. 88-89).

All notions of expiatory sacrifice, of propitiating an angry God, of the saving of men from the punishment of sin rather than from sin itself are in Wilson's view as completely excluded from any true doctrine of the Atonement as they are in Rashdall's teaching, but what a difference in the method of approach and style of presentation!

The second volume of the two recommended is of more general interest. *Problems of Science and Religion* (republished in cheap form by Macmillans in 1906). The fifth paper, 'Evolution as a Reply to Materialism, Pessimism, and Agnosticism,' sets forth his Christian Faith as an evolutionist in a way that any plain man can comprehend. It concludes with this characteristic *dictum*:

> 'It is possible in a word to be the truest Christian, the best Churchman and the most thorough evolutionist. Only place yourself always on the side of the idealist. . . And believe no one who resolves life into its meanest elements and basest motives. Look for God everywhere, and you will see Him everywhere: and to see Him and to know Him is life eternal.'

The following passage from the last paragraph of the volume indicates what he valued in the English Church :

> 'This is one of the reasons why I am a Churchman, because there is room in our Church for all the many-sided aspects of truth : because it is historically continuous : because it does not exist only to deny something which others affirm too strongly, or affirm what they seem to deny, but rather to lead into and maintain all truth.'

This will only be so while the Church of England retains in an influential position in her ministry men of the mental, moral, and spiritual calibre of James Maurice Wilson. We cannot in the nature of things have many such great-minded, great-hearted personalities among our clergy, but we do need them in positions of leadership if the Church is to be delivered from that reactionary mediaevalism which looks to Rome for salvation or that vapid vulgarity which identifies truth with trumps and substitutes 'stunts' for sound pastoral work.

Dr. Wilson's theology is summed up in the following paragraphs :

> 'Here, then, is the work of the Church as I picture it. Having defined our position and got our machinery, let us use it to moralise all our great activities—our politics, our commerce, our industries, our philosophy, our science, our education, our press. How is it possible that such moralisation can be effected by anything short of an idealism which is at once very simple and insurpassably inspiring? The doctrine of the Incarnation, that is of the very life of God in man, manifested to our eyes in Jesus Christ, is the only philosophy of life which is open to all ranks and intelligible to everyone. It appeals to the common instinct of the simple and the scholar. It is a religion and it is a philosophy. Moreover, it is a law as well as a life. It commands obedience as well as gives confidence. It moralises whilst it inspires. It does more than moralise : it consecrates. It gives us, therefore, a new standard of Churchmanship. He is the best Churchman who most clearly manifests the Divine Life in his own life and thought, and radiates it on the world' (*Gospel of the Atonement*, p. 103 *f.*).

We venture to add a few characteristic sentences selected from his writings. They exhibit the Baconian type of mind in contrast to the Thomist, and may remind some of our readers of Professor Hort's reflections in the posthumous appendix to his Hulseans.

> 'The unverifiable is no explanation of anything, and terminates no discussion. The elaboration of this type of theology recalls the astronomy of the crystalline spheres and epicycles.'
>
> 'Since reason and righteousness are in man, there must be a rational and righteous reality, evolving Himself in us.'

'"Science converts faith into insight" (Fichte). I take this to mean that the scientific habit of mind, which reasons inductively, when applied, as it must be, to the study of human life and ethics, transforms the unanalytic trust in a providential ordering of the world into a reasoned and profound insight into the laws of God.'

'Certitude in the presence of ignorance makes devotees—but certitude in the presence of knowledge makes sceptics.'

'Another great and permanent influence of scientific training is, that it compels us to regard theology as progressive . . . It appears to me that it will infuse into its study quite a new life. We can tolerate any degree of incompleteness, social, ethical, scientific, theological, provided we recognize the present condition as the pathway, and the only pathway, to something better. But the thought of progressiveness makes theology alive.'

On the 5th March last in a public speech delivered on the occasion of the visit of the veterans of the 1851 Exhibition to the Persian Exhibition of 1931, standing, says his reporter, 'tall and erect,' he said :

'In 1851 we thought we were inaugurating an age of wealth, peace, comfort and prosperity. But there came the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny, the American Civil War to shake our faith, and after them the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War and the Great War to shatter our hopes of peace and prosperity. We have been much confronted by the news from India to-day and we shall not cease to hope for better things to come.

'But we are like a ship steering into a cyclone, hatches battened down and ports closed, and I am afraid the passengers will have to suffer discomfort for many years to come. We need to show the same pluck and courage as our sons showed in the war.

'In 1851, and for some years afterwards, science and religion were cocksure and aggressive. Now they have learned modesty. I have great hopes for the future. I look forward to death with great thankfulness for the past, great hopefulness for the future and with some regrets at the thought of passing away from this beautiful world.'

These words, like the sights, which Christian saw in the Interpreter's House, are such as to set us 'in hope and fear.' Cyclones, however, may be weathered, if we have men of the stamp of James Maurice Wilson on the bridge.

H.D.A.M.

# THE LIGHT THAT FAILED

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

TWENTY years ago—before the war—people were busy reading Bergson and William James. The most popular of their works were *Creative Evolution* and *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, though James' various expositions of his own peculiar philosophical outlook—known as 'Pragmatism'—were also seen lying about on study tables and even in ladies' drawing rooms. One could not claim to be an intellectual without some knowledge of these philosophers' writings. Their popularity was enhanced by the fact that both were masters of a brilliant literary style; and Bergson in particular never ceased to be readable even when, as occasionally was the case, he was incomprehensible. As for James, he made philosophy almost as interesting as sex became a dozen years later.

It goes without saying that both writers were well exploited by religious apologists. Indeed, James himself wrote works of a popular religious character, *e.g. The Will to Believe*. James, in particular, was the quarry from which the brilliant Catholic theologian George Tyrrell hewed a good deal of the material, which he used with such adroitness that his most completely pragmatic work, *Lex Orandi*, actually carries the *Imprimatur*. There is no doubt that all this literature was highly stimulating, though it never really captured the English mind. Perhaps it was a trifle too brilliant. Who can tell?

The point of it all was that intellect must take a back seat. Bergson told his delighted if puzzled readers that intuition could reveal all mysteries to us if it only knew how. Mysteries which intellect was helpless to tackle would be transparent to instinct. He repeated the advice of Solomon to go to the ant, to consider her ways and be wise. Earnest clergymen, troubled by doubts, began to study insect life. They perceived how the ant went about her business with a certainty and inevitability and lack of hesitation which are all too lacking in the behaviour of human beings. The ant has no doubts; the ant does not need to specu-

late; she *knows*. She is guided by an infallible instinct. She needs no Church to supply her with certainty; she has an internal secretion of that priceless commodity. One wondered whether vertebrate evolution had not been a mistake? Surely the ant, for all her drabness and humility, stood at the top of the evolutionary ladder.

Similarly, William James did his disintegrating work. He told his readers, not in so many words, but in phrases which the intelligent could understand, that truth was a chimaera—the last of the superstitions. The ultimate truth was that no truth was quite true—or rather, that no lie was quite false. If a lie worked, it was to be regarded as a species of truth (how convenient this was in the political and religious fields). Beliefs which had stood the test of life were so true that the difference, if there was one, was negligible. The mere fact that a belief had survived was sufficient indication that there was something in it. In the struggle for existence only robust truths can avoid being smothered.

That this gospel came from America, where only the fittest and most popular truths can possibly survive for more than a few days, gave it all the infallibility of a tremendous commonplace. People felt that James had got hold of the stick by the right end. The true is that which works—keeps the pot boiling, the world going round, and dividends on the up grade. This gospel was something that the practical man could understand. It erected the temple of Truth four-square upon the solid foundations of expediency and popular opinion.

With regard to *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, this brilliant work was epoch-making in the sense of being the forerunner of a perfect spate of literature upon the phenomena of the religious life. The writings of all the mystics from Erigena to Swedenborg were sedulously explored, and the results were to be found in every drawing room. Everyone was studying the travails and transports of the saints—at second hand. Even schoolgirls were well up in the *patois*. They knew all about the 'dark night of the soul,' 'the beatific vision,' and so on. The anguish and rapture of the mystic had been reduced to the level of middle-class comprehension.

Earnest young women attended lectures on the subject as much as their aunts, twenty years before, had heard addresses

on William Morris or the Italian Primitives. In those days, before the war, there was so little excitement in life, so little scope for emotional output. To imagine oneself a saint was sometimes a consolation. Moreover, at that time, the psychologists had not laid sacrilegious hands upon the most sacred places of the soul. James, it is true, was a psychologist; but he lacked Freud's abominable manners. But when the New Psychology had got going, it was hardly possible to confess to any emotions at all, religious or otherwise. All such emotions were now open to the most obscene interpretations. The saints were all perverts or imbeciles. Such was the Nemesis which awaited the pre-war interest in the varieties of religious experience.

Indeed, Freud may be said to have put the necessary finishing touch to the view, introduced by Bergson and James, that man was not a rational animal. And when people became alive to the new but far less edifying lengths to which the anti-rational movement was going, they felt that they had been badly let down. Instead of giving us a new apologetic, the Bergsonians and pragmatists had only opened the flood gates to a much more devastating kind of criticism. The old rationalists had chastised the believer with whips, but the new psychologists would chastise him with scorpions. The little finger of Freud was thicker than T. H. Huxley's loins.

However, there was little time for searchings of heart, for the war came, and the public had little time for speculative problems, while the philosophers themselves were soon busy with the necessary business of propaganda. Pragmatic theories of truth experienced a temporary resurrection. Those truths and those alone were suffered to be true which reinforced the will to victory, and our too meagre human stock of veracity was seriously diminished. The war certainly seemed to have established the Freudian view that man is a non-rational animal. It was suddenly revealed that if you scratch the civilised European, you find the primitive savage.

It cannot, at any rate, be denied that one of the results of the war was a general lowering of intellectual standards—not least in religious and quasi-religious circles. For one thing, there was the sudden revival of occultism and spiritualism, which lasted for several years. And it was some time before scholarship be-

came once more international, so that it was possible to recognize a truth coming from the wrong side of the Rhine.

And it is not at all uninteresting that it was from the wrong side of the Rhine that certain new formative influences, of a characteristically non-rational character, were now to emerge, thus replacing Bergson and James by something rather different, but yet displaying a similar tendency.

The first exponent of the new movement—or new form of an old movement—was Professor Otto with his theory of the 'numinous' in religion. He held that the basic religious emotion is a 'numinous' feeling aroused by the *Mysterium tremendum*, which is God. The specific religious feeling is one of awe, and can be aroused by anything which seems to surpass our comprehension. It is the feeling aroused in the breast of the trembling savage as he moves through the sinister jungle full of hidden menace, swarming with malignant spirits ready to pounce upon him and suck his blood. The divine is this inscrutable, sinister, possibly hostile, presence, such as Thomas Hardy depicts as incarnate in the gloom of Egdon Heath. This it is that man worships, because this it is that gives him that 'numinous' feeling which *is* religion. Professor Alexander even likens this 'religious' feeling to that which is experienced by persons who are susceptible to certain changes in the weather or the presence of electrical disturbances in the atmosphere. It is a quasi-physical sensation; you feel it in your bones—in your marrow. It is Abraham's 'horror of great darkness,' the terror of the inscrutable. The sort of feeling that overwhelmed Pascal when he thought of the nightmare immensities of stellar space.

But this inscrutable 'something' was not only terrible, but somehow attractive, like the edge of a precipice. The *mysterium* was not only *tremendum*, but *fascinans*. It had something of the quality of the snake—of the boa constrictor—about it, and appealed irresistibly to the masochistic instincts which lurk deep in every human soul. Men felt an obscure but exquisite delight in torturing themselves—and torturing others—in honour of this monstrous and brooding spirit. The dark power could be propitiated by blood. Cries of pain and despair were infinitely sweet to him. He gloated over the writhing victim.

To be sure, Otto as an apologist for religion, presented his

new theories in a guise somewhat more attractive than the above. But the point of his gospel was that the object of religion was dark and inscrutable—and what is inscrutable may as easily be a devil as a god. But in their anxiety to escape from the cold touch of reason refugees from scepticism rarely look where they are going, and do not recognize that no religion is infinitely better than a bad religion.

What might be termed the 'Ottoesque' standpoint soon made itself felt in literature, especially in the case of writers popular amongst exclusive intellectuals. It became almost a fashion amongst such authors to travel to Mexican deserts, or to Central African or South American jungles to seek for inspiration, and to hold communion at first hand with the dark numinous forces of Nature.

In general, however, such writers were less interested in apologetics than Professor Otto. They saw more clearly whither the new doctrines led, and frankly professed themselves pagans. Mr. Aldous Huxley, in a recent article, perhaps not too seriously, has proclaimed the moon a god (or was it a goddess?) because it caused in him a 'numinous' feeling. The late Mr. D. H. Lawrence, that eccentric genius, was never tired of writing of the 'dark' forces, so full of vitality, as contrasted with the 'white,' abstract, intellectual, starved, half-life of Christianity. Sailing from Sicily to Sardinia, he looked back, full of a strange and inexplicable emotion, at Mount Eryx:

> 'Why in the name of heaven should my heart stand still as I watch that hill which rises above the sea? To men it must have had a magic almost greater than Etna's. Watching Africa! Africa the dreaded. And the great watch temple of the summit, world-sacred, world-mystic in the world that was. Venus of the aborigines, older than Greek Aphrodite. Venus of the aborigines, the world-mystery, the smiling Astarte. This, one of the world centres, older than old! and the woman Goddess watching Africa! *Erycina ridens.*
>
> 'I confess my heart stood still. But is mere historical fact so strong, that what one learns in bits from books can move one so? Or does the very word call an echo out of the dark blood? It seems so to me. It seems to me from the darkest recesses of my blood comes a terrible echo at the name of Mount Eryx: something quite unaccountable. At Eryx—my darkness quivers.'

*Mysterium, tremendum et fascinans!* That numinous mountain brooded over the sea, and caused in the soul of the twentieth century novelist and poet a strange unaccountable tremor. The

dark forces of the remote past seemed to stream forth upon him from that Sicilian hill—holy and haunted. He trembled under the access of a religious spasm. One sympathises with Lawrence. For him, as for Otto, the holy was something dark, strange, alien. A terrible 'otherness' was the primary characteristic of the divine—of the numinous.

Thus, as interpreted by the modern intellectual. Otto does not contribute a great deal to our edification or delectation or consolation. The *mysterium tremendum* only gives one the creeps, and makes one feel that the power or powers behind Nature are not such as one can worship very comfortably.

But if the speculations of Professor Otto have thus given birth to an Esau, they have produced a Jacob also in the shape of a Swiss country parson (not a Savoyard Vicar this time!) who subsequently became Professor at the University of Munster in Westphalia. A number of the utterances of Dr. Karl Barth have been collected in a volume which has been translated by the Rev. Douglas Horton, of Leyden Church, Brookline, Massachusetts. The new prophet is credited with having 'saved' Protestantism in Germany, and his admirers have even characterized him as the greatest religious thinker since Schleiermacher.

Without, perhaps, going so far as this, the reader who looks through these stimulating utterances will find in them evidence of a vigorous personality of considerable rhetorical power, and of a mind, if not of the first order, yet generously inspired with ideals. The careful and intelligent student will be able without much difficulty to isolate from this earnest and sincere blend of rhetoric and religion the essential contribution of Barth—*i.e.* the 'otherness' of God. An example will serve to illustrate what I mean:

> 'It will then be, above all, a matter of our recognising God once more as God . . . His will is not a corrected continuation of our own. It approaches ours as a Wholly Other. There is nothing for our will except a basic re-creation. Not a reformation but a re-creation and growth. For the will to which the conscience points is purity, goodness, truth, and brotherhood as the perfect will of God. It is a will which knows no subterfuges, reservations, nor preliminary compromises. It is a will with character, a will blessed and holy through and through. It is the righteousness of God. In its presence the first need is for humility. Have we enough humility? . . .

> 'And then a second consideration: in place of despair a childlike joyfulness will come; a joy that God is so much greater than we thought. Joy that is righteousness has far more depth and meaning than we had allowed ourselves to dream . . .'

In the first place God is *God, i.e.* He is 'different.' His will is not 'a continuation of our own.' On the contrary, it is 'other' than ours. In its presence the first need is for 'humility,' *i.e.* the negation of ourselves—the obliteration of the human as against the divine. In short, divine and human are opposites, separated by a gulf. The divine is remote; righteous, it is true, but 'righteous' with a righteousness which is not ours. Not human, that is, but inhuman. Behind Barth's symphony is the Ottoesque melody, sometimes hidden, sometimes obtruding itself—*Mysterium tremendum et fascinans.* The hidden dark God, covered by clouds. The high and holy one. True, the too naïve Barth gives to 'holy' a super-ethical interpretation. But all the same the holiness of Barth's God is not a human holiness; and herein his God resembles Otto's.

Now the question is whether the real service done to humanity by the Christian religion was not that it once for all swept these 'dark' gods of fear and fascination into the limbo of discredited superstitions? And so successfully was the work done that we do not realize the horrible implications of belief in those banished gods—the cruelty, the obscenity, the superstition. Aldous Huxley and D. H. Lawrence are far clearer thinkers than the pious and eloquent German pastor. They have abandoned belief in the 'white' God, the rational, human, incarnate God of Christianity. But they are well aware what is the alternative, and embrace it with a perverse eagerness.

Yet we must, perhaps, not take Barth too seriously. He is a symptom of a reaction caused by despair and disillusion. The Germans have had an exceedingly bad time; they have looked into the abyss, and as Nietzsche said, when you look into the abyss, the abyss looks into you. The dark god dwells there—a *mysterium tremendum et fascinans.* In the fear and horror caused both by the evils he has escaped and by those he has endured, the European is tempted to throw away his precious religious tradition of a human 'white' God of reason, of light, of sanity. He will desert Plato and Christ and will return to the

dark malaria-haunted misty places where his remote ancestors dwelt in perpetual fear, in the presence of a sinister unknown, whose 'otherness' daunted them.

We do not realize what Christianity has saved us from—that 'white' religion of reason, with its contempt for 'dark' gods—for superstition, for cruelty, and for the obscenity which accompanies them. We are too ready to sell our birthright to this new anti-rational vogue, which is a sign of mental and spiritual decadence. We have little to learn from these Ottoesque and Barthian fantasies.

And if we continue to believe in a human God of reason, we shall not seek to call in as props to our belief any such irrationalisms, whether of Bergson, or James, or their modern successors. We shall make a clean sweep of this biological thinking in terms of 'unconscious purpose,' 'instinct,' and so on. The biologist, the psychologist, and above all the anthropologist are too much with us. Scraping among the kitchen-middens of origins, these *savants* ask too much from us. They wish us to abandon our status as rational beings and once again to become trembling savages. Gently but firmly we must refuse to grovel before their *mysterium tremendum*—it is a bogey-man.

One would suppose, to read some of our modern theological *sansculottes*, that the light of reason had failed. No doubt in their case it has done so. As for ourselves, we shall attempt to keep the candle of the Lord from guttering out, or being blown out by the rabble of Bergsonians and Barthians. If this candle does indeed go out, then our number is up. Another civilization will have perished. The dark god will have won once more.

# IN DEFENCE OF SHAKESPEARE

## A REPLY TO SIR EDMUND CHAMBERS.

By Edgar I. Fripp, William Noble Fellow in English Literature in the University of Liverpool. Life Trustee of Shakespeare's Birthplace.

(Article I.)

SIR EDMUND CHAMBERS has recently published, in two large volumes of more or less close print (pp. xviii + 576 and xvi + 448), his crowning work, *William Shakespeare : A Study of Facts and Problems*.[1] The author, as we all know, is a masterly collector of facts and a keen controversialist of problems, and had he confined himself to these matters in this book he would have contributed, as in his monumental *Elizabethan Stage*, an invaluable array of material for the use of scholars, and a challenging criticism on many of the questions that at present engage them; and they would have rejoiced universally. But the gifted gatherer and sifter of records, and a champion on questions of text, is not necessarily an authority in art or biography; and Sir Edmund's pronouncements from time to time on the Poet's skill or lack of it, and his mental and moral force or feebleness, do not impress me as of great value; whereas the first three chapters of Volume I, giving a summary of Shakespeare's career and an estimate of his intellectual and ethical character, strike me as not merely unworthy of the rest of the book, but as misleading and even mischievous. From facts however disconcerting, and from erudition however challenging, only good can come; but lack of insight and interpretation, lack of humour, lack of art, may lead the unwary into the wilderness.

I will make my way from the facts, for which I am grateful (leaving for the moment the controversies in which I am only more or less interested), back to those three opening chapters (perhaps, as I gather from numerous allusions to myself, the latest written) which I condemn. Nor will I apologize for my

[1] Clarendon Press, Oxford, 42/- net. Announced by the Press as 'the most important book on Shakespeare written for half a century.'

condemnation. The book is far too important, too valuable for a welcome (especially before there has been time for reading and digestion) of mere laudatory generalities.

I begin, then, with Volume II, with three indispensable chapters, in which Sir Edmund is at his best, collecting, analysing, correcting, marshalling historical material, namely, 'Contemporary Allusions' (186-237), 'The Shakespeare Mythos' (238-302) and 'Performances of Plays' (303-353). The last is a revised record, made with very great care, of performances in which Shakespeare or his fellows, in any company wherewith he was or may have been connected, took part at Court, in London or in the provinces. Without this record, for which hitherto we have had to depend chiefly on the labours of J. Tucker Murray,[2] it is impossible to follow the movements and triumphs of the great actor-dramatist. 'The Shakespeare Mythos' is invaluable in another way. By its means we can trace, as never before, the rise and growth of legends which gathered about the name of Shakespeare and dishonoured it after his death. Few public men suffered less in their lifetime from 'The Blatant Beast,'[3] to employ Spenser's powerful name for Scandal. Until the latter half of the seventeenth century its 'poisonous spittle'[4] almost entirely spared his honoured and genial personality. But the Restoration would have no hero that was not a rake, and eighteenth century criticism preferred fault-finding to praise. I will note the chief stories, and then contrast them in their worthlessness with the high testimony to Shakespeare's character in 'Contemporary Allusions.' They tell of an addiction to strong drink, of a disreputable departure from Stratford and out-of-heel introduction to the London theatre, and of immoral intercourse with women.

The earliest tale of Shakespeare's 'hard drinking' appears more than forty years after his decease, in John Ward's anecdote (c. 1662): 'Shakespeare, Drayton and Ben Jonson had a merry meeting and, it seems, drank too hard; for Shakespeare died of a fever there contracted.' Sir Edmund Chambers says: 'There is no reason to reject this report.' I think there are good

[2] *English Dramatic Companies*, 1557—1642: a valuable work very far from superseded.

[3] *The Faerie Queene*, vi, 12.

[4] 'Spitting forth the poyson of his spight' (st. 29).

reasons for rejecting it—at least for rejecting the evil interpretation of the festivity. Ward himself is not *sure*—he says 'it seems.' He confesses, moreover, his ignorance of Shakespeare: 'Remember to peruse Shakespeare's plays and be versed in them,' not for the pleasure of reading them (in the Folio of 1623 or 1632), but 'that I may not be ignorant in that matter,' *i.e.* among his parishioners of Stratford and visitors to Stratford eager to hear of the Poet. Ben Jonson's presence in Stratford in 1616 is most unlikely; and that of Michael Drayton, if it were a fact, would be evidence of the respectability of the 'merry meeting,'[5] which almost certainly was the wedding[6] of Judith Shakespeare and Thomas Quyney on 10 February of this year. That Shakespeare died some two months later is well established, but that his illness, whatever it was (more likely the result of polluted water than too much wine), was the outcome of dissipation at his daughter's wedding, among leading neighbours at New Place, is so incredible, so unlike his reputation for 'courtesy' and 'good breeding,' that we demand extra strong evidence in its support. On the contrary, we hear nothing in confirmation for a century, and then a story even less convincing than Ward's. A visitor to Stratford in 1762 was conducted, he tells us, by his host, the 'cheerful landlord' of the 'White Lion,' to a crabtree at Bidford, known as 'Shakespeare's Canopy' in consequence of the Poet having there slept off the effects of a 'deep' drinking with the village 'sippers.' Weakest of all is the evidence 'about 1780' of John Jordan the fabricator (included by Chambers in his chapter 'Shakespeare Fabrications,' 377-393). He adorns the tale of the crabtree with various particulars, and enforces it with the assurance that 'our Poet was extremely fond of drinking hearty draughts of English ale, and gloried in being thought a person of superior eminence in that profession.'

The story of the deer-stealing and disreputable flight (hardly an '*Hegira*') from Stratford makes its first appearance more than a hundred years after the supposed event, and not in Stratford. In 1693 gossip in Stratford, in the mouth of the sexton,

[5] Fuller says of Drayton: 'He was a pious poet, his conscience having always the command of his fancy, very temperate in his life, slow of speech and inoffensive in company.'

[6] *Much Ado*, v, i, 335.

was of a butcher's apprentice who ran away from his master. But Richard Davies, rector from 1695 to 1708 of Sapperton in Gloucestershire (about 40 miles S.W. of Stratford[7]), was guilty of *memoranda* (not unworthy of a divine described by Anthony Wood in 1692 as 'looking red and jolly as if he had been at a fish-dinner at Corpus Christi College and afterwards drinking, as he had been') to the effect that Shakespeare 'was much given to all unluckiness in stealing venison and rabbits, particularly from Sir —— Lucy, who had him oft whipt and sometimes imprisoned, and at last made him fly his native country, to his great advancement; but his revenge was so great that he is his Justice Clodpate, and calls him a great man, and that in allusion to his name—[he] bore three louses rampant for his arms.' For this surprising information, after so many days, wherein the informant betrays his ignorance of Lucy's Christian name and non-possession of a deer-park, and of the law respecting poachers (who could not be whipt nor imprisoned), and of the name of Justice Shallow, and wags an uncurbed tongue (as in '*much* given,' '*all* unluckiness,' 'stealing venison and rabbits *particularly* from Lucy,' and therefore from others besides, '*oft* whipt,' '*times* imprisoned,' as in a further irresponsible statement that Shakespeare 'died a papist'), we need not go beyond the college dining-hall and Falstaff's abuse of Shallow (as Oldys recognized in 1773) in the first scene of *The Merry Wives of Windsor*. Davies probably was not the first (as certainly he has not been the last) to identify the mentality of Shakespeare with that of Falstaff.

The story, however, caught on. Rowe in 1709 tells, apologetically, of the young Shakespeare's 'extravagance' and 'misfortune,' his family being 'of good figure and fashion' and 'mentioned as gentlemen,' in falling 'into ill company,' who engaged him with them more 'than once in robbing a park that belonged to Sir Thomas Lucy' (as it certainly did not). He speaks also of 'a ballad,' since 'lost,' 'the first essay of (Shakespeare's) poetry,' 'so very bitter that it redoubled the prosecution against him to the degree that he was obliged to leave his business and family in Warwickshire for some time and shelter himself in London.' Evidently Rowe had not heard that he

[7] Between Cirencester and Stroud.

'left his family' for a long time. In due course a 'ballad' turns up, a 'misfortune' indeed to a young poet of such good breeding that in after life, as Rowe reports, 'every one who had a true taste of merit and could distinguish men had generally a just value and esteem for him.' It is found in a manuscript of 1727-1730 ('full of forgeries and falsehoods,' Malone declares), as sung by an old woman in Stratford in the hearing of Joshua Barnes, a professor of Greek at Cambridge, 'about 40 years since'; to whom the professor, for the two stanzas she could remember, presented, 'such was his respect for Master Shakespeare's genius,' a new gown. He must have had a poor opinion of the young poet's abilities and good breeding if he thought him capable of the following:

'Sir Thomas was too covetous
To covet so much deer,
When horns upon his head
Most plainly did appear.
Had not his worship one deer left?
What then, he took a wife
Took pains enough to find him horns
Should last him during life.'

The abuse is as pointless as it is vulgar. Sir Thomas and Lady Lucy, as it happens, had a reputation for matrimonial happiness. Any visitor to their tomb at Charlecote might know that if young Shakespeare wrote these lines he singularly lacked intelligence as well as good manners.

Hence perhaps the disappearance of the 'ballad' a second time, and reappearance about 1750 in a new form, as 'remembered' by 'a very aged gentleman,' Master Thomas Jones of Tardebigge[8] (18 miles from Stratford), who 'died fifty years since.' It now begins:

'A Parliament Member, a Justice of Peace,
At home a poor scarecrow, at London an ass:
If lousy is Lucy, as some volk miscall it,
Then Lucy is lousy whatever befall it.'

Lucy's contemporaries, acquainted with his services as a magistrate, a member of Parliament, a frequent commissioner for the Privy Council, and a recipient of the Council's special thanks for his services, would have treated such vilification with contempt. But he was forgotten, as was Shakespeare, before 1700,

[8] So Capell in 1780, who adds that he died in 1703, aged upwards of 90.

and the object of vituperation (he was a Puritan), as Shakespeare of dissolute suggestion, at the hands of clownish and townish wits. Fabricator Jordan eventually added to the Jones 'ballad' six stanzas, which he declared he discovered in 1790 'in a chest of drawers,' said to have come from Shottery, and discovered again, apparently the same month, 'amidst some deeds given to a tailor' for 'measure strips.' This is not the end of the Poaching Legend, but probably we have had enough of it. The curious thing is that Sir Edmund Chambers does 'not think, so far as the essential feature is concerned, we are called upon to reject it.' It suits his assumption of the Poet's feeble morality.

Of the arrival in London, Aubrey says (1681): 'This William being inclined naturally to poetry and acting came to London, I guess about 18, and was an actor at one of the play-houses, and did act exceedingly well.' Davies merely says he fled 'his native country to his great advancement.' Dowdall heard (1693) that he 'was received *into the playhouse* as a serviture.' Rowe says (1709) that 'he was received *into the company*, at first in a very mean rank.' Rowe apparently heard but did not believe a story, attributed to Sir William Davenant, that when Shakespeare first came to the playhouse he 'was not admitted to act' but was employed 'with several other poor boys' to hold the horses of gentlemen who came to the play. But by 1750 the tale had established itself, with the addition that such was Shakespeare's 'dexterity and care he soon got a good deal of business in this way,' and organized a company of boys to assist him, who 'recommended themselves by saying they were Shakespeare's boys.' It is well to hear of Shakespeare's 'dexterity and care,' however misdirected. He was not therefore, though young, altogether fool.

Sir Edmund Chambers is emphatic about Shakespeare's departure from Stratford and 'transference' to London, but he does not accept the 'direct' migration implied in the legends.[9] He postpones it, indeed, to 1591, when, surely, the Poet's age (26 or 27 years) would be inconsistent with the youthful recklessness and ill-breeding in the legends.[10]

The grosser mythos of Shakespeare's adulteries begins (save for an anecdote to be noted later[11]) with the disreputable boast

[9] i. 60. [10] i. 59. [11] Page 33 *n*.

of Sir William Davenant that he was more than the Poet's godson. Davenant was born in 1606 at Oxford, son of John Davenant, vintner of the Crown Tavern, and no doubt had Shakespeare for his godfather. The vintner, Aubrey tells us in 1681, was 'a very grave and discreet citizen,' and his wife 'a very beautiful woman of a very good wit and of conversation extremely agreeable. . . Master William Shakespeare was wont to go into Warwickshire once a year, and did commonly in his journey lie at their house, where he was exceedingly respected. I have heard parson Robert' (William's elder brother, born in 1603, scholar of St. John's College after Shakespeare's death, and chaplain to his kinsman, the Bishop of Salisbury, from 1621 to 1641, a D.D. in 1660 and, after the Restoration, Prebendary of Sarum) 'say that Master W. Shakespeare here gave him a hundred kisses.' William Davenant was knighted for service to King Charles I in 1643, became the dissolute Poet Laureate of the Restoration, and died in 1668. 'Now Sir William,' Aubrey tells us, 'would sometimes, when he was pleasant over a glass of wine with his most intimate friends, *e.g.* Sam. Butler (author of *Hudibras*) and others, say it seemed to him that he writ with the very spirit that Shakespeare [did], and seemed contented enough to be thought his son,' whereby 'his mother had a very light report.' Wood, for whom Aubrey collected his notes, omits (1692) this last remark. Evidently he had no belief in the scandal. Nor could anyone who knew the family, and the devotion of husband and wife, which at their deaths, within a few days of each other in April 1622 (she was buried on the 5th, he on the 23rd), was celebrated in verse, by one of several eulogists, thus :

> 'A contented life,
> A happy issue of a virtuous wife,
> The choice of friends, a quiet honoured grave,
> All these he had; what more could Davenant have?'

In his will the afflicted husband desired to be buried 'as near my wife as the place will give leave where she lieth.'

The 'poisonous spittle,' however, was sweet in certain circles in London (among Pope's friends *c.* 1730) and Oxford (earlier). In the latter city it was seasoned with a stale joke about 'son' and 'godson.' 'Master Shakespeare,' says Hearne (1709), 'was William Davenant's godfather, and gave him his name. One

day going from school a grave doctor in divinity met him and asked him, Child, whither art thou going in such haste? To which he replied, O Sir, my godfather is come to town, and I am going to ask his blessing. To which the doctor said, Hold, child, you must not take the name of God in vain.' Ancient gentlemen, who died 'forty,' fifty,' and, as in this case, upwards perhaps of eighty or even ninety years ago, are convenient pegs on which to hang current scandal.

A similar story, not included in 'The Shakespeare Mythos,' belongs to the year 1728. It is told by Theobald in the preface to a play, *Double Falsehood*, which he claimed to be Shakespeare's, restored by himself. 'There is a tradition,' he says, 'which I have from the noble person who supplied me with one of my copies, that it was given by our author (Shakespeare) as a present of value to a natural daughter of his, for whose sake he wrote it in the time of his retirement from the stage'—about one hundred and fifteen years since. Had the play been good enough, it might have carried the story; but it was so poor that the falsehood never achieved the height of legend.

Another tale not included in 'The Shakespeare Mythos,' of modern origin, must be noted, which, unlike Theobald's, certainly 'caught on,' and in a great variety of shapes, often contradictory, has acquired legendary fame, becoming in many minds almost an obsession. One day (I am not sure when) a critic (I am not sure who) discovered 'The Dark Lady.' He found her in the Poet's own writings, an unmistakable and avowed object in the *Sonnets* of his licentiousness. How could scholars have overlooked her? Does not Shakespeare deliberately say to his youthful friend (S. 42)?—

> 'That thou hast her, it is not all my grief,
> And yet it may be said I loved her dearly;
> That she hath thee, is of my wailing chief,
> A loss in love that touches me more nearly.
> Loving offenders, thus I will excuse ye:
> Thou dost love her, because thou knowst I love her,
> And for my sake even so doth she abuse me,
> Suffering my friend for my sake to approve her.
> If I lose thee, my loss is my love's gain,
> And losing her, my friend hath found that loss;
> Both find each other and I lose both twain,
> And both for my sake lay on me this cross;
> But here's the joy: my friend and I are one;
> Sweet flattery then! *She loves but me alone.*'

And is not this cynically carnal utterance part of a fuller confession (Sonnets 41 *f.* and 35, and some two dozen unblushing effusions in the last group, 127 - 154[12]) which can leave no doubt of conjugal infidelity and dissoluteness? Convinced of the Poet's love for this 'dark beauty,' Sir Edmund Chambers may be excused for detecting 'love affairs' elsewhere, for thinking there may have been some 'ground,'[13] after all, for the Davenant scandal, and declaring that there is no 'great improbability in Shakespeare's having a natural daughter' . . . 'the poor girl.'[14]

But is not sonnetry a rather unreliable source of information? Was it not in use in the days of Petrarch and Dante, and before them, for compliment, courtly and even religious? And subsequently for protestation that was not religious, nor courtly always, and sometimes fleshly and ribald? A trail of autobiography, more or less faint, was necessary to give it point, but very obviously the youthful sonneter of Shakespeare's day felt free to make what protestation he would without fear of being taken too seriously. Of Sidney's sequence of sonnets, *Astrophel and Stella*, one of the least frivolous of the time, addressed to a married lady, his friend Penelope Devereux Lady Rich, and published surreptitiously in 1591, Nashe wrote in the preface to the reader: 'Here you shall find a paper stage strewed with pearl, an artificial heaven to overshadow the fair frame, and crystal walls to encounter your curious eyes, whiles the tragicomedy of love is performed by starlight.' Such language is suitable for Shakespeare's sonnets, written I believe in 1590-1593, and published surreptitiously in 1609. We find in them 'a paper stage strewed with pearl,' some lustreless; 'a tragicomedy' 'performed by starlight,' in some cases, very properly, in darkness. 'The Dark Lady' has not been identified, nor will be, for the simple reason that she is made-up of the contradictory qualities of half a dozen 'ladies'—of the Court, the Tavern, the Brothel, and the Kitchen. The sonnets of the last

[12] The Sonnets consist of two sequences, 1—26 (Twenty-five Sonnets and an Envoy), 27—126 (A Century of Sonnets), both addressed to the young Earl of Southampton, and a miscellany, 127—154, mostly addressed to Mistresses.

[13] i. 573.

[14] i. 541 *f.* Sir Edmund is tender-hearted.

group give us 'black mistresses' (black in tresses or morals[15]) as varied as follows: a gentlewoman ('my Music,' 'sweet fingers,' 'lips to kiss,' 'gentle cheater'[16]) and a sluttish trull ('foul face,' 'false plague,' 'nor *taste* nor *smell* desire to be invited to any sensual feast with thee alone,' 'where all men ride'[17]); beautiful ('fair,' 'thy fingers walk with gentle gait,' 'pretty looks,' 'glancing eye,' 'every tongue says Beauty should look so'[18]) and forbidding ('mine eyes in thee a thousand errors note,' 'eyes well-seeing thy foul faults find,' 'thy face hath not the power to make love groan'[19]); hard ('tyrannous,' 'disdain,' 'cruel,' 'pity-wanting,' 'hate on'[20]) and pitiful ('lips that Love's own hand did make,' straight in her heart did mercy come and saved my life'[21]). Which of these is Sir Edmund's 'dark beauty,' the 'faithless, stolen mistress of the Poet' in Sonnet 42? Hardly the slut of unsavoury lips and malodorous breath, the 'false plague' with a 'foul face.' Is she 'The Dark Lady' of the sentimentalists? For her, I think, a more appropriate term of endearment would be 'The Black Bitch.'

To return to that offending Sonnet 42, with its anticlimax, 'She loves but me alone.' Could anything be more unreal? Does not the ingenuity give it away? the ridiculous 'excusing'? the play on words (which are Biblical and so queerly, unconsciously out of place: 'love,' 'cross,' 'lose,' 'find'[22])? the 'wailing' without a touch of passion in it? It is precisely the kind of poetic exercise ('theme,' it was called) a clever young member of the Inns of Court might aspire to write for the edification of his fellows, if beyond his power in verse and sense of dramatic situation.

Suspicion has detected 'an unsuccessful love-affair'[23] in Henry Willobie's whimsical allusion to Shakespeare in *Avisa*. He says: 'H.W. being suddenly infected with the contagion of a fantastical fit at the first sight of Avisa, pineth a while in secret

[15] If not in features. There was a notorious 'Lucy Negro' (as Dr. G. B. Harrison pointed out to me), head of a sisterhood of ill-fame, in Clerkenwell against whom Gray's Inn men were warned in 1594. See *Gesta Grayorum*. She is perhaps 'the Moor' in what looks like a bit of Kemp's gag in 'The Merchant of Venice,' iii, 5, 40–7.

[16] SS. 128, 151.
[17] 137, 141.
[18] 127 *f.* 139.
[19] 131, 141, 148.
[20] 131, 132, 140.
[21] 145.
[22] Matthew x, 38 *f.*
[23] i. 62.

grief; at length, not able any longer to endure the burning heat of so fervent a humour, bewrayeth the secrecy of his disease unto his familiar friend, W.S., who not long before had tried the courtesy of the like passion, and was now newly recovered of the like infection; yet finding his friend let blood in the same vein, he took pleasure for a time to see him bleed, and instead of stopping the issue he enlargeth the wound with the sharp razor of a willing conceit, persuading him that he thought it a matter very easy to be compassed and no doubt with pain, diligence and some cost in time to be obtained.' Surely Shakespeare's 'infection' was like Willobie's, literary and dramatic, not autobiographical. There is allusion, I do not doubt, to his saucy poem (on the metre of which that of *Avisa* is constructed) in imitation of Ovid's *Ars Amatoria* in 'The Passionate Pilgrim' (xix). Young Willobie was one of the, presumably, not a few Oxford scholars who admired and met Shakespeare on his visits in and before 1594 to the University city. He was probably encouraged in the writing of his earnest poem (far too earnest, it seems, for certain dissolute wooers of the heroine glanced-at in the neighbourhood of her home at Sherborne) by his 'familiar friend.'

Finally, if there is finality in scandal, there is the legend of the 'Second Best Bed.' Shakespeare left his wife 'my second best bed with the furniture.' The bequest has been interpreted by the suspicious, unacquainted with Old English domestic life, as a studied insult to poor Anne. Beds, often handsome carved four-posters, with woven hangings and bedding on an elaborate and costly scale, were fixtures, 'standers' or standards, in lesser houses than *New Place* and certainly there, and heirlooms from generation to generation. Farmhouses boasted of such 'best' and 'second-best' possessions. William Bracey of Snitterfield in 1557 left his household stuff to his wife Margery save 'the second best bed,' which he bequeathed with three pairs of sheets to his son John. William Palmer of Lemington, near Moreton-in-Marsh, in 1573 left[24] to Elizabeth his wife 'my second best featherbed for herself furnished and one other meaner featherbed furnished for her maid.' 'Featherbed' here apparently

[24] In his will, recently brought to light by F. C. Wellstood: P.C.C. 38, Peter.

means a bedstead with bedding of feather rather than straw or chaff. Thomas Combe of the College, Stretford, in 1608 left to his 'well beloved wife' all the bedsteads and other 'standards,' except the 'best bedstead,' which he bequeathed to his eldest son.

Sir Edmund, it is good to know, rejects the idea of 'a deliberate slight' as 'absurd'; and we wish we could believe with him that Mistress Shakespeare's bed came from her home at Shottery. But the two joined bedsteads in her father's 'parlour' were left as standers during the lives of his widow and his sons, Bartholomew and John. Bartholomew died in 1624, and his will and inventory show three or four such bedsteads at Hewlands. If Shakespeare's 'second-best bed' was that he had shared with his wife, as distinguished from the 'best' in the guest-chamber, the bequest was a mark of affection. It would ensure her the old room when the Halls (the heirs) took possession.

It is a pleasure to turn at last to Shakespeare's contemporaries. Save for the smutty interpretation in the student-mind of an otherwise delightful anecdote,[25] their verdict was unanimous. From 'the incomparable Mr. Edmond Spencer,' as Rowe calls him,[26] to Milton there is only admiration. Spenser was at Court with Raleigh in the Christmas season 1590-1 when Strange's Men, with surely Shakespeare among them, played twice before the Queen, and he wrote enthusiastically of a young poet ('last but not least') as 'Aetion,' the Eaglet, whose 'eye can behold the Sun'[27]:

[25] '13 March, 160½. Upon a time when Burbadge played *Richard III* there was a citizen['s wife] grew so far in liking with him that before she went from the play she appointed him to come that night unto her by the name of Richard III. Shakespeare, overhearing their conclusion, went before, was entertained and at his game ere Burbadge came. Then, message being brought that Richard III was at the door, Shakespeare caused return to be made that William the Conqueror was before Richard III. Shakespeare's name William (Master Curle).' Edward Curle was a fellow student of the writer at the Middle Temple, the writer being John Manningham. The lady would probably give a different and not less humorous version of her invitation and supper-party. There is no evidence that these young men knew the Poet personally.

[26] Though Rowe mistook the reference to Shakespeare to be 'our pleasant Willy' in *The Tears of the Muses*.

[27] *The Faerie Queene*, i, x, 47.

> 'A gentler shepherd may nowhere be found,
> Whose muse, full of high thoughts' invention,
> Doth like himself heroically sound.' [28]

Shakespeare's Muse had sounded like his name 'heroically' in the Talbot and Temple Garden scenes of *I Henry VI*, and there, and in the man himself, Spenser probably recognized the 'high thought' and gentle breeding which among contemporaries are his outstanding qualities. Greene's attack on Shakespeare in the summer of 1592 as 'an upstart crow,' 'peasant' and 'rude-groom,' bears witness at least to his ability as a dramatist (a writer of 'blank verse' and tragedy) and industry within the theatre ('Shake-scene,' '*Johannes Factotum*') and gives no hint (though the writer is not in a mood to spare him) of dissipation; whereas Chettle's apology, in the autumn, for this outburst, is eloquent of Shakespeare's good breeding and esteem among gentlemen, his integrity, his skill as an actor, his felicity as a writer of sonnet or comedy. Chettle says: 'I myself have seen his demeanour no less civil than he (is) excellent in the quality he professes[29]; besides divers of worship have reported his uprightness of dealing which argues his honesty, and his facetious grace in writing which approves his art.' *Honesty* is the word (hardly applicable to one addicted to wine, ribaldry and women) again and again given to him.[30] To his strenuous days in Shoreditch, of struggle and discontent and depression, belong not only sonnets and their levities, but the signal testimony of his fellows: He was 'the more to be admired *quia* he

[28] *Colin Clout's Come Home Again*, 444-7. Chambers says that 'Spenser is cataloguing 'court-poets, not dramatists,' and prefers to think that the allusion is to Drayton, who took the name of Rowland in his *Idea*. But *Colin Clout* is dated 1591 and *Idea* was published in 1593, and it is an assumption that the allusion was added to *Colin Clout* before its publication in 1595. Moreover, Spenser does include dramatists in his 'catalogue,' *i.e.* 'good Harpalus now waxen aged in faithful service of fair Cynthia' is surely Sackville, joint author of *Gorboduc;* 'Palin, worthy of great praise,' we may believe, is Peele; Alabaster was author of *Roxana*, a Latin tragedy which had been acted at Cambridge.

[29] This first-hand testimony is not weakened by Sir Edmund's assumption that Chettle flatters ('desiring to be courteous,' i, 84). The standing of Shakespeare, theatrical and social, here indicated is hopelessly inconsistent with the theory of his 'transference' to London in 1591 or 1590. A five years' experience is much nearer the mark.

[30] An item in Sir Edmund's Index is 'Shakespeare, William, love affairs.' I would substitute 'Shakespeare, William, his honesty,' ii. 189, 210, 214, 247; respect and veneration for his character, ii. 187, 209, 216*f.*, 234 235, 252, 259, 266*f.*, 268, 278. 'Honest' meant 'honourable.'

was not a company-keeper; wouldn't be debauched, and if invited to (dissipation) writ he was in pain'—otherwise unwell. Some years later, in 1598, Francis Meres set him at the head of English comedy and tragedy, and saw the 'soul of Ovid' in his 'mellifluous and honey-tongued' poems and 'sugared sonnets among his private friends.' A lover of his School Ovid, a University man and a clergyman, Meres was not scandalized by Shakespeare's occasional licence. He could see, moreover, if he could see anything, that he had outgrown it. Stratford neighbours of standing and education, God-fearing men, such as the Quynays, who had known him all his life, and Sturley, the Puritan lawyer, are emphatic in their confidence in Shakespeare's integrity. They would urge him, in 1598, to invest in the Corporation tithes as a means of his social advancement, still more as it would 'do us much good'—previous lessees of the tithes having given them much trouble, especially the late owners of New Place. These friends trusted in the honesty of the young new owner (aged 33), and evidently had no knowledge of unfaithfulness and debauchery on his part. He was their 'loving countryman.' A visitor to Stratford, some time before 1601, called on Shakespeare's father in his glover's shop in Henley Street, and saw 'a merry cheek'd old man,' who said, apparently on enquiry about his talented son, 'Will is a good *honest* fellow, but he durst crack a jest with him at any time.' Alderman Shakespeare the recusant was not the man to speak in such terms of a son who had for years deserted his wife and children. In 1609, the year of the publication of those damning Sonnets, 'grand censors of the stage,' we are told, men 'most displeased with plays,' are 'pleased with' Shakespeare's 'comedies,' and 'worldlings' find in them a 'wit' (an understanding) 'they never found in themselves,' 'such savoured salt of wit' being 'in his comedies that they seem, for their height of pleasure, to be born in that sea that brought forth Venus.' *Height of pleasure* recalls Spenser's '*high thoughts' invention.*' Twice, in 1603 and 1605, John Davies the poet made special choice of Shakespeare and Burbadge in his praise of players, 'generous ye are in mind and mood,' not 'guerdoned' by Fortune according to 'deserts.' And a third time, in 1610, he wrote of Shakespeare as supreme in his profession:

'Some say, good Will, which I in sport do sing,
Had'st thou not played some kingly parts in sport,
Thou had'st been a companion for a King,
And been a king among the meaner sort.
Some others rail; but, rail as they think fit,
Thou hast no railing but a reigning wit,
*And honesty thou sow'st which they do reap.*'

Ben Jonson wrote, after his great rival's death: 'I loved the man, and do honour his memory, on this side idolatry as much as any; *he was indeed honest*, and of an open and free nature.' With the same enthusiasm he spoke of him in the Folio of 1623:

'Look, how the father's face
Lives in his issue; even so *the race*
*Of Shakespeare's mind and manners brightly shines*
In his well-turnèd and true filèd lines;
In each of which he seems to shake a lance
As brandish'd at the eyes of Ignorance.'

Hemings and Condell, Shakespeare's 'fellows' from at least 1593 until 1616, honourable men in their callings and parish of St. Mary Aldermanbury, both churchwardens and near neighbours of Shakespeare when he lodged with the Mountjoys in Silver Street,[31] protested their ambition in the publication of the Folio of 1623, to be not 'self-profit' nor 'fame,' but 'only to keep the memory of so worthy a Friend and Fellow alive as was our Shakespeare.' They had heard nothing, we may believe, of his licentiousness. Nor had Milton, who wrote in 1630 of 'my Shakespeare's bones,' and 'hallowed relics,' and in 1637 of 'sweetest Shakespeare, Fancy's child,' warbling 'his native woodnotes wild'—as in *As You Like It*, where the lecher Jaques mocks the Forest song:

Duedáme, duedáme, duedáme.[32]

And lastly, what of the Man, as we may see him, if we have anything of him in ourselves in his Work? The Artist cannot hide himself except to those who cannot see. He reveals himself in every stroke, every scene, every character, every study of good and evil and their '*embattlement*' (to use Ben Jonson's

[31] Nobody, I think, has suggested that Madam Mountjoy was Shakespeare's mistress, but I do not doubt that some learned critic will gravely assume it.

[32] With Milton's delight in Shakespeare's joyous fancy ranging at large in and around his beloved Stratford, it is amusing to compare the solemn pronouncement of Oxford learning, that the Poet's imagination, 'while it assimilated town life, *never became oblivious of the country*' (i. 545).

fine phrase), every contrast of the mud with the star and the flower. As we follow, however imperfectly yet intelligently, in more or less correct chronological succession, and in the light more or less of their context, historical, social, biographical, that wonderful series of poems and dramas, we are conscious of the master-hand, in space and foreground, colour, line and speaking-point. And when we have become accustomed to its strength and delicacy, its mystery and magnificent simplicity, we shall not, I think, associate the Artist with 'a quart pot,'[33] with personalities, with loose women. He outgrows much, we feel, puts himself behind him half-a-dozen times; but always he is himself and master of himself, always he is sane, ever in the grip of ethical and spiritual reality, and able to say and do a thousand 'sportive'[34] things fatal to the reputation of the weak.

Drink in Shakespeare is associated with weakness — with foolishness, failure, disease and crime. We think of Belch and Sir Andrew Aguecheek (whose names give them away); of Menenius and his 'cup of hot wine with not a drop of Tiber in it,'[35] and his collapse of judgment; of clever, brilliant old Falstaff, victim of the pot and the pox; of Cassio's 'inordinate cup' and 'ingredient a devil,' and its irretrievable consequence; of the man-hater, Timon, and his 'Go, suck the subtle blood o' the grape'; of the Triumvirs and their 'Cup us till the world go round; of strong men, Richard III, Brutus, Antony, who call for drink on the eve of disaster; of Macbeth and his 'When my drink is ready . . . strike upon the bell'; of Lady Macbeth and her tell-tale words, 'That which hath made them drunk hath made me bold.' There is no mistaking the thought of the Artist. In his first poem he wrote of

> 'The proceedings of a drunken brain,
> Full of respects, yet nought at all respecting:
> In hand with all things, nought at all effecting';[36]

and in his farewell to the stage, before a Jacobean Court audience, he drew the drunkard Stephano, who 'will fetch off' his

[33] Chambers, i. 71.

[34] See Shakespeare's sonnet in apology for his 'sportive blood' (S. 121).

[35] Wine in Elizabeth's reign was usually taken with hot water and sugar; in James' reign strong potations were in favour to the disgust of old-fashioned people.

[36] *Venus and Adonis*, 910-2.

'bottle though' he 'be o'er ears for' his 'labour' in 'horse-piss.'[37]

Instances of commendation by wise men may be counted on one hand, if not on two fingers. 'Honest Iago' is the apologist for 'good wine, a good familiar creature, if it be well used.'

Scurrility in Shakespeare is not the mark of a gentleman or a lady. Nobody has shown men and women so well how to be gentlemen and ladies—how to speak and behave in gallantry or under provocation, how to say and do the fitting thing in changing circumstance. Nor has anyone so taught men to honour women or women to honour themselves. His heroes are more manly and pure because of the heroines, and his heroines are too womanly to be conscious of their purity.[38]

And adultery? In his pages it is, as in the Bible, a *sin*—'the impious breach of holy wedlock vow.' 'Committed! Heaven stops the nose at it.' It is ruinous to the soul, the home, and the state. *Antony and Cleopatra* shows us that, if Art can. *Lear* proves it, if Art can prove anything. Gloucester 'stumbled when he saw,' and began to see when he had lost his eyes.[39] His bastard, Edmund, shook the kingdom, while he wrecked three homes. He himself was wrecked at last, and he saw it all. Slain, he says, and no words are more poignant:

> 'Tis true;
> The Wheel is come full circle: **I** *am here.*'

## LONDON YOUTH AND CHRISTIANITY

THE writer of the leading article in the *Times* of April 2nd said:

> 'Ignorance and thoughtlessness rather than conscious irreverence are responsible no doubt for that misuse of Good Friday which is still too widespread. Yet in recent years there has been some distinct improvement, which will grow rapidly in proportion as the English people are helped to regain their knowledge of Christ.'

It is my business to teach Christian Religion to five hundred Cockneys, in batches of thirty, varying in age from eleven to

[37] *The Tempest,* IV, i, 199—214.

[38] Emerson said: 'What maiden has not found him finer than her delicacy.'

[39] The Law of the Locreusians, that adulterers should have their eyes put out, was much quoted by Puritans. *Cf.* Matthew v, 27-30. Says Isabel of Angelo, 'I will to him and pluck out his eyes' (*Meas. for Meas.*, iv, 3, 124).

nineteen, every week. I have done this for seven years, and while in general agreement with the brilliantly written article to which I have referred, I should prefer, if the statement were restricted to the youthful cockney, to eliminate the word 'thoughtlessness.'

Before I took up my present post, I was warned that I should find my disciples flippant, talkative, and 'not wanting it.' In practice, I have found flippancy twice, on two quite different and separate occasions. 'Talkative!' Yes, their powers of flowing conversation are absolutely incredible to those unacquainted with them, and they always address friends as if they were nearly stone deaf. 'Not wanting it,' *never*.

The cockney child or adolescent has great stores of aspiration for that which is divine, higher, sublimer, than that among which she lives. She is usually conscious of it, and she has this advantage, that having been brought up in a noise, noise does not disturb her, and therefore she can think, really using her brain, with the roar from the street, or windows rattling with the wind, which would petrify the brain of one brought up in a quieter environment. Sometimes the longing for the Higher is unconscious, but it is invariably (in my experience) there, and is often brought to the point of expression by something not directly religious; *e.g.* Art, Colour, Poetry, the example of someone else, etc.

I have not yet met the cockney who, if she were not shy, would not say with the Psalmist: 'Like as the hart desireth the water brooks, so longeth my soul after Thee, O God.' Not 'God' in the restricted sense of Sunday School use, but Something higher, more beautiful, more peaceful, than she has yet found.

It is the story of the Cross that appeals to them most. The Example of a selfless Love, and perfect self-control under physical suffering, and all absence of 'answering back' under the provocation of insult and jeers. Voluntarily, they will (figuratively) stand on the summit of Calvary for fifteen or twenty minutes, in contemplation and meditation, without any help from me, some firing questions at me, and quite unselfishly waiting their turn for their question, while others say nothing, but are evidently considering the great Event.

The scene of this devotion, or Hero-worship, if you like, is entirely uninspiring. A form-room with the usual blackboard, on which is hung a large picture of the Crucifixion and the surround-scene and actors as described by S. Luke and S. John, and I (possessed of no personal attraction) standing by the picture, in order to serve them by answering the questions. There is not therefore any attraction, except that of the Supreme Sacrifice, and their desire to imitate It.

The questions, always intelligent, may be purely physical; *e.g.* How did those who were crucified remain upon the cross, if there were only the slender support depicted? What convinced the penitent thief that our Lord was not an ordinary man?

Intelligent interest for the moment would not in itself be worth while, so here is an example of result, in proof that they do not just 'smite their breasts and return.' I was asked if prayers mattered, as there was nowhere to say them alone, and others who slept in the bedroom laughed when any were attempted. I suggested prayers could possibly be said elsewhere in the house. This, it appeared, was impossible. No privacy could be obtained elsewhere. So I said that in that case as the bedroom was the only place, although I considered prayers of the utmost importance, yet I felt incapable of giving advice, since in my own case I had a bedroom to myself, and no one therefore knew whether I said prayers or not, and I did not feel *certain* I should have the courage in the circumstances described to me, but hoped I should. The child, aged twelve, was silent. I waited. She then drew herself up, tightened every muscle in her body, and said, 'I'll start again in the bedroom.' She did, and she has carried it through.

What I have said is surely enough to prove, if anyone needs proof, the truth of the statement which I quoted at the beginning, that 'as English people are helped to regain their knowledge of Christ,' so this country will no longer be apparently indifferent and irreligious, straggling far behind many whose religion is on a less high plane. The trouble all lies in the lack of opportunity to learn; that is the cause of England's religious 'indifference.'

IGNOTA.

# WHY STUDY THEOLOGY?*

By Sir Harry R. Reichel, M.A., LL.D. (Emeritus Rector and Vice-President of the University College of North Wales).

THE study of Theology has to run the gauntlet between two lines of critics, the champions respectively of devotional piety and of scientific enquiry.

## I.

Let it be freely granted at once that Theology is not religion and cannot be a substitute for religion; also that there is a risk that a man immersed in the study of the processes of abstract thought and the investigation of institutional origins may weaken in the emotional warmth which is vital to the imparting of moral and spiritual truth, and even come to regard it as a disturbing element. Thus the young theologian fresh from University honours often at first 'fails to get his message across to his congregation,' as the Principal of one of our Theological Colleges remarked to the University Visitors on their recent tour of inspection. For as Theology endeavours to reduce to a coherent intellectual system the phenomena of religious activity, and as in any intellectual enquiry the introduction of personal feeling is apt to confuse the vision, his bias will often be to approach spiritual questions from the intellectual side alone, and, if he yields to this, his preaching will in the nature of things be void of spiritual power. A striking example of this tendency to decry the emotional element in the philosophical domain is furnished by a disparaging criticism which I chanced upon the other day of Henry Jones, the man who, next to Edward Caird, was probably the greatest and certainly the most inspiring teacher of Moral Philosophy in the last generation—'Henry Jones was rather a preacher than a philosopher.' To this sapient critic it was apparently an offence that the Professor was able to kindle moral enthusiasm in his class. He might have remembered that

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of the two giants of philosophic thought who laid the foundations of the study for all time, Plato and Aristotle, the former, when he speaks of virtue and the good, rarely fails to let us feel the glow of an imagination on fire with enthusiasm, while the latter, usually regarded as the embodiment of passionless philosophic detachment, was the author of the celebrated maxim, Intellect has no motive power.'[1] It would be well if some contemporary thinkers had this saying more in mind than one would judge from their utterances. Not that emotional appeal can take the place of dispassionate reasoning, but it must supplement and reinforce it, if truth is to issue in action.

Allied to this is another objection which I once heard advanced by a distinguished Oxford don, the Rev. T. H. Grose of Queen's, who had collaborated with T. H. Green (the great protagonist of the idealist philosophy at Oxford in the 70's and 80's) in the production of the classical English work on the Philosophy of Kant. A few years after the opening of this College I remember meeting him and urging in the course of conversation the importance of a sound theological course for young ordinands after their ordinary degree course. He would have nothing to say to it: the less theology the better. Theology was a narrowing influence that tended to separate clergy from laity, and to shut them off in an unreal world of their own, or at best a world which is not that in which we are now living. This was all the more striking as coming from a clergyman. And it cannot be denied that a certain type of theological study is apt to have this effect. It has been too exclusively concerned with controversies of past ages about questions which have either largely ceased to be live issues or else deal with unfamiliar names and are so involved in the obscurities of an out-of-date technical phraseology that the ordinary man, even when fairly educated, can often see little relevance in it to the problems of contemporary life.

And then there is the charge which it is impossible to rebut, that theology has been the prime mover in most, if not all, the religious persecutions which have drenched Europe and the Near East in blood from the fourth to the eighteenth century, and which have given dreadful point and a new application to

[1] Διάνοια οὐθὲν κινεῖ.

the tremendous indictment of Lucretius—'Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.' For the real criminal, it must be remembered, was not religion, but theology. During the first three centuries, the period when the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the Church, the period of Christian suffering and Christian purity, the Christian community did display the harmlessness of the dove. But with the establishment of the new faith as the State religion, a new regime became almost inevitable. On the one hand, the Emperor, who looked to Christianity to supply the spiritual cement, the growing lack of which threatened the prosperity and even the continued existence of the State, was naturally intolerant of anything like ecclesiastical disunion. How could a Church that was not at unity with itself promote unity in the State? On the other, the Christian clergy, from a class of political suspects, liable at any moment to execution or exile, suddenly transformed into the most influential professional body in the State! It would have been strange, indeed, if they had kept their heads. At the same time, if unity was a prime requisite for the State, the Church could hardly feel its importance less, remembering our Lord's prayer for unity in the Fourth Gospel and St. Paul's description of its own mystic existence as the body of Christ. Each of these powers then envisaged Christian unity as a fundamental need; but how was this to be secured? The spiritual Christian is the true Christian, doubtless, but who is to judge the spiritual state of the individual? Certainly not a great administrative machine, whether ecclesiastical or secular. But such a machine can easily ascertain whether a man is prepared to subscribe to some formula or declaration of belief. And to this must be added the tendency of any great learned profession to develop an intense *esprit de corps* which would be at once up in arms against unauthorized practitioners and unorthodox teaching. Of this we have recently had a striking instance in the excommunication by the General Medical Council of an anesthetist for taking part in an operation performed by the eminent bone-setter, Sir E. Barker, an act which caused much scandal to thoughtful laymen. Imagine how much more intense this professional feeling must have been when the eternal welfare of the soul and not merely the temporary health of the body was believed to be at stake,

and when the Church was largely regarded as the mouthpiece of an angry Deity, ever on the watch to mark what was done amiss and to punish it with rigour. Thus as the doctrine 'extra ecclesiam nulla salus' sank deeper into the ecclesiastical mind, the emphasis was shifted more and more from spiritual and moral excellence to credal orthodoxy, till in the so-called Ages of Faith it was far more dangerous to be suspected of doubting a comparatively unimportant proposition on which the Church had given a ruling, than to lead a thoroughly vicious life. Indeed, marked purity of life outside the cloister was apt to be looked upon as a rather suspicious circumstance, probably symptomatic of heresy. Lea, in his *History of the Inquisition*, quotes a defence made by a man accused of heresy at Toulouse: 'I am not a heretic, for I have a wife and children and I eat flesh *and lie and swear*, and am a faithful Christian.'

If this be so, it may well be asked, why study Theology at all? Why not throw overboard all this intellectual top-hamper which has encumbered the good ship Religion so long and let her ride free? *Because it is in the nature of things impossible.* A particular system of theology may be got rid of, but Theology would remain. The human mind is so constituted that it insists on giving some intellectual explanation of the things that matter to it most. Human nature cannot do without religion, and the only cure for a bad or debased religion is a purer one. In the same way religion cannot do without theology, and the only effecitve way of dealing with a bad theology is to produce a better. A striking instance of the way in which a sound may supersede an unsound theology to the great advantage of religion is furnished by the virtual disappearance of the doctrine of eternal punishment, except among extreme obscurantists, in the lifetime of many here present. Based on the literal interpretation of apocalyptic passages in the New Testament, divorced from our Lord's teaching about the Fatherhood of God, it had for centuries cast a gloom over the Christian mind and was responsible for most of the horrible cruelties which have stained the history of the Christian Church. At last the more enlightened conscience of our own time began to revolt against this slanderous misrepresentation of the divine nature, and the revolt was given historical confirmation by the remarkable work, which in

theology may fairly be termed epoch-making, of the great scholar who died the other day, Archdeacon Charles. By the concentrated labours of a lifetime, devoted to the Jewish literature produced between the close of the Old Testament and the opening of the New, he has shown in what an atmosphere of apocalyptic the writers of the New Testament lived and breathed, and how much this must have coloured their record of our Lord's discourses.

But theology is not limited to satisfying the imperious demands of intellectual curiosity; it serves as a powerful reinforcement to religious faith. It is a great corroboration of religious faith if it is found that religious experience can be fitted into the intellectual scheme of Reality. An effective theology in short serves as a defensive armour to religious faith. But armour, it must be remembered, has continually to be modified to meet new weapons; otherwise the breastplate of one age may easily become the strait-waistcoat of the next. Thus, as the intellectual field widens and the objects of knowledge multiply, theology on its side must also expand and change its point of view; or it may become an encumbrance instead of a defence. Each age has to work out its own theological system. And on no age perhaps has this necessity ever pressed more heavily than on our own, for we live in a time when the amazing development of natural science has changed the whole intellectual outlook on the universe, substituting the dynamic idea of evolution for the static idea of endless repetition.

That this call for a new theology does not imply any weakening of the old Christian message is shown in a striking manner by the remarkable fact that one of the strongest notes is sounded by workers in the mission field. By general admission, missions are the surest sign and best index of spiritual vitality in any religious body. A Church that has no interest in missions, it has been truly said, is spiritually moribund. Missions are at once a measure of the spiritual life in the Mother Church, and a source to her of fresh spiritual vigour. Now within the last half century the Christian missionary, while delivering the same Gospel message that has been preached from the earliest days, has largely changed his method of dealing with the native religion which he found in possession. Formerly he had nothing

for it but unsparing denunciation; it was a false religion with false gods, the whole proceeding probably from diabolic inspiration. This idea seems to have very soon captured the mind of the early Church, the 'Demons' of the New Testament being equated with the 'Diaboloi,' and translated in our own A.V. 'Devils,' and it has received imperishable literary consecration at the hands of Milton in his *Hymn on the Nativity* and *Paradise Lost*:

> 'Nor all the gods beside longer dare abide,
> Not Typhon huge ending in snaky twine;
> Our babe to show his godhead true,
> Can in his swaddling bands control the damned crew.'

And there are certain religions of low type, of which this is no unfair presentation. In some parts of the world there are primitive races who deliberately and consciously worship devils. Their religion is purely one of fear; they believe in the existence of good spirits as well as bad, but as they naïvely argue, it would be waste of time to worship the good, who can be trusted to do them no harm in any case; from the bad, on the contrary, they have everything to fear, and therefore it is well to propitiate them with supplications and offerings. Their attitude is much like that of the Spanish Grandee in the well-known story, who was accustomed to take off his hat when the Devil was mentioned and to speak of him as 'My very good lord the Devil,' and when taken to task for this scandalous attitude, replied that it was just as well to treat Satan with respect, as one never knew how near one might be brought to him in the next life. But directly we approach some of the great religions of the more civilized races, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism and the purer forms of Hinduism, it is felt that this attitude is no longer possible. In spite of many corruptions (and even the best religions are liable to corruptions, as the history of the Christian Church shows only too plainly), they have enshrined, however imperfectly, ideals of life and conduct which have had a powerful influence in helping the races that embraced them to reach a comparatively high standard of morality and culture. If, as we believe, every good gift is from above and comes down from the Father of lights, these must be regarded as manifestations of the working of the Divine Spirit. The modern missionary recog-

nizes this fundamental truth and has in many cases adopted a new method of approach. Like St. Paul at Athens, he seizes on the good points in the religious creed and practice of his hearers, and sets himself to show that these find their full development and perfect expression in the personality and teaching of our Lord, with the conviction that once this basic idea is firmly grasped and assimilated, the baser elements of the native creed will wither and drop off, and the transition to the higher faith will follow either immediately or ultimately through the medium of a purified form of their own. Anyone who has followed, even cursorily, the recent course of events in the Indian mission field, knows how amazing has been the influence of the best Christian thought in that great continent since this new method of approach has been in operation. Where a decade or two ago missionary meetings were held, if at all, under a running fire of hostile cries and interruptions not infrequently ending in a riot, now in the same places public meetings to hear and discuss the Christian message are organized by non-Christians and conducted in the most orderly manner with full freedom of speech. The change in the attitude of the audiences has been almost incredible, and apparently it has been due in the main to the change from anathema to sympathy in the method of approach. With this new outlook it is clear that one of the primary needs, if not the primary need, of the worker in the mission field will be the comparative study of the religions with which he is brought into contact. I was not surprised, therefore, to read an able article by a missionary in a religious magazine two or three years ago, calling for a new orientation of studies in the theological schools at home and the organization of a new theological course in which the core subject should be Comparative Religion. In this, as in the comparative weight to be given to considerations of Church order and those of effective evangelization, the thought of the Mission Field is much in advance of the thought in the Home Churches, just as it was in St. Paul's day. It may be here mentioned without irrelevance that in the scheme for the establishment of University Chairs in the Faculty of Theology adopted by this College, the first chair it is contemplated to found is a chair in this very core subject—Comparative Religion.

## II.

Then there is the second or scientific objection. The proper attitude, it is objected, of the University student is one of non-committal detachment and openness of mind. How can this be maintained in a subject like Theology, which is inevitably enveloped to a large extent in an atmosphere of prejudgment and party spirit? That there is some truth in this accusation no fair-minded champion of theology would deny, but he can retort with fairness that, Mathematics and the definitely mathematical sciences apart, precisely the same is true in varying degrees of every other subject studied in the University. The capital subjects of History and Philosophy are peculiarly open to this form of attack, for at every turn they are liable to find themselves confronted by strong deep-seated prejudices, social, racial or religious. Some of my hearers may remember that when Mr. Gladstone brought forward his first Bill for the establishment of a National University for Ireland, this difficulty was found so serious that he actually proposed to exclude History altogether from the list of subjects which might be studied in the new University! This counsel of despair was one of the most potent causes that led to the defeat of the Bill. In recent years Economics, too, in leaving the safer fold of the exact sciences to expatiate in the wider and more interesting field of historical enquiry, seems to have taken over the liability to partisanship from which History has suffered so much in the past and from which it can never be entirely exempt; and those who have kept in touch with academic developments in the United States are aware that the appointment of Professors of Economics has been a source of acute controversy in some of the American Universities. In the two great authoritative contemporary organizations of creed and conduct which are associated with the names of Rome and Moscow respectively, the University Chairs of Philosophy are rigorously supervised and censored. Nothing incompatible with the teachings, in the former case of Thomas Aquinas, in the latter of Karl Marx, may be professed, much less taught. This censorship is not confined, of course, to the subject of Philosophy; in principle it applies to every subject in the curriculum, and is so applied with extreme

rigour throughout the Soviet University, though in the Roman system it does not, I believe, actually extend beyond Philosophy and History. But in the nature of things it affects Philosophy more than any other, inasmuch as Philosophy is the basic subject which consciously or unconsciously determines a man's outlook on the whole world of thought, and must therefore to some degree qualify his treatment of every subject of study, except perhaps Mathematics and those branches of Science which lend themselves to strict mathematical treatment. The fact, therefore, that it is difficult to approach Theology without some bias is no valid reason for excluding it from the University domain. Yet there is some force in the dislike or at least uneasiness which many University men of wide intellectual sympathies have felt when Theology is brought within the University pale. It arises from the fact that the name is used to denote two very different kinds of study. Any branch of knowledge which lies at the root of a regular professional career, whether literary, scientific or industrial, is capable of being studied in two different ways, appropriate respectively to the University and the Professional School. In the former it is pursued for its own sake, the main object being the discovery of new truth and the advancement of learning; in the latter the aim is rather the equipment of the rank and file of the profession with the necessary minimum of knowledge required for its successful practice and the technical skill for applying it. Each has its own special task; neither can be dispensed with. If the Professional School has not the University behind it, it inevitably tends to become hide-bound and impervious to new ideas, and the profession gets out of touch with the realities of life. The Professional School can only be kept in a sweet and wholesome condition, if it is constantly drawing vitality and inspiration from the University. The latter, on the other hand, cannot effectively influence professional practice except through the medium of the Professional Schools in touch with itself. I am here, be it observed, using the terms University and Professional School strictly, in their mutually exclusive sense; but they are not always mutually exclusive. It not infrequently happens that a university organizes and controls a professional school within its own ambit, and a professional school may sometimes be so strong and ambi-

tious that it aspires to graft, as it were, a university research branch on to its own system.

Now apply this analysis to the case of theology and the ministerial profession, and we are led at once to the need of two different kinds of theological institution, the University Theological Faculty and the Denominational Seminary or Theological College, with two very different courses and ideals of study. Yet the term theology is commonly applied to the studies pursued in each of these institutions without distinction, and I think it would be true to say that the ordinary layman, when theological study is mentioned, has rather in mind the seminary type, in which the young ordinand is expected to master the formularies and system of divinity distinctive of his own denomination, while undergoing some training in pastoral work, than the higher studies of the University faculty. It is this equivocal use of the term which is mainly responsible for the objection raised from the University side to the recognition of theology as a legitimate subject of study. It is the same kind of objection as is often raised to the inclusion in a pure science degree course of practical applications involving an element of rule of thumb. But in theology the nature of the subject gives greatly added force to this objection. To many minds the very name is redolent of dogmatic assertion, of the suppression of free enquiry, of sectarian strife, of everything in short that is most antipathetic to the true University mentality. In all ages of the Christian Church *odium theologicum* has been a by-word. Is such a habit of mind compatible with the University atmosphere? To this there can only be one answer. The theology of the authoritative sectarian type which forms the bulk of the studies in the theological seminary would be altogether out of place in the University school, but there is another theology, the theology of free enquiry, to which this objection does not apply. If knowledge is one, as the universe is one, then we are not only justified in concluding, but forced to conclude that the principle of its acquisition should be the same in all its branches, and therefore that theology can be studied with the same freedom of enquiry and the same hope of arriving at the truth as any other branch of knowledge; but always on the same condition, *viz.* that the enquirer is sincere in his search, that truth is

his real object and not personal distinction, that he comes to his investigations not only with an open mind, but with that reverence of mind which has been distinctive of all the really great explorers in philosophy and science. The universe does not yield up its secrets either to the prejudiced or to the clever and light-hearted questioner.

This conclusion is not only reasonable in itself; it is confirmed in the most striking manner by the growth of contemporary higher study. One of the most remarkable developments of our time has been the foundation and expansion of Faculties of Theology in the new Universities and the complete transformation of those which already existed at Oxford and Cambridge. When I was an undergraduate at Oxford, the Divinity School was virtually an Anglican, indeed almost a High Anglican preserve. Nonconformists had no theological institutions of their own; nor was the Free Church point of view represented on the teaching faculty or the panel of examiners. An occasional nonconformist might attend lectures and qualify for the degree, but so far as theology was concerned, the University contributed little or nothing to the thought of the Free Churches and received as little from them in return. Now the position is completely changed. Two fine colleges, maintaining in a striking manner the best Oxford architectural tradition and organized largely on traditional University lines, have been established, Mansfield College and Manchester New College, manned by staffs of academic distinction, whose co-operation is welcomed by the Anglican members of the Theological Faculty, and recognized in a combined lecture scheme for the Schools. The same change in no less marked degree has taken place in Cambridge. And this transformation, for it is nothing less, has been brought about without friction, without heat. It might have been expected that the bringing within the sacred enclosure of elements, which till only the other day were regarded as discordant and incompatible with Oxford ideas, could only have been the issue of a long and obstinate struggle, that must have embittered personal relations and established in the heart of the University two permanently hostile camps within a stone's throw of each other, evermore offering or seeking occasions of offence. Yet, as we all know, the course of events has been altogether

different. The antagonism of warring sects has been replaced by the friendly rivalry of men of learning engaged in a common and absorbing pursuit. One might almost say that the old *odium theologicum* had been exorcized by a new *caritas theologica*. No doubt this has been due in some measure to the growing spirit of toleration which was so marked a feature in the thought of the last half-century, at least in matters religious, but in the main it is to be accounted for by the different character of the studies pursued. The Professional School of any Christian body is naturally anxious to impress on its young ordinands the *raison d'être* of its own existence as a separate organization, by showing that it possesses, either exclusively or in a superior degree, elements of belief and practice vital in its opinion to the Christian religion. In its teaching, therefore, it inevitably stresses those points in which it differs from other Christian bodies, and is more concerned with the maintenance of inherited doctrine than with the discovery of new truth. Its attitude towards its students is necessarily authoritative: 'if you wish to function as an ordained minister of our Church, this is what you must do and this is what you must teach.' The University Faculty, on the other hand, does not concern itself with these differences, except as interesting facts in the historical section of its domain, nor does it prescribe to the student what he must believe or practice. It finds large fields of enquiry in textual criticism, in history and in philosophy and in psychology, in which men of different ecclesiastical loyalties, or of none at all, may work in harmony side by side, in the same manner as in kindred studies with the other faculties. The influence of such a school clearly tends to emphasize points of agreement; and as the work goes on, the men who are engaged in it more and more come to see how large and important are the matters on which the Christian bodies agree, in comparison with those on which they differ. Thus while the theology of the purely Professional School necessarily makes for division and disunion, the theology of the University Faculty by a like necessity fosters the influences that promote harmony and union. There is, in short, no case for the exclusion of Theology from the University domain. Most of us remember the time when it was banned in the new Universities by fashion if not by statute. It was so by the charter of our

own College, and the prohibition has only within the last few years been removed. When that prohibition was originally enacted, we had in our minds the sectional theology of the denominational seminary, and had hardly envisaged the possibility of the inter-denominational theology of free enquiry. Theology therefore *has* a legitimate place in the studies of the University. But we may go further and claim that it has not only a right to be included, but that its inclusion will be of direct advantage to the studies of the other faculties. This will be most apparent in the case of the humane faculties, those which are concerned not with the material universe around us, but with the mind and activities of man, and which fall into the categories of Language and Literature, History and Philosophy in their various branches. Which of these can afford to ignore Theology? How much of the greatest literature of the world, Hebrew, Sanskrit, Classical, Medieval and Modern, is not steeped in religious ideas and the theology to which they have given rise? How would the serious study of history be possible for any period, if the consideration of some of the greatest motive forces that have impelled the mind of man and so determined the course of events were ruled out? What effective study could be made of the Middle Ages if the Papacy, of the Renaissance if the Reformation, of the Byzantine Empire if Islam were left out; or to come to our own times, what treatment of contemporary European history could be adequate, if the creed of the new autocracy of Russia, which has been pithily summarized in the epigram, 'There is no God, and Lenin is his prophet,' were ignored? Again, how could Philosophy, which enquires into the laws of thought and the nature of reality, neglect, except at its proper peril, religion and the metaphysics of religion. Philosophy is the great co-ordinator, the architectonic study whose business it is to survey the whole field of knowledge and existence, to show how the different parts are related to each other, and as far as the capacity of the human mind extends, to reduce it to a cosmos, an ordered coherent whole. It must, therefore, include and give some account of religion and the systems of thought to which religion has given rise. Religious experience is as real a phenomenon as sensual experience, and any philosophy that cannot find a place for it is in so far an

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incomplete and imperfect philosophy. In point of fact, Philosophy has in some degree always concerned itself with religion, and Theology has always not merely concerned itself with Philosophy, but used the prevailing philosophy of the day to express its own ideas. In early times, Platonism and Neoplatonism, later on, especially in the Western Church, Aristotelianism dominated the thought and largely formed the theology of the Christian Church. They tend, too, to occupy the same territory, though they approach it from different sides. Philosophy starts from the True, Theology from the Good; but each finds itself unable, owing to the fact that the universe is a cosmos, to confine its activity within the limits of that section of reality on which it started. This indeed is inevitable in any enquiry into reality; from whichever side it starts, it cannot stop arbitrarily at any point till the whole field has been covered. Thus on the metaphysical side the complete philosophy and the complete theology would ultimately coincide; so that the claim of the medieval schoolmen that Theology was the Queen of the Sciences was not such a paradox as it may at first sight appear. Thus a University which formally excluded Theology would not only be forfeiting its title to be regarded as a University in the highest sense of the term (for the ideal University, though it may be unable for lack of means and opportunity to include within the scope of its activities every subject reasonably capable of intellectual investigation, cannot without treason to the commonwealth of learning formally banish any), but it would also be condemning its existing faculties to a serious contraction of scope and impoverishment of subject-matter. This would naturally affect the humane faculties most, but its effect would not be confined to them. Natural science has never been able to avoid incursions into the domain of metaphysics and theology. The human personality is ultimately a unity like the universe, and not a mere bundle of faculties. Hence, whatever his main study, the really thoughtful man can rarely resist the strong impulsion to speculate on its relation to other branches of knowledge, and in doing so he almost inevitably tends to apply to them the methods of enquiry which he has used with success in his own. Occasionally this has had a somewhat ludicrous result, as when a distinguished medical lecturer informed his class that

he had been dissecting the human body for more than thirty years, but had never come across the seat of the soul, the implied conclusion being that the soul had no existence except in pious imaginations. But the greater scientific minds have not been so hidebound. Some, like Huxley, have taken refuge in Agnosticism, a virtual confession that the methods of enquiry appropriate to natural science break down when applied to the metaphysical domain; others have been led on to postulate some ultimate power which is at the basic of cosmic unity both in the physical and the spiritual spheres. And not unnaturally this latter tendency becomes more pronounced as the field of investigation expands. The most striking example of this is furnished in the recent development of what is virtually a new science, the larger astronomy which has been aptly dubbed Cosmogony, the super-science that treats of the inconceivable immensities of space and the development therein of a well-nigh endless number of astral systems in comparison with any one of which our own solar system is as the fine dust of the balance. There must no doubt be some among my hearers who followed the series of lectures on Science and Religion which were recently broadcasted by eminent representatives of either, speaking in alternate weeks, and they were probably struck, as I was, with the predominant part played in the reconciliation of scientific and religious thought by the two representatives of the new science, Professors Eddington and Jeans. I felt, as I listened, that it was impossible to keep these two spheres of knowledge rigidly fenced off from each other, that each had much to learn from the other, and that ultimately, if they did not coalesce, they could at least be brought together in a supreme harmony that would make the universe at once more intelligible and more endurable.

Thus from every point of view the claim of Theology to a place, and an important place, amongst advanced University studies is, I submit, amply justified. But it is more than justified. The cultivation of a large-minded and fearless but reverent theology is a *duty*. We owe it to the University, we owe it to the Churches, and especially do we owe it to that large and, I fear, growing body of able young men and women who are being estranged from religion by intellectual difficulties inherited from the worn-out theological systems of the past.

# PHILLIPS BROOKS

WHEN Phillips Brooks preached before the University of Oxford in 1885, one who heard him wrote thus :

> ' In applauding Phillips Brooks men did not merely applaud a famous preacher. The praise was not that of the scholar, the artist, the athlete, but of those who felt instinctively when they saw him that *here was a man as God intended man to be.*'

He was a splendid man to look at. ' The face of Phillips Brooks is to be classed among the few beautiful faces which the world cherishes,' says his biographer. ' He was the most beautiful man I ever saw,' writes another.

His intellect was of the highest order. There was in his mind a Hindu swiftness, mobility, penetrativeness, and mysticism. He was widely read, delicately cultured, full of artistic sensibility. And as a moral and spiritual power, his influence over all with whom he came in contact was supreme. Few men have had such opportunities for enlarging their range of influence. Phillips Brooks travelled a great deal, moved in many circles, made friends with the best and greatest men in England and in America.

And wherever he went, or wherever he spoke, it was universally acknowledged that a spiritual giant had come among them. Yet the message of his life lies not so much in his endowments, physical, mental, or moral, but in the man himself, the rich and powerful personality, that instinctive recognition which impelled his hearer to write : ' Here is a man as God intended him to be.'

Phillips Brooks, in his charming Essay on Biography, has advised readers of biography to begin in the middle. ' It is the way in which,' he says, ' you come to know a man.' I do not intend this paper to be a brief biography. I want rather to touch on some aspects of his life. Yet, after the manner of biographers, I must begin with his parents. He has himself described the difference in their temperaments :

> ' Mother always felt that everything must be set right at once. Anything wrong roused her to appeal to her husband. " William, aren't you going to do something about it? Why don't you talk then?" And my Father with his quizzical smile would say, " But it is none of my business." '

Mr. Brooks was a typical Boston merchant, solid, upright, unimaginative, unemotional. Mrs. Brooks was a woman of intense emotional feeling, deep spiritual life, saintly character. Hence Phillips Brooks owed to his father his business-like and orderly habits, his clear, logical understanding, his strong commonsense that no fervour of feeling, no passionate outburst of soul, could ever sweep from its anchorage. But the power of imagination, the largeness of his sympathy, the ardent spirituality, the magnetism of his genius—these he owed to his mother. Her letters to him are full of tenderness, and their maternal anxiety and simplicity make one almost smile. She is so concerned lest he should become perverted by reading unorthodox books 'God knows, Philly, I would rather never have you preach Christ's blessed Gospel than wickedly pervert it as Bushnell does.'

A deep affection existed between mother and son. 'She has been,' he wrote, 'the centre of all the happiness of my life.' He dwelt on some of the leading characteristics of her life in his sermon on the text, 'O woman, great is thy faith.'

Phillips Brooks' life was not a long one—as lives go nowadays. He began his career at Philadelphia. For twenty-two years he was Rector of Holy Trinity Church, Boston, and for about two years after Bishop of Massachusetts. He died in 1893 at the age of 57. What follows has been suggested to me by three of his writings. His lectures on Preaching, his lectures on the influence of Jesus, and his little work on Tolerance. They typify the man as a Preacher, as a Thinker, and as a Personality.

## I.

As a Preacher he stands out pre-eminently. No one can question his greatness in this respect. He has been called the 'Shakespeare of the Pulpit.' Whether this is too high praise I know not, but I am certain there has been no divine in our age who has had such a great influence. 'By common consent, no one has translated so much of the Christian religion into current thought and life,' says a well-known minister. And this is probably true. Possibly Spurgeon reached a wider circle, but Spurgeon's appeal was essentially confined to a less educated class of the community. Phillips Brooks did appeal to the simple, but also to the educated, the cultured, and the artistic.

When I study the method of his sermon preparation, I am struck by its mechanical nature. His sermons are written on the same kind of paper, in the smallest of handwriting, and each of the four small pages is invariably filled out to the last remaining space.

> 'It was remarkable that one who gave the impression of such utter spontaneity, whose sermons seemed to come by a flash of inspiration, with no effort, should have thus limited himself in fixed and apparently mechanical ways.'

So writes his biographer. Yet his sermons cost him great effort. 'I can remember,' he writes, 'how before I began to preach, every book I read seemed to spring into "a sermon,"' and he read many books. His biography contains numerous extracts from his note-books. Phillips Brooks was never without a note-book, and he was in the habit of jotting down texts and thoughts the moment they came into his mind. No doubt this constant habit of jotting down passing thoughts accounts in a measure for his astonishing fertility. Consider what work must have been involved in preparation for a single Lent—as this programme shows:

> Sat. Evening Bible Class.—Larger words of Scripture and life, *e.g.* Creation, Preservation, Inspiration, Incarnation, Redemption, etc.
>
> Friday afternoons.—Course of the *Te Deum*, bringing out the sublime meaning of the Church's greatest hymn.
>
> Wednesday evening.—The personal utterances of Christ which expressed the essential meaning of life—associating them with the utterances of the great men in Scripture.
>
> Monday mornings.—Special addresses to men.

All this in addition to the two sermons on Sunday!

His manner and general style is characterised by its sustained elevation. He was no preacher of smart up-to-date sermonettes. He never brought the pulpit down to the level of the lecture platform. Nor did he lay much stress on elocution. He writes:

> 'Of oratory and all the marvellous mysterious ways of those who teach it, I dare say nothing. I believe in the true elocution teacher as I believe in the existence of Halley's comet, which comes in sight of this earth once in about 76 years.'

'It was no luxury to hear him preach,' says Professor A. V. G. Allen; 'it strained the tension of the hearer, beyond any other experience of the art of oratory.'

In the earlier part of his ministry he seems generally to have written his sermons and read them: sometimes without taking his eyes from the MS. Later on he generally adopted the extemporaneous method. But whichever way he chose, he preached with a rapidity of utterance which almost defied the ablest reporter.

If we analyse his sermons carefully, we find they generally consist of a theme—suggested by a text—which he works out with marvellous skill. Take, for example, his sermon on 'The Spirit of the Lord departed from Saul and an evil spirit from the Lord troubled him.' Here the theme is: 'A beneficent power, if we obey it, blesses and helps us; but the same power, if we disobey it, curses and ruins us.' He works this idea out with regard to Nature, government, art, friendship, and then finally points to its fulfilment in religion.

Two things, he held, go to make a great preacher: the love of truth and the love of souls. And of preaching he has laid down his famous definition:

> 'Preaching is the communication of truth by man to man. Preaching is the teaching of truth through personality. Jesus chose this method of extending the knowledge of Himself through the world.'

The preacher's personality, he taught, should be such as to convince his hearers that he had been in association with Christ.

> 'Personal piety is the deep possession in one's own soul of the faith and hope and resolution which are to be offered to one's fellowmen for this new life . . . Nothing but fire kindles fire.'

This remark calls to my mind the saying of another great preacher:

> 'Some men prepare their sermons, other men prepare themselves.'

Phillips Brooks was not only a preacher. He managed his parish with care and ability. He was somewhat old-fashioned in his ideas, and dreaded the danger of a parish becoming over-organized. He did not take kindly to the idea of Parochial Missions, considering that they implied the suggestion of failure on the part of the parish priest.

His accessibility was notable. A friend who stayed with him several weeks found that the average number of times the bell rang was once for every five minutes. He steadfastly declined to seclude himself, or appoint hours when he would be at home

to callers. He was open to all who came to see him at all times. I think this is remarkable when we remember the great demands made on him by his preaching.

In the sick room his power was something marvellous and rare. He had a great gift for inspiriting people who were depressed or who had lost heart in their work. What he said to a young woman, tired out with the care of an invalid mother, illustrates this: 'You go on taking care of your mother, and when she is gone, God will take care of you.'

## II.

In considering Phillips Brooks as a Thinker, we may dwell on his thought concerning religious matters only. For, as his biographer says, 'Behind it all lay his theology.' Here the book that will guide us is *The Influence of Jesus*, and, I might add, a remarkable sermon entitled *The Priority of God*.

Generally speaking, I suppose Phillips Brooks would be classified as a modern Churchman. But there are points in his teaching which made him approach the Evangelical standpoint. Take, for instance, his words on the Atonement:

> 'The death of Christ has saved the world. Not merely his character or His teaching. Always, everywhere, the Christ whom Christianity has followed, has been a Christ who died. The picture it has always held up has been the picture of a Cross. The Creed it has always held, however it might vary as to the precise effect of His death, has always made the fact of His death vital and cardinal. The Jesus who has drawn all men unto Him has been One who based His power upon this condition, "I, if I be lifted up."'

He maintained that not in the physical suffering in itself, but in the submission of Christ to the Will of God, of which the suffering was an inevitable accompaniment, lay the mysterious potency of the sacrifice of Christ.

Several principles should be noted which lay in the background of Brooks' thought on religion. He held as a primary conviction that all men were, by nature and grace, children of God. This—the sonship of all humanity and the universal redemption—constituted for him the fundamental difference between the Anglican and the Roman communions. And it was precisely this 'primary conviction' which stimulated his ardour in the cause of Foreign Missions. Some of his noblest speeches and many of his most famous sermons were spoken on behalf of

foreign missions. It is not a little curious to remark that a Christian duty of which the ordinary Broad Churchman is sometimes neglectful, the duty of preaching the Gospel to the heathen, called forth from Brooks some of his richest efforts. He writes:

> 'Missionary life has most closely seized and tenaciously holds and lives by the essential, central life-idea of Christianity. What is that idea? That man is the child of God. That, beyond all doubt, is the idea of Christianity. Everything issues from, everything returns to, that. Man's first happiness, man's fallen life, man's endless struggle, man's quenchless hope—they are all bound up and find their explanation in the truth that man was and has never ceased to be, and is, the Child of God.'

But unquestionably the central point of his teaching was his doctrine of our Lord's Person:

> 'Not Christianity but Christ! Not a doctrine but a Person! Christianity only for Christ! The doctrine only for the Person!

Again, in his address on 'The Pulpit and popular Scepticism,' he writes:

> 'What man needs is a completer, livelier, presentation of this personality, so that He shall stand before them, and claim what always was his claim, "Believe in Me"; not "Believe this or that about Me," but "Believe in Me."'

Nowhere is this conviction more finely worked out than in the last section on 'The Influence of Jesus on the Intellectual Life of Man.' He is occupied with drawing a contrast between Socrates and Christ. He depicts the scene in the Athenian prison. Socrates is surrounded by his friends: the gaoler has prepared the poison: the discussion hovered and fluttered a little, but it soon settles down. It has become a sustained argument for immortality. It is very hard to think that this man is going to die, and knows it, who sits here calmly arguing that the soul must be immortal. And what were his arguments? Really they were three. First, the distinctness between the soul and the body, as testified to by a favourite Socratic doctrine, the preexistence of the soul. Next, the indestructibility of the soul from its simplicity, its incomposite nature. Finally, a long and subtle argument about ideas and the attempt to draw the distinction between the imperishable idea and the perishable attributes of life. These are his arguments. And the scene itself remains one of the most sacred pictures of the human soul. The prison cell is one of the temples of man's faith, one of the vestibules of immortality.

Then Phillips Brooks bids us turn the leaves of 400 years, and in 'the Upper Room,' on the night of the betrayal, feel the difference :

> 'As Jesus speaks, argument disappears. Conviction is attained by the immediate perception of life by life. "If ye had known me, ye should have known my Father also, and from henceforth ye both know Him and have seen Him . . . In my Father's house are many mansions. I go to prepare a place for you." This is the argument of Jesus for immortality. It is not right to say that Socrates appeals to the reason, and fails, while Jesus speaks to the heart and succeeds. The appeal of Jesus is to the reason, too, only it is to that spiritual reason which is no special function of the nature, but is the best action of the whole nature, working together, the affection and the will being the partners of the brain.'

Here we see the central point of Phillips Brooks' theology. The Lord's Person a living power in life, moving men, inspiring them, and convincing them of their eternal heritage.

## III.

I have little space left to deal with Phillips Brooks as a man. Yet this is the most vital and interesting part of my subject. What a man accomplishes, what a man thinks, are the outcome in a great measure, of what a man is.

First, there is his wonderful vitality and surpassing interest in life. There was a superabundance of spirits which showed themselves in merriment and fun. How this used to disturb his quiet and affectionate mother! Even after the boys had grown into men she still felt called upon to exercise her sway in quieting the tendency to uproar. When the Rector of Holy Trinity, Boston, and his brother, the Rector of St. Paul's, Cleveland, were on a home-visit, she is recalled as putting her head into the doorway of the room from which the sound of merriment came, and saying : 'Boys, remember it is Sunday.'

Throughout his life you feel the wonderful vitality of the man—active, energetic, wide-awake. No one valued more than he the preciousness of the life God had given him. His interests were not first in Nature, but in human life. We realise this as we read his masterly Lecture on Biography. 'I think,' he says, 'that I would rather have written a great biography than a great book of any other sort.' Once, at the Brunswick Hotel in Boston, when he was calling upon friends, someone spoke of the

green fields and beauties of Nature. He rose and looked out of the window, over nothing but roofs and chimney-tops, and said :

> 'Oh! No! not nature, but this beautiful view. Give me this, for these chimney-tops stand for life, for humanity, and that is what attracts me and makes life worth the living.'

As illustrating this preference, we find him writing : 'The Bible shows how the world progresses. It begins with a garden, but ends with a Holy City.' When Brooks points out that St. Paul builds his argument in I *Cor.* xv for immortality upon the richness and splendour of this mortal life, we see the same robust attitude :

> 'Often enough men have said, because this world is so full of wretchedness, therefore there must be another world . . . Paul makes heaven not a compensation, but a development.'

Everywhere there is the recognition of the beauty and the joy of life :

> 'How good is man's life the mere living! how fit to employ
> All the heart and the soul and the senses in fulness of joy!'

But this betokened in him a sensitiveness of feeling. He was not blind to the darker aspects of life. He did not shrink from its inequalities. Yet there was a healthy way of viewing things which prevented any approach to sentimentality. For example, he once remarked to a friend :

> 'I suppose that there are men passing this house every day wearing overalls, and carrying their dinner in tin-pails, who, if they happen to know where I live, look up at this house and say, with a sneer : "There is that grand house, and a clergyman lives there, a teacher of the religion of Jesus Christ. A fine sort of Christian teacher he must be to live in a grand house like that!" But I believe I have a right to live here, with this beauty and luxury about me. I enjoy it all, and I do my work as a Christian better for having these surroundings. A man is no better Christian for wearing overalls than for working in a beautifully furnished study. He can be one in either situation, if only he have the spirit of Christ.'

Phillips Brooks had a keen sense of humour, with a complete absence of that petty cynicism and straining after smart sayings. How excellent is his description of some Church Congress speeches : 'Like towing ideas out to sea, and then escaping from them by small boats in the fog.' A clergyman once said in jest that he was going abroad in order to bring back with him a new religion. 'You may have some difficulty in getting it through the customs,' someone remarked. 'No,' said Brooks,

'we may take it for granted that new religion will have no *duties* attached to it.' 'When I think of Phillips Brooks,' writes a correspondent, 'I recall the remark of Dr. Johnson that "the size of a man's understanding may be justly measured by his mirth."'

The most noticeable feature of his character was tolerance. In his treatise on tolerance he vindicated his own position, his mental freedom, his wide sympathies, his own tolerance for all sincere and earnest thought. It was this subject he chose to preach upon before the University of Cambridge in 1885. The late Dr. Hort, who heard him, wrote:

> 'The matter was admirable, a carefully thought out exposition of Maurice's doctrine of Tolerance as the fruit of strong belief, not of indifference.'

This sermon was afterwards expanded into the treatise. He firmly believed that the tolerance which was grounded on indifference to dogma, or rose from the ruins of its rejection, was a dangerous thing. True tolerance he defined as

> 'The willing consent that other men should hold and express opinions with which we disagree, until they are convinced by reason that those opinions are untrue.
>
> There must be positive conviction on our own part, and sympathy with men whose convictions differ from our own, the love of truth and the love of man, each brought to its perfection and living in harmony with one another . . . . . enfolded in the greater love of God.
>
> 'The real unity of Christendom is not to be found at last in identity of organisation, nor in identity of dogma. Both of those have been dreamed of and have failed . . . But in the unity of spiritual consecration to a common Lord . . . all souls shall be one with each other in virtue of that simple fact, in virtue of that common reaching after Christ, that common earnestness of loyalty to what we know of Him.'

So we may take leave of Phillips Brooks, peace-seeker, peace-maker, peace-bringer. None can question the greatness of his powers. All who were brought into contact with him were inspired to affection and to esteem.

R.P.

# SACRAMENTS IN HUMAN HISTORY

*ἃ θύει τὰ ἔθνη.—I Cor.* x, 20.

ONE wonders how many people who visited the special collection of antiquities from Ur of the Chaldees at the British Museum in the summer of 1928 came away possessed by a spirit of uneasy melancholy.

For we saw with our own eyes for the first time what one of the sacrificial customs of the ancient world actually meant, as we contemplated the piteous relics of those who had stood, ranged in the prime of strength and beauty, awaiting the hand of the slayer. The poignancy of the sight lay, I think, in the fact that it awoke a slumbering pain of mind, a heart-shaking recognition that there was something 'natural' in the tragedy. Was this due to race-memory *recognizing* one of the familiar calamities of the past?

Race-memory might also afford an explanation of the experience of an acquaintance of the writer, who was at Glastonbury not long ago and was particularly interested in the relationship of primitive Christianity there to the pagan worship which was, probably, its precursor in the holy island. One night my informant was haunted by a sense of gloom and apprehension, and then, in the early hours towards morning, after all ordinary noises had died into silence, was startled out of a drowsy restlessness into complete consciousness by a sudden sound. It was an attenuated but quite definite sound of weird music, like that of bagpipes confused with jangling instruments, and, without warning, it died away into a thin but piercing shriek, prolonged for some seconds.

The sounds may, of course, have come from some remote acoustic source; but to the listener (who considered them critically) they seemed to be located in the region of the mind that registers memorized tunes and unexpectedly reproduces them. Subsequently, the explanation suggested itself that the phenomenon was due to some psychic faculty reproducing the clamour and the horrible wail that were accompaniments of a human sacrifice in the pagan age, at the prompting of either subcon-

scious imagination, or race-memory, stimulated by the associations of the place. In either case the story serves as a reminder that behind one great class of religious rites in every religion lies the original rite of human sacrifice. The sacrificial mementos from ancient Ur were relics of a funerary rite; but human sacrifice entered as intimately into the direct worship of the gods of every religion.

About twenty years ago a very remarkable book[1] appeared, of which one main thesis was the idea that underlying all the brilliant city life of the Mediterranean races of the Classical period was the reluctant conviction of an ultimate obligation to human sacrifice, long after it had been normally discontinued. The authorities used in support of this thesis were, principally, the Greek Classics, but the Hebrew Scriptures and the history of Rome and Carthage also furnished contributions to the evidence. And, if we go farther afield, we find the idea enshrined in almost every ancient religion. The Egyptian kings, in remote historical times, sacrificed their enemies to the gods; the priests of Nineveh flayed alive the kings conquered by her armies; in the New Continent, down to a comparatively late date in the Christian era, the sacrifices of some of the Mexican tribes were holocausts of men.

And the slaughter of enemies was not the most poignant type of sacrifice. Some writers consider the story of the Passover in *Exodus* to be a revision of an account of a general sacrifice of first-born children, akin, perhaps, to the sacrifice of the Sacred Spring among the Romans, and to the Carthaginian orgies of child-sacrifice to Melchish, and the Israelitish practice of children offered to 'Moloch';[2] which had, perhaps, its counterpart in ancient Britain in the 'bale-fires' to which Caedmon likened the interrupted sacrifice of Isaac.

These awful sacrifices were, in their religious aspect, of three kinds.[3] (1) The most selfless was the *oblation*, the offering of pure devotion—such as Abraham's offering of his son—which sometimes, as in the case of Iphigenia, took the tinge of fear and the character of a propitiatory offering to a capricious deity.

[1] *Modern Greek Folk Lore and Ancient Greek Religion.* J. C. Lawson.

[2] *Moloch* is no doubt *Melek,* 'the King,' *i.e.* Yahweh.

[3] *Exploratio Evangelica,* ch. xxvi. Percy Gardner.

(2) Another kind of sacrifice—the *expiatory*—seems to have been derived from the *propitiatory*, but to have rested on a more definitely ethical basis. Micah the Prophet alludes to it: *Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression?* (vi, 7).

(3) The third kind of sacrifice has an entirely different motive; it is the *mystical*, or *sacramental*, sacrifice through which the worshippers seek communion with their god. In this, the original victim was the priest, whose *raison d'être* was his alleged possession by the spirit of the god and his sacrificial death, by which the divine spirit that dwelt in him was released, to enter into the worshippers.

To those who worshipped by means of any one of these appalling sacrificial rites, there was a dreadful majesty in it, the god appearing to their minds as concealed in clouds of lurid gloom. But we are appalled by the intense cruelty involved. In the case of the mystical sacrifice, the cruelty springs from the callousness of the worshippers; but, in that of the propitiatory or of the expiatory sacrifice, there is also the implied cruelty of the god who is rapacious of human suffering.

The quickening of the conscience which converted propitiatory sacrifices into expiatory led to a modification of ideas about the attitude of the god. The growing sense of responsibility towards one's fellow-men leads to a doubt whether human sacrifice is really pleasing to God. And for the child is substituted the lamb or the ram or the bullock. But it is only our callousness to the pain and terror of dumb creatures that makes us blind to the essential cruelty in all religious sacrifices involving slaughter.[4] And in the ancient world the callousness of mortals was reinforced by their conception of the nature of Immortal Deity. The Greeks who, gazing on the Parthenon frieze when it was in its place, might see reflected in it the agony of anticipation which they had often witnessed in the attitude and look of the victims led in the sacrificial processions, can have had no delusions about the cruel nature of sacrifice. But, though they had an eye for the piteous, lurking fears of the capricious cruelty of their gods made real pity pass them by.

And, even though one Hebrew Prophet had likened the Suffering Servant of Jehovah to *a lamb led to the slaughter*, and all

[4] The Hebrew word for altar, *mizbeak*, means the slaughter-place.

the great eighth century prophets, such as Micah, doubted whether the Lord had pleasure in the blood of bulls and goats, the nation at large, as represented by its priests, princes and populace, was oblivious of the cruelty of the Temple sacrifices, and a post-exilic prophet could represent 'the Lord of Hosts' as girding at the niggardly spirit which spared the whole animals and brought the 'torn and the lame and the sick' for sacrifice. (There was, of course, the spiritual truth expressed in his words —that oblations to God must be of a man's best.)

After the substitution of dumb creatures for children and men, there was very little change—and very little difference—in the expiatory rites of the different races of the ancient world; but there was a considerable, and a diverse, development in the character of their sacramental rites. Here, as elsewhere, the first change was in the replacement of the priest by an animal victim, in which the god had his temporary abode. And the sacrifice of the animal was never discontinued; *e.g.* lambs for each household were slaughtered at the Jewish Passover, together with other animals, which, perhaps, had an expiatory significance. And at the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries pigs were slain. But a whole new feature was added to the mystic rite, such as to bring into play the imaginative, or aesthetic, faculties of the worshippers. This feature was a commemoration of the mythical elements of their religion.

This is true even of the Hebrews; for to them their own history was their great religious μῦθος (*mythus*), and the Passover was the commemoration of the marvellous deliverance that Jehovah had wrought for them; and the recital of the story, in later days at any rate, by the father of each household, reinforced by prayer and psalm, brought the worshippers into communion with the Divine Father of their race, whose triumph was one with theirs.

The Greeks followed so closely the dramatic representation of the legends of their gods that they appear to have re-lived the story in an ecstatic condition which brought them into communion with the creative spirit immanent in nature.

This pagan type of sacrament had a special kind of evil bound up with it—sensuality. But we must not forget that the Jewish sacramental ordinance accentuated, even, perhaps, more

than the Gentile, the evil of disregarded cruelty. There is room for speculation as to whether it was not, principally, humane indignation that inspired the Lord Jesus, when, in the days preceding the Passover, He drove the sheep and oxen out of the Temple courts, which He likened to a 'den of brigands.'

One tradition about James 'the Lord's brother' is that he ate no meat, and this seems to be in harmony with the fact that Jesus Himself ordained 'broken bread' and wine poured out to be memorials of Himself. It is now debated whether He intended to institute a definite rite, and, if so, whether it was to take the place of the Jewish Passover; but the fact is certain that the 'breaking of bread' was from the beginning of the Christian Church the simple rite in which He was commemorated by His followers, and, moreover, that it gradually absorbed into itself the most spiritual features of the Jewish sacrament and, also, some of the higher characteristics of the Pagan mysteries. These seem, at the outset, to have brought with them into the Christian rite traces of the typical evil of Paganism—sensuality. Not the worst forms of it, but the sensual side of good-fellowship, of indulgence in eating and drinking. St. Paul's rebuke to the Christians of Corinth for 'eating and drinking unworthily' has rung through the centuries; and the exact form of that unworthiness has not been repeated. But perhaps the essential guilt has been present where the Sacrament has been used *solely* as an earnest of some kind of fellowship which falls short of Christian fellowship—of political fellowship, or of religious partisanship.

The true importance of Christ's own ordinance—or expressed desire—lay far deeper than in any ritual significance; for it was only the symbol of the new principle of sacrifice which He was about to establish by His death—that no sacrifice is acceptable to God but self-sacrifice;[5] the giving of one's own body, soul and spirit to God, without counting the cost.

There had been noble individuals in all ages who had recognized this truth—the priests of prehistoric times who had given their lives freely in the tribal sacrament, and such others as the priestesess near Mt. Atlas who flung themselves into the waves of the ocean as a propitiation to the pitiless god of the sea; or as

[5] He would not allow His followers to have a reluctant share in His fate. *Let these go their way.*

Hamilcar, who, when his armies were routed by the Romans, called on the gods of Carthage and, lighting the sacrificial fire, leaped into it himself. And some of these may well, in some degree like Christ, have made of death only a culmination of the living sacrifice of dedicated lives. *Many shall come from the east and the west and shall sit down in the kingdom of God.*

But HE, by His example, established the universal principle of Self-Sacrifice. *I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me.*

In the writings of the New Testament we see the sacrifice of the Cross regarded (1) as the supreme oblation to God; (2) as an expiatory sacrifice; rather, in the sense of a sacrifice of reconciliation; and (3) as the mystic sacrifice, the eternal sacrament, in which the followers of Christ become partakers of the life of God, in Him.

St. Paul was the great exponent of the sacrifice of expiation; and it was the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews who worked out in detail the sacramental aspect of Christ's death.[6] He did so by returning to the primitive idea of a priest as one who died that his brethren might live in God, and to him the Cross is the sacramental altar of the Christian fellowship.

The author of St. John's Gospel emphasizes the sacrifice as an oblation. *Therefore doth my Father love me because I lay down my life*—but He is laying it down 'for the sheep.'

For in all the New Testament writings the different ideas of sacrifice shade into one another; probably the truth is that it is only our minds that differentiate between them, and that every sacrifice consists actually in self-surrender to God, the rest being the accomplishment of His will in and through the dedicated soul. *Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone. . . .*

That is why, perhaps, the Christian sacrament was able to attract to itself ideas derived from every kind of religious sacrifice with which the past had made men familiar. We are acquainted with them in the Anglican Communion Office, which is, for English Churchmen, the epitome of this glorious rite. There the rite is treated as commemorative of Christ's 'oblation of Himself once offered,' and the idea of oblation is carried into

[6] *The Epistle of Priesthood.* A. Nairne.

the immediate experience of the worshippers, who definitely 'offer and present themselves, their souls and bodies, to be a reasonable, holy and living sacrifice': and, again, His sacrifice of reconciliation is commemorated as a 'full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world.' But the main idea in the rite is that it is an occasion for actual participation in the mystical Body and Blood of the Lord. There has always been a consensus of the majority of Christians in this opinion, though they disagree as to the nature of the 'means of grace' through which communion is attained.

And because in this aspect the rite, very early, came to be regarded as an actual projection into time of the great eternal sacrament—the mystic sacrifice of the Lamb—there followed a natural tendency to recognize in it, also, an actual expiatory offering which was one with the eternal sacrifice of reconciliation. This view eventually became one of the points at issue between those who held the mediaeval tradition untouched and those who tried to rid themselves of what they held to be accretions to the doctrine of primitive Christianity. It is carefully avoided in the Prayer Book of 1662; but we find it expressed in some Anglican hymns of the nineteenth century, *e.g.* in the lines

> 'For lo! between our sins and their reward
> We set the passion of Thy Son, our Lord.'

Was it through the channel of some such dark view of the mercy of God that the evil spirit which the Lord had excluded from a place in His memorial rite returned to it, as to a house swept and garnished by the devotion of His followers — the same spirit of cruelty as that which had sheltered itself under the Jewish sacramental ordinances, but disguised under a new form—that of ecclesiastical rigour?

By the third (or fourth) century of the Christian era the Sacrament was being applied to punitive purposes; *i.e.* excommunication became a retrospective penalty for sins of the flesh which had been actually abandoned. There was, no doubt, justification for the withholding of the sacrament from those who obstinately continued in their sin, because wilful sin rends the Body of Christ by making one of its members out of harmony with His will; but it was the repentant, also, who were deprived of communion for long terms of years, during which Christian

marriage was also forbidden to them—an almost savage discipline, very far from the spirit of Christ's earthly life.

The entrance of the Barbarians into the Church brought with it an enhanced spirit of harshness, and of the desire for 'maistrye'; and in early mediaeval times excommunication was used, not only for moral discipline, but as a means of breaking down ecclesiastical opposition, which was often mainly political; and in its most inhumane form it was extended to numbers of wholly innocent people when the territory of a contumacious magnate was laid under an Interdict. Excommunication was also imposed by parish priests on parishioners who would not pay their tithes — though this imposition was discountenanced by Papal authority.

But, a little later, a worse thing happened, when certain forms of Eucharistic doctrine were penalized, and those who promoted, or even held, them, were punished by a form of death which revived the old human sacrifices proper to primitive paganism.

The spread of the humanities after the Renaissance gradually brought to life a disapproval of the infliction of bodily suffering in religious causes; but the impulse to use the Sacrament as an instrument of painful discipline persisted. To give some random examples of this: In the Church of England, till the last century, the Communicant Test was applied as a method of depriving Nonconformists and Roman Catholics of public advancement. Again, from the seventeenth century till the present day, in the Roman Catholic Church excommunication has been imposed, at least on the clergy, as a penalty for heterodoxy and contumacy.

And in the sphere of Eucharistic observance—whether in our own day or in the past—the law of self-sacrifice has been too seldom vindicated by being put to the proof. It was in connection with a dispute about a religious observance that St. Paul wrote, *Let no man seek his own, but every man another's good* (I *Cor.* x, 24, R.V.).

M. C. Malim.

# SOME IMPLICATIONS OF MODERNISM

By the Rev. Ronald Allen, M.A., M.C.

MODERNISM has been described as 'The claim of the modern mind to determine what is true, right, and beautiful in the light of its own experience, even though its conclusions be in contradiction to those of tradition.' It is the attitude of mind of the artist, the scientist, and the prophet.

Before, beyond, and within all things lies the mystery of Reality, apprehensible but not comprehensible by finite minds. Modernism is man's conscious effort to approach ever nearer to Reality. It is also his attempt to share his experience with his fellow-men, to make it available for the people of his time. It, therefore, attempts to perform a twofold task of discovery and interpretation.

Modernism is not exclusively religious; there are Modernist movements in science and art. Nor is religious Modernism exclusively Christian; there are Modernist movements in Judaism, in Hinduism, in Buddhism and in Mohammedanism. Nor does Modernism belong exclusively to the present day. Whenever in General Smut's great phrase, 'Mankind has struck its tents and the great caravan of humanity is on the march,' there is a movement which should rightly be called Modernist. The Renaissance and Reformation were in certain aspects Modernist movements. And there have never been uttered two more Modernist statements than these:

> 'It was said to them of old time . . . but I say unto you . . .
>
> And again
>
> Think not that I am come to destroy. . .
> I am not come to destroy but to fulfil.'

Hence although the spirit of Modernism remains the same, yet both the content and expression of Modernism are continually changing. New revelations of reality modify old beliefs; new methods of life require that truth should be expressed in new forms. Moreover, the Modernism of to-day tends to become the Traditionalism of to-morrow. Dogma, or the verbal formulation

of truth, tends to petrify. It has been described as enshrining the living faith of the dead and the dead faith of the living.

This does not mean that Modernism and Traditionalism are mutually antagonistic; they are not antagonistic but complementary. Modernism without the background of Traditionalism has nothing against which to test the validity of new experience, and would exchange the continuity of progressive thought for mere private speculation. But it is equally true that Traditionalism must embrace Modernism. Otherwise Traditionalism degenerates into superstition, and ultimately dies of inanition. Moreover, if it attempts to raise barriers behind which to protect itself and humanity from the encroachments of Modernism, sooner or later humanity will burst those barriers by violent means. Furthermore, if Traditionalism denies to humanity that vision, without which the people perish, and will not permit Modernism to express new intimations of reality in terms of present-day thought, insurgent humanity when it rises to take charge of the situation, as it inevitably does, flies at one bound from the dogmatism of the past to a new and even more irrational dogmatism of the future. This, for example, is exhibited in the past and present history of the religion of the Russians. Hence another characteristic of Modernism emerges. It is essentially mediating.

But underlying this discussion as to the relative places of Modernism and Traditionalism lies the question of finality. Is there not in the Christian religion a finality which it is the business of both Traditionalism and Modernism to uphold? We can best attempt an answer to this question by distinguishing between the interpretative and the experiential, aspects of Modernism. In so far as Modernism is interpretative, unquestionably there can be no finality so long as human history continues, since Modernism seeks continually to find new forms of expression, new myths and metaphors taken from the everyday life of the times in which to express the mysteries of Reality.

It is easy, for example, to see this process at work in art, and the fact that in this matter organized religion has lagged behind is one of the reasons for the emptiness of the churches.

But what of the experiential aspect of religious Modernism? Does not, for instance, the Incarnation represent finality?

The answer seems to be 'yes' and 'no.' 'Yes,' as the revelation of God to man; 'no,' because finality will only be reached when of the whole of mankind it shall be true, as St. Paul says, 'They know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge and are filled unto all the fullness of God.' Moreover, this will not come about by literally copying Christ, even if that were possible, but only in so far as the love, wisdom, truth, and beauty of God become not only immanent, but also incarnate in human lives. And whenever the Spirit of God does so become incarnate He expresses Himself creatively, forging that particular type of character, with those particular capabilities and no less those particular limitations that are appropriate for each individual in that place in the universe in which he finds himself. For as St. Paul also says, 'We are many members of one body.'

In spite, therefore, of the logical finality demanded by religion, and the historical finality of perfection reached by Christ, there is a place for Modernism both interpretive and creative, and there will remain such a place until the end of time.

We are now, I think, in a position to indicate very briefly the attitude of present-day English Modernism with regard to certain other attitudes of mind. I select three—science, dogma, and faith.

It is a platitude to say that we live in an age of science. The scientific methods of induction from observed facts; of classification, analysis and explanation have penetrated into nearly every sphere of life. Not only the material world but history, religion and the human mind are alike laid on the dissecting table and under the microscope.

Moreover, the scientific outlook with its insistence on accuracy and sincerity, and its recognition of vast unfathomed mysteries has an appeal extending far beyond the laboratories. To all this the Modernist both in his interpretative and experiential capacities raises no objection.

Essentially a child of his age, he endeavours to interpret his own intimations of reality in metaphors taken from the domain of science. But also, he admits the claim of science to include every sphere of life within the scope of its investigations, and welcomes especially the light thrown by the scientific method

upon such subjects as the study of the Bible, comparative religion and psychology. Believing the Spirit of God to be continually drawing all men to Himself, he accepts the discoveries of science as evidences of the operation of that Spirit. But recognizing that God works through human instruments, he is not perturbed by the partial and transitory nature of those discoveries. He identifies himself with such discoveries as have been made, but is not afraid to abandon them in the light of further knowledge. An example of this is to be found in his changing attitude with regard to the possibility of miracle in the light of the abandonment by science of the conception of a closed universe. To the Traditionalist he may often seem to 'be tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine,' but he is not alarmed by the indictment, since he is not ashamed to admit ignorance and error. He would subscribe to the words of Erasmus: 'By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.' He would also subscribe to these words taken from Dr. Stanley Jones' book, *The Christ of Every Road*.

> 'I am not afraid that men will be too scientific. I am afraid that they will not be scientific enough. I am persuaded that if we go far enough with the facts they will lead us to the central fact of our moral and spiritual universe—Christ.'

But at the same time, while paying this homage to Science, the Modernist (and not only the Modernist in religion) believes that Science is only one method of approach to Reality, and is not sufficient by itself. The further it goes, the more perfect its methods and the more complete its system, the more Science is coming to realize that Reality itself escapes it. It is discovering not so much what things are, as what they are like and what is their relationship one to another. Both in its methods and in its results, Science is approaching Art. Art is the attempt not to comprehend Reality, but to apprehend it by giving sacramental expression to it. 'Expression,' writes Whitehead, 'is the one fundamental sacrament.' Moreover, just as Science uses the methods of Art, so also Art borrows from Science. Artistic expression is accurate and satisfying only in so far as it is supported by the scientific laws of perspective, proportion, com-

position, harmony or prosody. It may indeed disregard one or other of these laws in order to intensify particular impressions, but it must disregard them consciously and purposely with full knowledge of what it is doing. Otherwise it fails. Yet neither art nor science is man's supreme method of giving expression to Reality. The final method is Religion, and both Science and Art are subservient to it. Religion at its highest is man's attempt to express Reality by living in harmony with it. It is concerned with the whole of life, of which both Science and Art are but parts. It is passed on by the influence of one life upon another. The urge to Science is man's quest for truth, the effect of it to enable life to be lived more nobly and effectively. The urge to Art is man's quest for beauty, the effect of it to enable life to be lived more beautifully. But the urge to Religion is man's quest for, or rather his calling by, God; the effect of it is to enable God most fully to reveal Himself and to beckon to the next generation of men.

We pass to the consideration of the Modernist's attitude to dogma. 'Religious dogma,' writes Professor Whitehead, 'is the attempt to formulate in precise terms the truths contained in the religious consciousness of mankind.' For the reasons which have been put forward in the preceding paragraph of this essay, dogma is compelled to use the methods both of Science and of Art. In so far as possible it endeavours to define the truths of Reality with scientific accuracy. But since Reality for ever escapes it, it is compelled to attempt to give pictorial expression to experience by the use of metaphor and myth. Now to Modernism no particular expression of dogma is sacrosanct for two reasons. Where dogma is scientific, the Modernist believes that it is continually possible to approach to greater degrees of accuracy in the light of new knowledge and improved methods. Where it attempts to be pictorial, he believes that the metaphors are continually in need of renewal in order that they may be kept in touch with the changing order of society and so be understanded of the people. To rest upon dogma is a subtle form of idolatry, and there is nothing which more effectively bars the way to new spiritual experience and to all progress in thought. 'Religions,' writes Professor Whitehead, 'commit suicide when they find their inspiration in their dogmas.'

But when the true character of dogma is understood, its existence is seen to be a necessity. It is the vital element in Traditionalism. Christian dogmas are roughly divisible and have been so divided by Dr. Major into three classes, spiritual, historical and scholastic, in that order of importance. By spiritual dogmas are meant the 'basic truths of the spiritual life,' as for instance, 'That God, Who is Love and Light and Truth, is our Father, the express image of Whose character and will is seen in Jesus Christ,' Who is thus the Saviour, and Redeemer, of mankind and the pattern of true humanity. Now these dogmas are the attempt to express in words the sole essentials of the Christian religion and the sole necessities of discipleship. But religion does not exist in 'believing' those dogmas, since they are not amenable to complete logical demonstration. The test of their validity is experience. They come to life only when lives are lived in the light of them. It is also worth noticing that they are all pictorial. Love, Light, Truth and Father, applied to the Godhead are metaphors taken from human experience; so are the conceptions Saviour and Redeemer. But this is not to say that the underlying truths are any the less real; it is to say that metaphor is the least inadequate way of giving verbal expression to them.

The second 'historical' class of dogma includes such statements as that Jesus was born of the Virgin Mary, was crucified under Pontius Pilate, died and rose again on the third day, leaving the tomb empty. Now history is partly the scientific record of facts, partly the attempt to portray the significance of those facts to the historian and his contemporaries, by arrangement, emphasis, selection, suppression, and even by the use of legend. The attitude of the Modernist of later time varies according to whether he is dealing with the facts or with their significance. In so far as he is dealing with the former he is bound to follow the methods of scientific historical criticism, to preserve an open mind and if necessary to accept the verdict not proven. In so far as he is dealing with their significance, he has to approach the problem first of all historically, noticing what that significance was for the age in which the facts are alleged to have happened, and secondly he has to determine whether or not they have the same significance or indeed any

significance for the age in which he himself lives. Only by this method will he avoid both going astray himself and leading others astray with him.

The third 'scholastic' class of dogmas are the speculations of the Greek and Latin Fathers, Mediaeval Schoolmen and Protestant Reformers, such as the Dogma of the Trinity in Unity. These too the Modernist believes are only valuable to-day in so far as they are approached historically. If they are made the *sine qua non* of Christian discipleship, to be accepted whether or not they are properly understood, they become a burden too grievous to be borne. As Richard Baxter said, 'The plague of the Church for above a thousand years has been the enlarging our Creed and making more fundamentals than God ever made.' But if they are approached historically, they are valuable as the conclusions of a Church which almost uniformly decided rightly against definite heresies and which was compelled to go deeper into the mysteries of certain aspects of Reality than the present age is perhaps capable of doing. Even then their value is negative rather than positive. They are the negation of heresy rather than the definition of reality which as always eludes definition. (In other words, they are valuable as a series of warnings marking the precipices on either side of the narrow road to truth, but as a notice-board in the centre of the path reading 'thus far, and no further,' they are pernicious.)

No Modernist who attempts to explain his attitude to religion ever escapes the question, 'Where is your faith?' and it is usually at this stage that the accusing finger is pointed at him. We must attempt therefore to make clear his position.

Faith for the Modernist is not the unquestioning acceptance of authority, whether of the past or present. He has no infallibilities; not the Church, since, in the language of the XXIst Article, 'General Councils . . . be an assembly of men, whereof all be not governed with the Spirit and Word of God,' and which 'may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining to God'; and not the Bible, since it requires an interpreter and can be and has been variously interpreted; not science, since it makes no pretentions to finality; and not art, since no artist claims to have arrived at perfection of technique; not the Vox Populi, since whatever it may claim to be it is not

the Vox Dei; and not the individual conscience, since the Modernist knows himself to be fallible. Those who demand infallibilities seem to him to be actuated not by faith but by panic.

Faith, for the Modernist, is quite simply his relationship to the mystery of Reality. It has four aspects—trust, quest, communion, co-operation. The Modernist starts with the unproven assumption that the Reality is beautiful, rational and moral, an assumption which while often rendered more probable by experience, remains unproven to the end. Moreover, the taking of probability as the guide to life involves the necessity of from time to time living with the probable seeming to be improbable. Logically, of course, the alternative to this assumption is complete scepticism and the abandonment of any attempt to find meaning in life. Yet as a rule the assumption is not held as a result of any rationalization, it is rather an intuitive trust like the trust of a small child. It is expressed in such phrases as 'We love God because He first loved us.' 'Thou hast formed us for Thyself and our hearts are restless until they rest in Thee.' A corollary of faith in the Rationality of Reality is the belief that the Universe is an organic whole in which all the parts are inter-related. It is this which gives to faith a social aspect. Claiming the right to determine what is true, right and beautiful in the light of his own individual experience, the Modernist is also bound to allow the same right to everyone else. Claiming the right to share his interpretation of Reality with his fellowmen, he abandons the right to force it upon them.

The second aspect of the Faith of a Modernist may be summed up in the word quest. He is like Abraham who according to the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, 'when he was called, obeyed to go out unto a place which he was to receive for an inheritance; and he went out, not knowing whither he went . . . for he looked for the city which hath the foundations, whose builder and maker is God.' Yet having found, he is soon on the road again. He is conscious also that 'We have not here the abiding city, but we seek after the city which is to come.' For him as for Stevenson's traveller, 'To travel hopefully is a better thing than to arrive.' The spires of El Dorado remain for ever upon the horizon.

The third aspect of the faith of a Modernist is represented by the word 'communion.' Communion with Reality is ultimately the supreme quest of every seeker and the driving force of all science, art and religion. But to the Christian it takes the particular form of communion with One who exhibits and transcends the characteristics of a living Personality. The logical ground for this attempted communion is the conviction that Reality must be such as to account for the highest expression of it hitherto revealed to man, namely, human personality at its highest. The historical ground is the series of historical events which are summed up in the dogma of the Incarnation. The practical ground is the conviction that the most fundamental thing known to man is that relationship between self-conscious personalities which is called Love. In seeking personal communion with a Personal God the Modernist naturally uses every method to understand the Character of God, seeking by Science the self-revelation of God in the Universe, by Art the self-revelation of God through the sacrament of Beauty, by History the self-revelation of God in human relationships, by Biography the self-revelation of God in human character and supremely in the character of Jesus of Nazareth, by Love the self-revelation of God in living humanity. All these methods help to make direct mystical communion richer and more real. Gradually there emerges what is perhaps best described as a dogma of God, taking partly the form of a concept and partly the form of a mental image, and conceived of either as Father exhibiting all the characteristics revealed by Christ, or as Christ but endowed with all the capabilities attributed to the Father, or as Spirit but exhibiting the characteristics of both Father and Son. The richest dogma is the Christian dogma of the Trinity, but it remains true that in worship there is not a consciousness of the Divine as a Duality or Trinity of Persons. It also remains true that however rich and accurate the concept or image which we form, it remains a concept or an image and is not God nor Christ. As a dogma it is valuable and necessary as an aid to worship, a channel of approach to communion with God. But worship of a dogma is no less idolatry because the dogma is a figment of the mind. Our images and our conceptions of God change; they become less or more accurate; but God abides, uncreate, in-

comprehensible, eternal. And if this be a hard saying, consider the human relationship known as Love. Between two who love there is also a communion of independent, and interdependent personalities. Yet on each side the object of Love is something which Art cannot fully portray, nor words express, nor thought conceive, something which is at once mysterious and real.

There is, however, a fourth aspect of faith. Not without our seeking, but seldom if ever at our beck and call, there comes a consciousness of co-operation with God. This is the faith that removes mountains, and is invincible. For a brief moment we become amazedly but most gratefully conscious of being the tool of the creative power of God. Even to those who are religious such faith is usually evanescent. But to a Brother Lawrence, a Sadhu Sundar Singh, a St. Paul, and most of all to our Lord Jesus Christ, it approaches permanence. Yet it seems probable that even here God respects and works through our human limitations. Such capacities as we have, our sympathy, our knowledge, our skill, our love, are exalted to the 'nth degree,' but God can use us only in so far as we have somewhat to offer in His service. Our task is to become not empty channels, but living instruments of His love. Our duty is both to develop and to limit our activities. 'Are all prophets? are all teachers? are all workers of miracles?'

Let us now bring the argument of this essay to a conclusion by considering Modernism against the background of the life of to-day. The first report of the Jerusalem Conference opens with these words: 'Throughout the world there is a sense of insecurity and instability. Ancient religions are undergoing modification, and in some regions dissolution, as scientific and commercial development alter the current of men's thought . . . On all sides doubt is expressed whether there is any absolute truth or goodness. A new relativism struggles to enthrone itself in human thought . . .

'Amid widespread indifference and immersion in material concerns, we find also everywhere, now in noble forms and now in licence or extravagance, a great yearning, especially among the youth of the world, for the full and untrammelled expression of personality, for spiritual leadership and authority.'

What, if anything, has Modernism to offer to meet this yearning? Let it at once be admitted that the Modernist starts with what is *prima facie* a disadvantage. He cannot offer the external authority of any infallibility. From time to time he sees men and women, when the yearning becomes too strong for them, flying to the arms of those older theological systems which claim to have infallibility, or to their less worthy modern counterparts. He cannot accompany them there, since he believes the ways of such systems are the ways of death. Moreover, when he hears his own Church claiming infallibility he is bound to criticize that Church. But while he can and must put forward what semes to him the more excellent way, yet in the last resort he is bound to allow to others the same liberty of judgment which he claims for himself.

But against this disadvantage the Modernist has one great countervailing advantage. He stands down in the world as a man among his fellows. He is one of them. He shares at once their doubts and their yearning. He does not hide, and is not ashamed to admit, that he is

> An infant crying in the night,
> An infant crying for the light,
> And with no language but a cry.

Moreover, the Modernist respects each man's individuality. Claiming the right to determine the true, the good and the beautiful in the light of his own experience, he is bound to allow a similar right to all other men. He cannot force his beliefs upon others; he can only offer them to be accepted or rejected as each man wills. He is as ready to learn as to teach.

And yet the Modernist knows that his business is not to make others follow him, nor even to make them accept his theological system or his Church, but to help them to find and obey God.

# REUNION FROM ABOVE OR BELOW?

By the Rev. C. H. D. Grimes, M.A., F.R.G.S., F.R.Hist.S.

THERE are two ways of tackling the problem of the Reunion of Christendom. One way, and the best-known way which has almost invariably been followed in the past, is to bring together the leading theologians and the recognised heads of the different Churches, and to get them to consult together as to what measure of agreement can be found. Such a method was tried two years ago on a very large scale at Lausanne, after many years of careful preparation. The results were, however, apparently exceedingly small. Probably the chief reason for this was that the Roman Church refused to take any part in it, and so the English and Greek Churches in particular hesitated to do anything which might ultimately lead to drawing them still further apart from the Christian Church which has the largest body of adherents in the world. Lausanne was crippled by the absence of Rome in a much greater degree than the League of Nations is by the absence of Russia and America, and while in another ten years both of these may be members of the League, as things are at present there is not the slightest sign of Rome changing her attitude. The Malines Conference, which was again a meeting of leaders of the English and Roman Churches, produced no visible result. But I do not write with the object of discussing the futility or otherwise of these conferences of leaders—the Dean of Canterbury is the man we should turn to for advice on so intricate a subject. My object is to draw attention to another and, I believe, more hopeful line of approach. It seems agreed now that so long as we look to the experts and their conferences, no solution will ever be found of the question of naval disarmament. In just the same way no solution will ever be found of our doctrinal differences so long as we look to the experts mainly. But as the different governments, responding to the great popular demands for disarmament, are putting in their right relationship their experts and technical details as far as possible, in order to satisfy this popular demand for progress, so it seems to us that something like this is taking place or will soon take place in the realm of religion.

The second way to reunion is then from below—the people forcing their leaders to take real action, instead of the initiative coming from the leaders themselves, the new function of the leaders being to find a satisfactory formula to cover the points of agreement. This is the most healthy and hopeful line, since without the popular support the leaders in any case are valueless.

Now let us trace a few of the popular forces at work in the matter of reunion. Chief among these is surely that great democratic force, the wireless. The people all over the Continent of Europe, where the great divisions of Christendom remain more strongly marked, hear every Sunday on the T.S.F. the services of the best churches of the different divisions.

Distance, shyness, fear of ecclesiastical censure, have prevented many from hearing divine service as it is conducted by any other Church but their own, and so from youth up they have acquired strong prejudices, which later on are almost impossible to remove.

Certainly I know that many Roman Catholics on the Continent have acquired a very different and much higher idea of the English Church since they listened to the services of some of the best English churches. The rendering of the service in the vulgar tongue, the prominent part taken by the congregation, the hearty way in which the hymns are sung, make a strong appeal to them; while the short sermon, without trenching on party politics, teaching always good citizenship as being one with good churchmanship, has much which commends it to them. At the same time, others who listen to the Roman service will often acknowledge that it is not the formal thing they had once thought it. If in the few years of its existence the T.S.F. has done so much for Reunion, especially in the case of the most difficult partner, who has not yet found a way of putting it on the Index, what may we not hope for in another decade or two? Armed with this great weapon, democracy is more firmly seated in the saddle, and as the greatest political autocracies have had to give way before it, so must the same be true of all religious autocracies, even the greatest.

We will say nothing about the spread of education, because that is so obvious. Let us refer to another and smaller force

which has come under our notice. We have already said that the Malines Conference was apparently productive of little good so far as the leaders were concerned, but it has had indirect results among the rank and file. A well-informed Belgian told me that the Roman Catholics in that country had come to regard the English Church in a very much more appreciative light since their beloved Cardinal had taken so much pains to try and bring the two Churches together. It had become obvious to them that the English Church must have a much stronger position theologically than any of them had supposed. The English Church in Belgium, supported as it is by the State, respected by the nation as a whole as the Church of the Power which helped them so generously in the war, and respected by many of the Roman Catholics because of Cardinal Mercier's attitude, might do much for Reunion—more than it is actually attempting—if it realized its *rôle* and grasped its possibilities.

Let us here note another small point, but one which seems to show again the indirect influence of the Malines Conference. I was a short time ago at Malines Cathedral, when a young priest came up, and seeing that I was a priest of the English Church he kindly explained the Cathedral to me. He pointed out that they had little stained glass; much had been destroyed in the war, and in any case, he said, Cardinal Mercier had wished to have the Cathedral as light as possible and did not hanker after stained glass. He also showed me how the Cardinal had so arranged the choir that the screen between chancel and nave had now been reduced to a very low wall, smaller than exists in most parish churches in England, because he wished to do away as far as he could with the separation of the clergy and the people; and he had also raised the altar by gradual stages till it stood eight steps above the nave, so that the people could see quite clearly what the priest was doing. He said, also, he had encouraged congregational singing. These changes, carried on by his successor, seem to point to the fact that in the primatial diocese of Belgium some real steps have been taken to approximate to English ideals and therefore towards Reunion.

If in Belgium the English Church can play some part in drawing together great Churches through a sympathetic movement of their different adherents, this is even more true in Hol-

land. Every English Church in Holland has a considerable number of Dutch adherents who come to it because they prefer the Liturgical Service and the short sermons to their own, where they find the service too dull and the sermon so long as to become inevitably prosy. At the Hague a new Church has been built entirely on English lines under the direction of its Dutch pastor, and the service used there is modelled on the English Prayer Book, being drawn up by the pastor's wife, a Dutch baroness. The Church is crowded every Sunday with a congregation in which young people seem to be in the ascendant. This contrasts very much with the remark of a very intelligent young Dutchman to me that no one but old Die-Hards now go to church among the Dutch Protestants. In another English church a Dutch student who is reading for his Doctorate of Theology, for which he proposes to take reunion as the subject of his thesis, has been confirmed and become a regular communicant. He hopes after taking his Doctorate to obtain a lectureship and so to continue to work for reunion.

The Archbishop of the old Catholic church is on very friendly terms with the English church, as his predecessors have always been, and between the two churches there has been established the rule that in the absence of their own priests members of the one church can communicate at the altars of the other. I ought also to add that many of the younger Dutch pastors view with favour the English form of service, and some have even suggested the possibility of being allowed on occasions to use an English church for their service, so that they could demonstrate to their people the value of a different arrangement of their own church with Altar, etc. In Switzerland also the professor of ecclesiastical history at one of their universities assured me that to retain their younger people it was necessary to get away from the bare service and the long sermons to which they had been accustomed. Thus it will be found that there is a general desire among the younger generation to have a liturgical service which while not necessarily modelled on English lines, should be far nearer to it than has been the case in the past. Probably none would wish for a standardized form of service for all nations, such as Rome sets out to supply; this would make for poverty and not for wealth of devotion, but the popular demand every-

where would seem to be for a greater uniformity of service than exists to-day, and in this connection it is unnecessary to add that Anglo-Catholics are playing their part in bringing much that is good in Romanism into the English Church and so helping to bridge over the gulf.

For better or for worse it cannot be said that points in the creeds over which theologians spend so much time, as, for example, the *Filioque* clauses which once split two great Churches, have any place in the popular mind. Nor if left to themselves would they keep them apart. They would seem to demand rather a simple form of liturgical service with an historic setting, into which each can as he actually does to-day read his own meaning. I am not here concerned to advocate what should be or what is best, but only the certain tendency of the popular movement.

We are of course told that Rome will never consent to reunion except on her own terms, and certainly if by Rome we mean the Vatican as now constituted, that is entirely true. But we cannot be blind to the fact that though just now amid so much disintegration as we see going on around us, the united front which Rome is able to preserve is giving her a great advantage; yet there are other forces which are at work to-day undermining all autocracies and which are not likely to be unsuccessful in dealing with the oldest autocracy, steer its course as carefully as it will.

The Concordat of the Pope and Mussolini heralded a great advance, but it has its dangerous side. To the French the Pope has now become more definitely Italian, and the loyalty of the French Church, strained by the attitude of the Papacy in the War and over the Action Française, may become more so, and one hears again talk of a Gallican Church which would certainly be far more favourable to union with the rest of Christendom than French Catholicism can be to-day. Or as is more likely, it may lead to a non-Italian, therefore less ultra-montane Pope. The Pope again seeing rightly the danger to the rigidly separatist position of Rome which such an International Movement as Rotary involves, only at the last moment withdrew his threatened veto, largely no doubt because he realized that such a veto would certainly in America be a tremendous blow to Roman Catholicism and by many Romans would be ignored.

But that veto still applies to priests. Rotary, as its authors claim, is not a religion, but its high ethical Code naturally draws into its ranks some of the most earnest and religious men of all Churches, since it asks no question about religion and does thus help to break down not only national but religious barriers. Through it I have had the opportunity of entering on the most friendly terms with circles exclusively Roman Catholic, which otherwise would be closed to me. Rotary is indeed only one of a great number of international movements which are moving with enormous rapidity and whose very existence is a protest against the rigidity with which barriers whether of nation, class or religion have been observed in the past. I have not here mentioned such a distinctly Christian international movement as the Student Christian Movement, of whose existence I have just been reminded by seeing a body of students from Birmingham University on their way to attend the annual Conference of Dutch Students at Nunspect, and whose headquarters is rightly at Geneva.

To conclude, I believe that reunion is being brought about in a way not commonly talked about, *viz.* from below rather than from above, as I have defined these terms. The reunion which has just been accomplished in Scotland and the reunion going on in South India and also the reunion in Canada are partial or regional agreements somewhat similar to the agreements which are advocated between nations at Geneva. They prepare the way for a greater measure of reunion. These also it should be made clear have really been brought about by pressure from below and not from above. In the case of Scotland, it was realization of the fact that the Presbyterian Churches were gradually being crushed out between the growing forces of Roman Catholicism and Anglicanism which prompted such action. In Canada the economic factor, the waste of money and energy in putting three different ministers in a township which could barely support or find work for one. In South India the hindrance and confusion which these divisions caused in the mind of the native convert.

No man with any idea of scholarship would wish to underrate the work of the leaders in such a work as reunion. In thinking out accurately and defining as exactly as possible the terms

on which it should be accomplished, I have been endeavouring to show that, as it seems to me, it is the work of the leaders to give effect to the popular demands in this direction rather than to take any decided initiative, and for this we may be devoutly thankful, for I am persuaded that history shows that it is to the people as a whole rather than to their over-cautious leaders that we must look for the great step forward in the cause of righteousness with which one must certainly identify reunion.

## FROM A NEW ZEALAND PARISH

By a New Zealand Vicar.*

'HE is not an extremist' best expresses the type of clergyman most suited to the average New Zealand parish. The English or Anglican Church in New Zealand occupies a somewhat different position from the Church of England. There is neither establishment nor endowment, and the Church is looked upon as one of many different religious denominations competing for the custom and patronage of the community.

Consequently by many the Church is regarded as a kind of business. The activities of trade rivals have to be watched, and anything suitable in their methods has to be adopted and adapted whenever possible. It is no uncommon thing for a vicar to be told that the Presbyterians, or some other body, have organised some new branch of Church activity, and that 'we ought not to be behind them in this matter.' There is considerable competition in Church bazaars and similar functions, both in securing novel ideas, and in fixing a date that shall anticipate the rival function. In small places people in business feel that it is their duty to support 'all the churches,' as they put it, and this frequently means that they support none. I remember calling on a baker to ask him whether his children attended our Sunday School. He replied: 'In my business I cannot afford to patronise one Church more than another. But as I only have

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two children I am sending one of them to your Sunday School, and one to the Methodist, because I find that the Church of England people take more bread and the Methodists take more small goods.' There is also a feeling in some quarters that if somebody in business attends your Church it is your duty to give him all the business you can. If you have a carpenter, for intance, on your Vestry you must give him any carpentering work that may be required. The same thing applies to plumbers. It is a pity that so much time has to be devoted to finance, and the support, not only of your own Church, but of various diocesan organisations.

For a New Zealand clergyman intellectual mediocrity is a valuable possession. I remember attending a gathering of clergy and laity at which the matter came up of appointing a clergyman to a high and responsible office. Various names were suggested, and amongst them there was the name of a great scholar who had taken a double first at Oxford. Immediately his name was mentioned one of the clergy rose in his seat and said: 'I don't think a man with brains like that is at all likely to be sound to the faith.' This seemed to be such a general opinion that the name was not even seconded, and the next name being that of one with less brilliant intellectual attainments, found more favour from those who like 'sound Churchmanship.' There is some distrust of the clever and brilliant minister. Partly the New Zealander thinks that there must be something wrong about him or he would never have wanted to come to New Zealand. If he is a native born, people wonder why he is content to stay in New Zealand when he could do so much better elsewhere. New Zealand Churchmen are very conservative, and the Conservative Party in England has always been supicious of talent. I remember an old lady of extreme Tory persuasion lamenting that her brother had turned Liberal. But she excused it to some extent on the ground that he had always been clever, 'and you never quite know what a clever person will do.' There may be also a slight pity for mere intellectual ability, such as was expressed by Gibbon's ducal patron, who, when Gibbon took him his copy of *The Decline and Fall*, turned over a few pages and said, 'Still scribbling, I see, Mr. Gibbon.'

The New Zealand Churchman has very little sympathy with the extreme Anglo-Catholic. He says that such people ought to join the Church of Rome, 'to which they really belong.' He has a kind of idea that if you are paid to teach the doctrine of any particular church you ought to teach what you are paid for, or else leave that church. At the same time he is not particularly 'Low Church,' because he thinks the Low Church Party is very little different from the Dissenter; and here again he feels that anyone who is paid to give Church teaching ought to give it, and if he does not agree with it he ought to turn Dissenter. This is the commercial idea of the Church applied in another and a slightly different sphere. Nor has the average New Zealander much sympathy with the Modernist, as he understands Modernism from his newspaper. There has been a good deal of agitation lately to exclude the teaching of evolution from the schools. This has led to a rather amusing newspaper controversy. The literal interpretation of Genesis has been defended with more zeal than scholarship, but it has certainly given additional grounds for the belief that people with brains are not at all likely to be sound in the faith, as the Fundamentalist sees the faith.

The religion of the New Zealander is less concerned with intellect than with practice. New Zealanders are extremely generous, kind, and warm-hearted people. What they really want in religion are the simplicity and sincerity that are in Christ Jesus. In the more remote country districts they attend what is called 'The Settlers' Church,' which is a building constructed by the gifts of members of all churches, and in it the religious services of different denominations are held on successive Sundays. On the first Sunday there may be 'a definite, dogmatic Churchman' expounding the narrower type of teaching that used to be known as 'High and Dry'; the next Sunday you may have a Methodist drawing his lesson from the hands of a clock or other familiar object; the next Sunday a Presbyterian may expound some phase of predestination; and on the fourth Sunday you may have a Baptist or an Original Bible Christian. The settler listens to them all, and tries to derive something that may be of use to him in his daily round. For that is what the New Zealander really seeks. These people live hard lives,

and they face life's trials with an astonishing courage and strength. They cannot always understand life, nor can they always quite realise why, when they have offered up sincere and heartfelt prayers for those they love, these prayers should so often go unanswered. Practical difficulties confront them. They have few intellectual difficulties about either the Bible or the Church. They read the parts of the Bible which they find helpful, and they leave the more difficult parts to others. But they do find it a real puzzle why God should take their loved ones, when they have prayed so earnestly that they might be spared. In times of trouble they look to their minister to comfort and to explain. There are a few who feel intellectual difficulties, but the best way in such cases is to ask these people round to the vicarage and personally discuss their difficulties with them—not to attempt to deal with them in sermons. The average New Zealand clergyman has but little time for reading. The higher clergy have still less. So much time is taken up with routine work, and covering long distances, that reading has to take second place. This, however, is not of the same importance as it would be in England. The New Zealander wants a lamp unto his feet and a light unto his path—and the lamp has to be a human personality. He will follow anyone whom he regards as sincere and sympathetic.

No one knows New Zealand who has lived in the large towns only. The true New Zealander is to be found in the country places. Here you find the simplicity, energy, and courage which have gone to make us the 'Britain of the South.' And here you find the wonderful New Zealand woman. Working all day, she yet finds time for social recreation and education, never complaining, always brave and cheerful, bringing up her children in the paths of righteousness, and for herself content if she may be

> A Mary in the House of God,
> A Martha in her own.

# BOOK REVIEWS

## THE VIRGIN BIRTH*

From a New Testament Professor in the Westminster Theological Seminary of Philadelphia comes a large book of nearly 400 closely printed pages dealing with the Virgin-birth tradition, in the main from the historical rather than from the doctrinal standpoint. It is remarkable, in view of what we are accustomed to in England, in that while it is in effect Fundamentalist in its attitude to Holy Scripture, its author has clearly read and pondered a vast array of relevant literature. The following principle is stated on p. 227:

> 'When once we have accepted the entrance of the supernatural in connexion with the appearance of Jesus in this world, we are no longer interested in setting exact limits to the extent to which the supernatural is to be found.'

This is said in a defence of certain of the more dubious portions of the Matthean infancy narrative as actual events. Though it is obvious that this standpoint determines Dr. Machen's evaluation of evidence throughout his work, his conclusions in his study of the separate accounts of *Matthew* and *Luke* are certainly argued in remarkable independence of it. But even those who would be willing to accept as events, if they were better attested than they are, what Dr. Machen calls the supernatural, might nevertheless still hesitate to accept his principle as quoted above. Its justification lies outside the scope of his book and it is certainly not established by the generalizations which are too frequent to arise naturally out of the literary and historical discussion, and too brief to be of any intrinsic value. Of course Dr. Machen is right in thinking that judgements of the value of evidence are largely determined by presuppositions, but as the value of presuppositions is not to be decided by *à priori* argument, nothing useful is said until it is asked whether the presuppositions do not rest upon considerations more relevant than a supposed disinterested examination of ancient documents.

The first chapter deals with second century affirmations and denials of the Virgin-birth. Dr. Machen regards the former as weighty; the latter are negligible because they do not rest upon any independent historical traditions. Credulous readers are left to infer that the affirmations are in better case, and add something independent of the accounts of the first and third Gospels. It is argued that since Harnack discovered that in a well-known passage of Justin's Dialogue with the Jew Trypho the true reading is 'There are certain men of *your* race who confess that he is Christ, but maintain that he was born a man from men,' it cannot be held (as when '*our* race' was read) that Justin recognises any who deny the Virgin-birth to be Christians. But Dr. Machen translates the next words of Justin thus: 'With whom I do not agree nor would the majority of those who have come to the same way of thinking as I,' without so much as asking whether they have any significance for Justin's meaning!

Turning to the New Testament, the whole ground is covered in chapters which deal with the Lukan narrative (including a good examination of the Hymns in Lk. i), the Matthean account, the relations between the two, and

* *The Virgin Birth of Christ.* By J. Gresham Machen, D.D., Litt.D. (Marshall, Morgan & Scott, Ltd., London and Edinburgh. Price 15/-.)

their relation to the rest of the New Testament, their ' inherent credibility,' and their setting in secular history. The fullest treatment is naturally accorded to the Lukan section. The Virgin-birth is defended as being originally contained in a very primitive source which the third Gospel never lacked. Interpolation hypotheses are all rejected, but less than justice is done to the difficulties in the text as it stands which those hypotheses endeavour to remove. For instance, Dr. Machen relies on the old explanation that such terms as ' his parents,' ' his father and his mother,' (see Lk. ii, 27, 33, 41, 43), represent the quite natural way of speaking, in view of Joseph's *legal* relationship to the child; but the real question is *why the author of the Gospel,* if he had just related the Virgin-birth, should use these unnecessary terms (which the MSS. show to have been a difficulty at an early date), in writing for Gentiles. Matthew carefully avoids them. Elsewhere, in discussing Lk. ii. 5 Dr. Machen rejects the Western reading ' wife ' (which correctly describes Mary's legal status at the time), in favour of ' betrothed.' We are asked to believe that Luke wrote ' betrothed ' to designate the peculiar relationship of the period when (according to Matthew) Joseph was Mary's wife, but ' knew her not until she had borne a son '; in other words, Luke carefully uses unnecessary legal language where it was misleading, and carefully avoids it where it would have been strictly correct, in favour of a word which would give Gentile readers to understand that Mary went on the journey to Bethlehem with a man to whom she was not yet married. With the aid of mistakes, Dr. Machen is able to dismiss the MSS. evidence in support of interpolation at Lk. i, 34, as neglible. In itself it is undoubtedly weak; but it is not worthless when taken with other considerations; nor, remembering the importance attached to the Virgin-birth from the early 2nd century, is it insignificant that a single 5th century MS. should survive without it. Dr. Machen is quite wrong in stating that the Old Latin MS. *b* substitutes v. 38 for v. 34 ' and then omits v. 38 from its proper place,' and that the reading ' produces nonsense, since it represents the angel as continuing to speak (verses 35-37) after he has already departed.' The fact is that *b* does *not* transpose the last words of v. 38 (' And the angel departed from her '), but retains them there. The reading thus makes excellent sense. Nor is it ' entirely isolated.' It finds partial support in *e* which omits, but does not transpose to v. 34, the same part of v. 38. Dr. Machen's great argument that the author of the Gospel saw nothing incongruous in relating the Virgin-birth and then tracing the physical descent of Joseph, and using such expressions as ' his parents,' is greatly weakened by the fact that it is probable, on other grounds, that the Lukan writings were never finally revised with great care. He states that the old idea that the third Gospel originally lacked chs. i and ii is now out of fashion. That is only true of the hypothesis that the Gospel *circulated* without those chapters; and he makes no reference to the work of Streeter and Vincent Taylor in favour of a Proto-Luke beginning at iii, 1, which means that the infancy narrative was added at a late stage in the composition of the Gospel. Dr. Machen's arguments are a strange blend of points of real weight with unfounded surmises. Nothing in his New Testament section necessitates a real modification of the position of Vincent Taylor in his excellent monograph, *The Virgin Birth.*

The most useful feature of Dr. Machen's book is the long section on the attempts to show that the Virgin-birth story was derived from pagan sources. The reader unacquainted with German will find much valuable material here, for Dr. Machen gives full summaries of all the important arguments which he criticises and rejects. But he at least tacitly accepts

one of the major assumptions of those he criticises, namely, that the early Christian consciousness contained nothing that was not given to it in historical fact or found in some other external source, and that it was incapable of contributing anything original! This undoubtedly adds to the completeness of his arguments, for it means that he proves a case that the origin of the Virgin-birth story must be found in an actual event, unless a complete parallel can be discovered. But demonstration is not possible, and judgement must follow probabilities. It appears to me, however, that in this section of his argument, Dr. Machen is in large part justified in his conclusions, though the common idea that first century Jews, or Christians, were untouched by the thought of the pagan world is an illusion. He is less successful in his reply to the suggestions that the Virgin-birth tradition was suggested by Isa. vii, 14, because, like so many others, he doesn't recognise that the question is not, What kind of interpretation was possible to first century Jews? but, What interpretation became possible to Christians? Dr. Machen accepts a view of the Messianic passages of Isaiah very like that at which Christians soon arrived after the earliest major breach with Juduism—the acceptance of a crucified Messiah. The precise questions which he says would constitute a real gap in desirable knowedge if we knew not of the Virgin-birth, are the questoins which interested Christians in the Churches from which came the traditions embodied in our first and third Gospels; and, in view of the great influence of the LXX in Luke i, who can say that the LXX of Isa. vii, 14, may not have suggested one answer to those questions?

The upshot of historical investigation of this matter is that the Virgin-birth tradition comes down to us with whatever authority attaches to the fact that the authors of Matthew and Luke accepted it. Dr. Machen fails to carry our knowledge any further back. In an argument which consists of a whole series of hypotheses, not a few of which can only be established with the aid of a fairly large doubt, the cumulative uncertainty remains.

In a final chapter Dr. Machen claims that the Virgin Birth is of paramount importance for two reasons. If it is not true, the infallibility and authority of the Bible (he allows no real distinction) goes, and it also brings men to the issue of the supernatural where it cannot be evaded. It is not much good selecting for this challange any alleged event not reasonably established as such on historical grounds, and, in spite of its learning, Dr. Machen's treatment of the relevant group of problems entirely fails to justify the derisory implication that only an *à priori* prejudice against the occurrence of the miraculous can explain hesitation or dissent in regard to his conclusions.

J. S. Bezzant.

## THE GOAL OF CERTAINTY.

In spite of an appalling dust-cover, the pattern of which suggests that everything certain has given place to an endless question-mark, Dr. William Adams Brown's book* is a study in the meaning and possibility of certainty in matters of religion. That there is much uncertainty to-day over both dogma and morals is indisputable. This is partly due to the fact that in the rapid advance of modern thought, many positions once regarded as strongholds have been abandoned as antiquated defences. Also, a more scientific study of the history of religions has brought to the fore the part played in them by subjective factors. Hence some, seeing that the old forts look derelict, have concluded that the position is no longer

* *Pathways to Certainty.* By Wm. Adams Brown, D.D. pp. 254. (S.C.M., 1930. Price 8/6.)

capable of defence, and so have abandoned their religion for humanism of a non-theistic type.

With these, Dr. Brown would argue that they have mistaken their ground owing to their having looked for the wrong goal. He rightly distinguishes between that certainty which is capable of mathematical proofs foreign to the nature of religious convictions, and such a certainty as comes to us when we are convinced of the beauty of a scene or picture. As another writer has said, 'Living convictions can be stronger than dead certainties!' Hence Dr. Brown goes on to explain that certainty does not mean changelessness, though it includes some element that lasts and gives continuity to experience and unity to thought.

He then explores four avenues which he calls the pathways to certainty. Of the first of these—the Way of Authority—he warns us that a merely negative rejection of this is superficial and has led many to 'bid good-bye to the Bible only to set up a new mentor in psycho-analysis or behaviourist psychology.' But we naturally look to Rome to see how authority works; and, as Dr. Brown remarks, 'That Rome has spoken one may know, but what the utterance means may remain as mysterious as the word of Sybil.' Hence, in the very nature of things, authority can never offer a sure way to certainty; it may be a valuable guide in the period when we are too immature to think for ourselves, but afterwards, 'It can tell us what our predecessors have *thought* about God and so can help us to understand better what it is we are to test for ourselves' (p. 108).

From Authority, which may offer us conflicting counsels, we may turn to the Way of Intuition—that immediate insight which comes to us periodically. In reference to this, Dr. Brown makes some interesting comments on the value of mysticism, and a useful comparison between the parts played by Intuition in Art and Religion. The third Way is that of Reasoning, and this must be employed to test the consistency of competing beliefs with other known facts of the world: while the fourth Way is that of Experiment, by means of which we can find which of the competing beliefs can best adapt itself to the changes which the future has in store. 'Authority, intuition, and reasoning, each in its way, define for us the convictions that we wish to test. Experiment is our way of verifying the accuracy of the definition.' Because of this need of experiment, Christianity must appeal to the future for its complete justification, and there can be no short-cut to certainty. 'The argument from miracle in the conventional form is such a short-cut. But . . . the effort is unsuccessful. For one thing, it is never possible to prove of any alleged miracle that it may not at some later time be shown to fall within the system of Nature. For another, there is nothing in the mere occurrence of an event, however wonderful, that carries with it any guarantee of divine revelation' (p. 197).

There is not a great deal which is new in this work, and it tends at times to be unnecessarily discursive, but it has a freshness of approach which makes it useful and interesting. J.P.H.

## THE FAITH OF A MORALIST.

In his Gifford Lectures* Professor A. E. Taylor approaches the subject of religion, natural and revealed, from the standpoint of the moralist.

'A religion we can accept means, among other things, a guide by the light of which we can face all the tragedy and all the comedy of life

* *The Faith of a Moralist.* By A. E. Taylor. (Pub. Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 2 vols. 15/- a volume.)

joyously and undismayed, without frivolity as without misgivings. . . The infinitely serious issue for the whole future of European civilisation is that of the soundness of the Christain ideal of human character and the Christian rule of life. If we can still maintain that in that rule and ideal we have something absolute and permanent, authoritative for Europeans of our own age no less than for Jewish or Hellenistic communities of the first century, or for our ancestors of the thirteenth or seventeenth, it is certain that the Christian religion will survive uninjured by any criticism it may yet have to encounter from biologists or anthropologists.'

Morality is not regarded seriously if it is taken to be a matter of mere subjective valuation. It demands an ultimate basis. Morality can only live if its foundations are deep in the nature of things. The suspicion that the universe is indifferent to human distinctions of right and wrong is fatal to it. 'Serious living is no more compatible with the belief that the universe is indifferent to morality than serious and arduous pursuit of truth with the belief that truth is a human convention or superstition.' Value and fact are inseparable. The moralist who, like Bertrand Russell, divorces morality from existence is logically driven to Narcissism.

'Mr. Russell, to be sure, once wrote a too-much-belauded essay on the *Worship of a Free Man* whose freedom is based on emancipation from the belief in any intrinsic connection between worth and fact. But I suspect that the title of the essay was only one of Mr. Russell's little ironies. In truth, his "free man" *worships* nothing, or, if anything, himself. He *despises* fact for its brutal stupidity and revenges himself on it by becoming the Narcissus of his own dreams.'

His 'free man' worships the work of his own hands. The principle of the Autonomy of the Will in itself only issues in that 'peculiarly detestable kind of idolatry,' self-worship.

There must be some more profound and ultimate reverence. Professor Taylor, holding that it is legitimate to argue from the existence of a function to the reality of an environment in which the function can find adequate exercise, urges that morality involves something more than succession, time conceived, in the vulgar phrase, as just 'one damned thing after another.' It only receives its fulfilment in an eternity which transcends time. A temporal 'meliorism,' he says, is only 'a foolish *alias* for pessimism.'

'It is moral aspiration which has humanised the human animal, and we dare not believe that the humanisation of man is an illusion, or a bad joke. The goal may be out of sight, but a goal there must be, or

There's nothing serious in mortality,
All is but toys.'

Having argued that a living morality implies an environment which can only be provided by belief in God and eternity, Professor Taylor goes on to enquire where this environment can be found. He thinks that the 'natural religion' of the philosopher will not provide it. It can only be found in the historical religions, seeing that 'natural religion' cut loose from historical religion degenerates into a naturalism which has nothing religious about it. The warmth and life of a philosophical theory are in fact not its own. They are derivatory. Spinoza's religious devotion, for example, derives from the Jewish attitude to the Blessed One which he learned in his early days in a pious Jewish home and retained even when excommunicated

from the synagogue. It was not bred and could not be bred of his metaphysic. Plato's religious convictions, again, through Socrates owed their origin to the revelational religion of the Orphics.

> 'When we dream of a "true" religion without creed, church or institutions, we may be making the same mistake as those physicists of the last century who supposed themselves to be getting down to the "reality behind appearances" by converting the physical world into a vast apparatus of differential equations.'

To Professor Taylor Authority, Sacramentalism, Institutionalism, are essential elements in a historical religion, and he accordingly examines carefully their place, function and justification. In doing so he starts from the assumption that as a matter of historical fact God has at definite times in history revealed religious truth through religious seers, who stand to average humanity in the same kind of relation as in another sphere Shakespeare stands to the ordinary man.

> 'If there is so much about human nature which would be dark to us but for the intuitions of Shakespeare and his fellows, there must be much more that is true of God which would be completely hidden but for the flashes of intense and direct insight which are granted to a privileged few.'

The weakness, sometimes the fatal weakness, of revelational theologies is that frequently they provide no adequate criterion of the truth of the alleged revelation. After all, many, if not most, prophets have been false prophets, and violence of affirmation, or even of conviction, is no guarantee of truth. Professor Taylor finds his criterion in the congruity of the revelation with the highest religious knowledge we already possess.

> 'The relation between a knowledge of God through a genuine revelation and "natural" knowledge of God, such as we may reach by the analysis of the presuppositions of the moral or physical order, has an analogical counterpart in the relation between truth about human nature disclosed to us by the "intuitions" of a Shakespeare and truth about human nature reached by our own reflections on everyday experience. . . In the same way, if there is a doctrine of God, claiming to rest upon genuine revelation, which provides us with surprises, but surprises recognisable *après coup,* though not antecedently as inevitably, as of one piece with, though not discoverable from, that which a strictly natural theology can tell us of the divine character, there should be no rational objection against the acceptance of such a doctrine as a further and fuller disclosure of the divine nature, and the recognition of divine self-manifestation as its source.'

Religion is thus for Professor Taylor bound up with historical persons and historical happenings. He deplores the tendency in some quarters to dispense with the historical element, and adds that 'we call this tendency to dispense with the historical element in religion "Modernism."' To this description of Modernism Anglican Modernists may well demur. If Professor Taylor would glance through the papers read at the 1928 Conference of Modern Churchmen, when the subject was *Christianity and History,* we are confident that he would at any rate except Anglican Modernism from his general definition. In truth, in one respect, many Modernists would go considerably further than he does in emphasising the importance of the historical element in the Christian faith. 'Of the Lord's life as a

whole,' he writes, 'we know hardly anything, and this of itself seems to vitiate all attempts to justify the Christian conception of the significance of that life by appealing to the testimony of plain fact,' and he goes on to stress the point that 'St. Paul records only one incident of the life of Christ antecedent to the passion of Calvary, and that an eminently "numinous" and "other-world" act, the declaration that the bread and wine of the Last Supper are "my body on your behalf" and "the new covenant in my blood."' Many Modernists would reply that of our Lord's life and teaching we know a great deal, and that what we know is of primary significance to Christianity. As against the silence of S. Paul stands the striking fact that, at a period when the end of the world was expected in the near future and we should therefore assume *a priori* that little interest would be attached to the compilation of historical records, so great was the importance attached to the words and actions of Jesus that it inspired the composition of the Gospels, while behind them again stand the lost records from which the Evangelists drew their material. If, moreover, as there is reason to believe, the Gospel according to S. Mark is a direct development of the preaching of S. Peter, this affords an additional warning against the danger of over-stressing the silence of S. Paul.

In his sermon at the close of the 1928 Conference the preacher said: 'We are Churchmen and Catholics. We must perform our task as Churchmen and Catholics, as members of the historic Church of Christ, and as those who value the Church's historic institutions. . .' In speaking thus, he represented fairly the position of Anglican Modernists, and we do not doubt that they will be in general agreement with much of what Professor Taylor has to say about Institutionalism and Authority. He draws a clear distinction between authority and inerrancy. He pleads for docility in those who are placed in a position of authority. 'Unfeigned docility in the representatives of theological authority would have as one consequence a salutary advance, on the part of philosophers and men of science, from religiosity to religion.' As to the dogmatic utterances of authority, he holds that the permanence of truth 'is perfectly compatible with the transience of the precise formulae in which we try to give truth its expression.'

Professor Taylor dissents from the Conservative interpretation of the Creeds as expounded in the writings of Dr. Gore:

> 'Dr. Gore notoriously would include the article *natus ex Mariae virgine* among those which must be understood "literally." But how much does he mean by this? We know the interpretation put on this *credendum* by St. Thomas and in the *Catechism* of Trent. Does Dr. Gore mean to insist on the whole of it, or only on some part, and, if not on the whole, how does he justify himself against the criticism, which might be brought against himself from the Tridentine point of view, of not really accepting the article without diminution? Does he regard it as *de fide* to hold that Christ as a physical fact, *ex mulieris alvo sine ullo maternae virginitatis detrimento editus est?* If not, is he not permitting a latitude he professedly rejects in the interpretation of the word *natus?*'

He finds it difficult to understand the hard and fast line drawn by Dr. Gore between articles which are admitted to contain symbolic elements such as *ascendit ad coelos* and others which must be taken as 'bare records of such happenings with no such intermixture.'

'It is not that I deny all validity to this distinction, so long as it is regarded as one of degree. . . What I dispute is the right of any man, or body of men, to claim once and for all to limit the right to recognise the presence of the symbolic element to the case of certain specified articles and to exclude from active participation in the devotional life of the Christian community those who do not make the same precise restriction. . . I gather that Dr. Gore's own view is that the principle of distinction is itself an historical one — certain *credenda* have long been understood (but by whom?) to be expressed in symbolic language, others not so, and the line must continue to be drawn always just where it was drawn in the past (in the fourth century?). I own that I feel some doubt about the fact. I cannot help thinking that one would only have to go sufficiently far back in the history of the Church to find a time when a Council of Dr. Gore's episcopal predecessors would either have condemned his "symbolic" Ascension, or have left it uncondemned only because a distinction so clear to his mind would have been unintelligible to theirs.'

In *The Faith of a Moralist* Professor Taylor has given us a treatise which, we believe, will strongly influence the trend of Anglican theological thought. It is the work of a philosopher of repute. It is also the message of a man of religion which will call forth a response from all to whom the religious life is a reality. From none, we are confident, will he receive a more sympathetic understanding than from the Modernist.

G. L. H. Harvey.

## STUDIES IN MATTHEW.*

Dr. Bacon's new book is a large-scale attempt to analyse the sources of the First Gospel, to reveal the process of its construction, and to expound its chief themes. It is written in his well-known vigorous style, marked by apt and vivid illustration and, though no food for babes, it is very readable. Undoubtedly it is a great contribution to the study of the Gospels, and will require the close attention of all serious writers on *Matthew* for some time to come.

There are two obvious sources of *Matthew*: first, *Mark,* and secondly, the coincident material of *Matthew* and *Luke* which is not derived from *Mark,* called 'Q.' Dr. Bacon insists that this Q is not itself actually the second source, 'but only the most easily traceable factor of a lost work,' which he designates S. Q is a nucleus of S which cannot be reconstructed merely from Q. He finds that portions of the material found only in *Matthew* or *Luke* give evidence that they come from the same document as Q; parts of *Mark* may also have belonged to it. But, in order to avoid confusion, Dr. Bacon strongly protests against the use of 'Q' to cover both the actual material coincident in *Matthew* and *Luke* and *also* the elements 'conjecturally added.' No doubt Dr. Bacon's is an excellent scheme for marking by symbols the sources of the Gospel when it is printed in a continuous narrative, as Dr. Bacon does in a new and excellent translation; it also makes things easier for beginners. But Dr. Bacon seems absurdly to overrate the confusion of other scholars in using the symbol-scheme against which he protests. For example, on p. 507, he says: 'Streeter's assumption that Q=S followed by more or less successful attempts to find room in Q for P material (*i.e.* material peculiar to *Matthew*

* *Studies in Matthew.* By B. W. Bacon, Litt.D., (London: Constable & Co., Ltd. Price 18/-.)

of *Luke*), leads only to worse entanglement of the sources and paves the way for subjective judgements as to their nature.' But Streeter is fully aware of this. Of the P additions which may be supposed to have belonged to the same document as Q, he says explicitly, 'the identification of them can never be more than a skilful guess,'—which is as true of Dr. Bacon's identification of them as it is of Streeter's, and is a state of affairs in no way altered by calling Q + the conjectural elements S. There is nothing very clarifying in Dr. Bacon's symbol-scheme, but it is not important to reject it.

Dr. Bacon has some pertinent criticisms of Streeter's 'Four Document Hypothesis,' and particularly of that part of it which Streeter calls a special source M, and of *Proto-Matthew*. These will need serious attention. Dr. Bacon would allow much more freedom in the way of much more addition by the final redactor o the Gospel. Doubtless Streeter could easily agree with Bacon to the extent of contending for *at least* a four document hypothesis; but Dr. Bacon seems to argue for three *documents* (*Mark*, S, and a Nazarene Targum, from which came the Infancy narrative), together with matter derived from oral sources, and finally the Redactor's contributions. It may well be that Streeter's M was of smaller extent than estimated in *The Four Gospels*. The arguments by which Bacon would eliminate it are undoubtedly more ingenious than those on the basis on which Streeter asserts its existence, but further study will be necessary to determine whether they have a greater solidity.

Dr. Bacon's contentions are always very interesting. Among them we may note that τὰ λόγια of Papias did not refer to Q, or to another collection of sayings, or to anything except to *Matthew* as we know it; that the name Matthew cannot have been transfered to the Gospel from Q, because had Q been so named it would not have been forgotten; the identification Levi = Matthew is an early harmonization and that they were not identical; that Ignatius did not take the Apostolic authorship of *Matthew* seriously, or he would have adhered more closely to its form of the birth-story; that we are left to conjecture as to who Matthew was—he was probably a converted rabbi; that the Gospel does not emanate from Antioch, as Streeter thinks, but received its title and backing from that Church, its place of origin being 'the Greek-speaking Jewish-Christian communities of northern and north-eastern Syria'; that it deals with the same problems of 'church demoralization' as do Revelation and the Pastorals, and is to be dated between 90 and 100 A.D.

Dr. Bacon develops at great length the long recognised 'five divisions of *Matthew*' and throws much light on the construction of the Gospel as consisting of 'Five Books,' with a Preamble and Epilogue, carefully and elaborately analysing the sources and the redactional elements in each. He then expounds the 'Five Great Themes' of *Matthew* giving them the titles: The New Ethic of Jesus and the Law; The Apostolate; The Hiding and Revelation of the Mystery; The Problem of Church Unity; The Messianic Judgement. The value of *Matthew* as a historical source for the life and teaching of Jesus he regards as slight; it is rather adaptation of earlier material to the needs of the post-apostolic age than history. But his expositions are most illuminating, and never dull. They all illustrate and emphasize his general estimation of the Gospel which he states thus:

> 'This late Gospel holds indeed a golden treasure, sacred, invaluable; but for the most part the treasure was known elsewhere and largely in better form. But it holds it in an earthen vessel. And this indeed, though none of the finest, tells the story of its age. It shows us the

adaptation of the everlasting gospel to the post-apostolic age and environment, a story which to the historian makes the meaning of the treasure itself larger and richer than before.'

Dr. Bacon modestly regards all his works as preparatory to telling the story of Jesus and his teaching: the present work is certainly, as he says of an earlier one, 'the story of the story.' It has many points of contact with the different approach of Dibelius and Bultmann, to whose work, however, he does not refer. He is probably over-optimistic about the agreement among scholars as to the extent of the reliable history on the basis of which the story of Jesus and his teaching may be told; and little immediate increase of agreement is likely to result from these 'Studies.' Many despair of the possibility, and are not a little pleased that it is not possible to reveal an original historical, purely ethical teaching which gradually evolved by the assumption of alien or non-essential elements into historical Christianity. But such satisfaction is too negative to be satisfying, and will, I fear, prove a quite inadequate defence of Christianity as we know it. But for the time being, the most recent Gospel criticism—if I may adapt a phrase of Dr. A. E. Brooke—has more to tell us of how a 'Geschichte' could have taken shape than how much history really lies behind it. Dr. Bacon, however, hopes to address himself to the more ultimate task, should health and strength permit. May it indeed be so! Certainly all who read these 'Studies' will impatiently await the companion work on the Fourth Gospel promised under the title *The Gospel of the Hellenists*.

J. S. B.

## PSYCHOLOGY IN NEW YORK.

If for no other reason than that 'like understands like,' we are always interested when distinguished members of one profession criticize the views of their fellow members whom fortune or fate has brought into the limelight. A recent Symposium* is of this kind. It offers 'an antidote to the behaviourist poison which has been spread so freely among the young.' In many ways it is an extraordinarily stimulating, critical study of the cult which is raging in America, which has influenced its educational methods and its ethics, and of which its leading exponent, Dr. Watson, declares that it will be the means of abolishing marriage as an institution within fifty years! 'Absurd,' 'mania,' 'nonsense' are words which occur frequently through the book, but they testify to the deep convictions which have produced it. On the whole, it is a very fair examination of the Behaviourist School, and its several essays state the value as well as the abuse of the Behaviourist method. The attack is led by Professor McDougall, and his stimulating study of the 'Psychology they teach in New York' is followed by the essays of seven other writers. It is, throughout, a psychologist's attack on Behaviourism, but while its religious significance is largely incidental, it is nevertheless of great importance.

J.P.H.

## EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.†

The author of this little book is supposed to hold to a conservative, some would say an impossibly rigid, estimate of the permanent value of the Church's early formulations of doctrine; but whatever position he takes

* *Behaviourism—A Symposium.* Edited by W. P. King. (S.C.M. 160 pp. Price 5/-.)

† *The Beginnings of Christian Theology.* By J. K. Mozley, D.D., Canon of St. Paul's. (Cambridge University Press. Price 5/- net.)

on that question is never obtruded into this outline of the course and development of Christian theology down to the Council of Nicaea. He says, 'the first business of anyone who speaks or writes on such a subject is to give the facts not to argue a case,' and he certainly exemplifies his own principle, for scarcely a sentence betrays his opinion of the present value of the material of his story. There is real ground for his belief that 'it is a great and serious mistake' to suppose that Christian people can afford to leave his subject entirely alone. Not a few imagine themselves stout upholders of the faith against dangerous heretics, in blissful ignorance of the certainty that Athanasius would have excommunicated them all alike, and whose defence of orthodoxy reveals nothing so clearly as their ignorance of what it is: others think it a sign of enlightenment to ridicule ancient attempts to work out the significance of facts and to deal with difficulties, which they are too impatient to try to understand, and who often end by embracing, with an equal lack of intelligence, the obscurantism they formerly denounced. This little work will leave all such with less excuse. Its chapters were originally eight broadcast talks, and they now form an admirable piece of objective writing. The main points in the story are assembled and elucidated in a way only possible to a teacher of wide and thorough knowledge of his subject. In spite of its simplicity, which is no small achievement, a faithful record of the impressions made on listeners who are not 'instructed churchpeople,' as on many who thought they were, might possibly depress Canon Mozley. But he may console himself with the knowledge that he has produced something more than he intended. There are few young students who, at the beginning of their studies in the complexities of Christian doctrine, would not be grateful for the guidance which this book will so admirably afford, before they turn to the larger works in which they easily get lost. Dr. Mozley must continue the story on the same lines and within the same limitations. J.S.B.

## DOES RELIGION EVOLVE?*

Until rather recently the modern attitude towards the origin and growth of religion has been largely that of Evolutionism. It has been held that a belief first in several personal deities and then in one Supreme Deity came about gradually. At an early stage one had, it was believed, to reckon with Animism, or with something even more crude, Pre-Animism, and with Magic, or with a mixture of Magic and religion. Primitive man, it was supposed, was little more than an animal endowed with a slightly higher intelligence. Not only was he devoid of knowledge and lacking in experience, but he was provided with a brain of such a kind that it had to improve slowly before he could be expected to become a moderately civilized being. With his embryonic mentality, he ascribed life and spirit to all sorts of seemingly inanimate things—logs of wood, slabs of stone, rocks, mountains, pools of water, etc.—and stood in awe of them or worshipped them. He discovered an affinity in certain animals, and conceived of some sort of relationship with them which has been described as totemism. This kind of attitude came to be accepted so generally that hardly anyone has dared to oppose it.

Now, whatever may be thought of the evolutionist point of view, it can hardly be denied that the evolutionists have carried their theories to extremes, and that the time has long been ripe for reconsidering the whole

* *The Origin and Growth of Religion: Facts and Theories.* By W. Schmidt. Translated by H. J. Rose, M.A. (Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1931. pp. xvi, 302. 15/- net.)

question of the origin and growth of religion. Unless one is overpowered or obsessed by the idea of evolutionism, on second thoughts, now that we seem to have discovered that on the whole ' primitive man's deficiency was not so much in intelligence as in knowledge, it is more natural to suppose that he ascribed power to, and stood in awe of, a being like himself, than that he worshipped, in the first instance, a log of wood or a slab of stone. Persons and personalities from the beginning and all down the ages seem to have been the factors that really counted. Early man, it may be conjectured, was impressed and influenced by persons who were like him in type and frame but excelled him physically and mentally. Such persons he would put on pedestals and worship. It has been presumed therefore that the first gods were living men or deceased ancestors.

This latter is not the view of Professor W. Schmidt, the founder and editor of the enthological journal *Anthropos*, though he too, like others, has has parted company wtih the evolutionists. Professor Schmidt's views, however, compel attention. Until recently these views have not been easily accessible to English readers. This has been remedied, and we now have English translation of a German book specially written and designed to give a comprehensive and readable account of Professor Schmidt's theories.

The theories, being original, striking and provocative, can hardly fail to stimulate inquiry. It is the main contention of the author that belief in a Supreme Being was the most primitive religious belief, and, presumably, that it was a belief implanted in the human mind from the very beginning. ' Comparing the primitive cultures with the later ones, we may lay down the general principle that in none of the latter is the Supreme Being to be found in so clear, so definite, vivid and direct a form as among the peoples belonging to the former.' Further, ' this Supreme Being is to be found among all the peoples of the primitive culture, not indeed everywhere in the same form or the same vigour, but still everywhere prominent enough to make his dominant position indubitable.'

We can, acording to Schmidt, establish the existence of the Supreme Being among all the Pygmy tribes of the central culture, in so far as we have anything like thorough knowledge of them, both in the Asiatic and in the African groups; among the groups belonging to the southern primitive culture (the Bushmen, the people of Tierra del Fuego, the people of South East Australia); among the groups belonging to the Arctic primitive culture (Samoyeds, Noryaks, Eskimos, Ainus); and finally among the North American primitives (the North Central Californians; certain tribes of the interior of the North West, the Joshua and Indian Salish; the Aljonkin tribes). It may be claimed, it is contended, that no culture later than the culture of these peoples can boast of a distribution which encircles the whole earth so completely. ' But if it is clear that wherever remnants of the primitive peoples are still discoverable over this huge area, they show belief in a Supreme Being, then it is likewise manifest that such a belief is an essential property of the most ancient of human cultures, which must have been deeply and strongly rooted in it at the very dawn of time, before the individual groups had separated from one another.'

The Supreme Being of primitive religion, as portrayed by Professor Schmidt, has a curiously close resemblance to the Christian god. Speaking of the emotional side of religion, he says that as a matter of fact these strong emotions did exist at the very beginning But they were not the result of some ' induction ' of an undefined ' something ' labelled ' holy '; they arose from the profoundest depths of a conviction of the Supreme Being as the Universal Cause. Upon this Being, the ' Father,' who was

the author of all good and of nothing but good, were concentrated in the most intense fashion the sunlit emotions of love and gratitude; to him, as the Creator from nothing of the boundless universe, was directed the amazed admiration of his creature, conscious of its own helplessness; before him, as the absolute Lord over life and death, his adorers trembled in fear of losing life's highest good; and before him, as the inescapable Judge and Avenger, they hid themselves in terror and shuddering. Indeed, the emotions aroused by this great and mighty personality were far greater, far more overwhelming, than any caused by a dumb, vague, neater "something" could ever have been.' This picture of a sublime personality at the beginning of religious history and among the most primitive folk emerges, we are told, through the employment of the historical method in Professor Schmidt's anthropological researches!

It all sounds very nice. But is it true? The crux of the whole matter is the question: Was the belief in a Supreme Being, as described by the author of this book, really 'an essential property' of the most primitive of human cultures? In other words, are these so-called most primitive cultures really primitive? Let it be granted (by all means) that, as far as religion is concerned, the evolutionists have gone very far astray. Let it be granted even that monotheism may have been the earliest religious belief, and not a later development. Polytheism may very well have been the splitting up of a unity into a diversity, of a single personality into a variety of aspects of the same personality. Let it be granted (by all means) that Animism or something like it, magic, and totemism may have been secondary rather than primary. Nevertheless, the Supreme Being of Professor Schmidt's primitive culture looks too much like the deity of the higher cultures of the ancient world to be accepted as really primitive until better proof is given of the thesis that belief in him arose independently. The presumption is that somehow or other Professor Schmidt's so-called primitives came into touch at an early stage with people representing an ancient and higher culture and borrowed from them at least their belief in a Supreme Being.

In any case, Professor Schmidt has given us a book which deserves to be read widely. It is interesting as giving us a lucid account of his own theories. It is interesting also as giving an account of the theories put forward by other anthropologists. The author criticises other people freely. For instance, he is not at all pleased with Rudolph Otto, who is enjoying something of a vogue just now in this country. If he is open to criticism, and has been criticised severely, himself, nevertheless he has done a real service in reopening discussions which were supposed to have been almost closed. He may not have succeded in giving the true explanation of the origin and growth of religion, but he has helped to pave the way for the true explanation.

M. A. CANNEY.

## 'WHEN YE PRAY.'

The practice of holding Family Prayers has to a large extent died out to-day. Its demise may have been due to the hurry and bustle of modern ways; but we suspect that it was also due in some measure to the opportunity it gave to those long, rambling, extempore prayers which the Puritans seemed to love and which 'The Barretts of Wimpole Street' illustrate. Mrs. Guy Rogers has given us a book* which may well provide new scope for Family Prayers; while for those who do not care to revive this practice, it still provides a useful and well-ordered scheme of prayer

* *Morning Prayers and Readings for School and Family.* (S.C.M. Price 3/- and 2/-.)

for the year. In prayer as in other matters, it is well to vary one's stroke; and this scheme includes not only a wealth of subjects but also a diversity of approach to them. The Foreword is in the nature of a Pie—though, fortunately, less difficult to follow. There are so many prayers in existence which can only be used with mental reservations or efforts of definition so elaborate as to make them into feats of juggling. Mrs. Guy Rogers has avoided these snares, and her compilation is one which we heartily commend. J.P.H.

## SHORT NOTICES.

Another book* of that striking Japanese worker, Kagawa, has been translated into English, and, together with the biographical sketch contributed by the Rev. Murray Walton, this offers the English reader the chance of understanding something of the mind and work of this modern prophet who has swept Japan as John Wesley swept England. The book is to a large extent autobiographical, though it deals with aspects of the religion of Jesus: it is discursive, and goes on from anecdote to anecdote, but it conveys some idea of the power of Kagawa's preaching and the force of his personality.

*The Realism of Christ's Parables* (S.C.M., 2/-, 1931) contains a series of lectures given by Canon Quick to Sunday school teachers as the Ida Hartley Lectures. They offer stimulating reading on familiar subjects, and a much wider circle even than Sunday school teachers will find them not only interesting but helpful.

Another interesting and helpful book which deserves to be in the hands of every Sunday school teacher, and of those who train teachers in preparation classes, is *Bible Stories and How to Tell Them* (W. J. May; S.C.M., price 6/-, 254 pp.). This is more than the familiar paraphrase of Bible stories. It is a study in how to teach children, by one who quite obviously understands child psychology. We may not agree with every remark about the Bible; but we cordially agree with all that Mr. May says about teaching the child.

While *The Little Boy of Nazareth* (Edna M. Bonser; 270 pp.; S.C.M., 6/-) contains much imaginative beauty in the way of stories told around the boyhood of Jesus, we are uncertain for what use this book is meant. Apparently the stories are intended to be read by (or to?) the children, and the 'Suggestions for Teachers' at the end of the book provides some useful expression work. But it also suggests that only the first half of the book is suitable to those under nine—and we are left wondering what these mites will make of such words as *forfend, mangy, phylacteries*! However, the book is full of interesting information, chiefly in the form of footnotes to the stories, on all sorts of Biblical customs and names.

* *The Religion of Jesus.* By T. Kagawa. (S.C.M., 1931. 4/-.) J.P.H.

# CORRESPONDENCE

## SUNDAY CINEMAS.

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

In your admirable article on Sunday Cinemas you quote 'The soul is dyed the colour of its leisure thoughts' as a notable *dictum* of the Dean of St. Paul's. Marcus Aurelius seems to have been of the same opinion:

'Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character of thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it, then, with a continuous series of thoughts such as these: for instance, that where a man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in a palace; well then, he can also live well in a palace' (*Meditations*, v. 16).

Can he in a picture palace? Possibly. But 'our new educated workless poor' prefer living well in a different sense.

T. F. Royds.

Haughton Rectory, Stafford.

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Dear Sir,

Is not the quotation on page 663, 'The soul is dyed the colour of its leisure thoughts,' to be attributed to Marcus Aurelius (Book V, par. 15, Casaubon's translation) and not to Dean Inge? It occurred also in the last number of the *Modern Churchman* as from the Dean.

L. T. Bartholomew.

4 Hill Close, Hampstead Way, N.W.11.
*March 25th*, 1931.

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Sir,

Many, I am sure, much appreciated your article on 'Sunday Cinemas' in the March *Modern Churchman*. It is a wrong policy to cater (often by means of undesirable mental pabulum) for the increasing incapacity of people to amuse themselves. The opening of cinemas on Sundays would merely pander to this growing weakness amongst great masses of the people. It seems now that even light literature makes too much mental demand: and crowds will walk the streets, even in the rain. And yet millions of money have been spent on their education. The people are not entirely to blame, but there must be something greivously wrong with the system. The religious education given in our Day Schools, both Church and Council, is frequently of a most antiquated type. So we see vast masses, from 14 to 17 years of age, permanently lost to church and chapel. The failure of traditional religious education for children is very obvious. Reform here is the most crying need of the Church; and children take very readiiy to constructive modern views. The position in secular education, too, seems far from satisfactory. This hopeless inability to make a good and happy use of leisure is one indication. We may admire some elements in the present system of elementary education, but my own limited experience suggests that the system fails in one essential point — it fails to develop any love of learning. The great desire on leaving school is to cast away the books. The result is that some, after the age of 14, go backwards instead of forwards. I have even met recently two or three young people who could not read or write. Many others seem to dislike anything approaching the pursuit of serious knowledge of any kind. The position of the religious education of children to-day seems to many of us to be tragic, and that of secular education to be far from satisfactory.

L. C. Rowan-Robinson, M.B., Ch.B.

Brinsley Vicarage, Notts.
*March 31st*, 1931.

## PRAYERS AND THE DEPARTED.

SIR,

There must be many who find it difficult to express their 'remembrance' of friends who have passed on in any authorised prayer. May I suggest the following, which has been written for my use in connection with one who found himself out of tune with much of the expression of organised religion.

H. BERNARD TOWER,

Hurstpierpoint College, Hassocks, Sussex. *Headmaster.*
*March 15th*, 1931.

O Lord of all good in life, who through Thy rich gifts of beauty, wit and kindness dost draw near to many, receiving from them unconscious loyalty and unwitting service; grant that those our friends who all unknowing loved Thee here may, in that wider life which they now share, rejoice to find in Thee the source of all they held most precious. And give us brave hearts that, being mindful of their friendship, we too may come to share and know Thee, the Perfection we so blindly seek; in Thine own name of Friendship, Jesus Christ Our Lord.

## ASTRONOMUS INTER PROPHETAS.

SIR,

Sir A. Eddington's pronouncement that we cannot know accurately both the velocity and the position of a particle at any instant appears to have brought immense comfort to many persons for whom the freedom of the will of man is of vital importance to the ethics they feel bound to teach. They have been quick to hail with joy a pronouncement which they have decided to regard as announcing an exception to the universal reign of law in the material world. This rejoicing is quite natural, for if law does not obtain everywhere in nature, the assertion of the determinist that the actions and choice of mankind are subject to law is greatly weakened. But, though natural, is not this rejoicing somewhat premature and even misplaced?

For (1) what interpretation is to be put upon the newly-discovered fact, and (2) if an exception to the reign of law in the material world has really been discovered, will the position thus created offer any real help towards an establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the will?

1. There appear to be three possible assertions that might be made regarding the recently discovered fact about the behaviour of the particle and its connection with the reign of law. It may be held as a consequence of it:

(*a*) that in the present state of our knowledge, and with the scientific instruments at our disposal, we do not know what governs the behaviour of the particle, and whether it conforms to law or not;

(*b*) or that, however great our future knowledge, and however perfected our instruments, man can never know what governs the behaviour of the particle, or whether or not it is subject to law;

(*c*) or lastly, that the new discovery about the particle has given us the definite knowledge that the particle is not governed by law and that its behaviour must be accounted for by something else than law.

(*a*) is an assertion of our present ignorance as to why a particle appears to behave as if it was not amenable to law, while (*b*) is an additional

assertion that our ignorance on the matter can never be dissipated. Neither of them pronounces for or against the question as to whether or no the particle is subject to law: they leave the matter open. (*c*) on the other hand, if it represented the considered verdict of scientific experts, and so long as it did this, would go far in stultifying the arguments of determinists that men's actions are subject to law, for 'We are scarcely likely to accept a theory which would make the human spirit more mechanistic than the physical universe.'

It would seem, therefore, that unless interpretation (*c*) is put upon Sir A. Eddington's announcement, the apparently erratic behaviour of a particle is no valid cause of rejoicing for indeterminists, for I do not suppose that anyone will be inclined to rely upon an argument based upon ignorance.

2. Let us then examine for a moment the assumption that (*c*) is true, and that an exception to the reign of law in the material world has really been established. If the behaviour of a particle is not due to law, how is it to be accounted for?

Three suppositions might be suggested:

(*x*) Unfettered choice, guided by something corresponding to desire or will, as predicated of mankind by upholders of freewill.

(*y*) Direct action by God, moving a particle according to His Will.

(*z*) Fluke or chance.

I venture to think that no one would be prepared to adopt supposition (*x*) as accountable for the unpredictable behaviour of a particle; that supposition (*y*), with its God tinkering with His universe, would meet but scant approval except, perhaps, from some Fundamentalists and some Roman Catholics; and that supposition (*z*) would mean a return to chaos.

If none of these suggestions are credible as accounting for the behaviour of the lawless particle, how is the cause of the indeterminist advanced, and is his rejoicing really warranted?

G. A. Byron.

Lewes.

## DEAN FARRAR AND MARLBOROUGH COLLEGE.

Sir,

In your March number Dr. Martin writes, amidst much that is interesting about Dean Farrar, that 'in 1870 he was the successful candidate for the Head of Marlborough. This School had been steadily going down: no indiscretions of the Head were likely to make it worse. Farrar . . . did not merely stop the rot. . .' This picture of Marlborough on Farrar's succession is the exact opposite of the fact. The School was flourishing, and Bradley, his predecessor, enshrined in the admiration of masters and boys, as he deserved to be: Farrar's difficulty, not entirly surmounted, was not to suffer by comparison.

Cyril Norwood.

Harrow School.

## DR. MARTIN'S REPLY.

I fear I misinterpreted the authorities, which I understood to mean that Bradley's last years had been unfortunate. *E.g.*, 'Parents wrote by every post withdrawing their sons' names from the doomed school. . . The school was threatened with extinction. Then Farrar came and the tide

turned. He raised the school out of the slough of despond' (*Life*, p. 179). *Cf.*, p. 149, 'A crisis in its history.'

In view of Dr. Norwood's assurance that the school was actually 'flourishing,' the foregoing statements can hardly be taken at their face value.

E.T.M.

## SLEEPING SICKNESS IN THE SCRIPTURES.

SIR,

In the hope of extracting expert Biblical opinion, I am venturing to send a suggestion on a subject which has puzzled us and perhaps others. My suggestion is: Was sleeping sickness prevalent in Our Lord's time? I venture to think it was for the following reasons, and I hope to prove a *prima facie* case:—

(*a*) In the *Morning Post* of February 26th, 1926, 'Medicines of the Pentateuch, by Pathologist,' a list is given of various diseases prevalent in the Mosaic Code, and among them is sleeping sickness, and it says: 'Biting flies are acting agents in conveying the trypanosomes of sleeping sickness from cattle to man and from man to man.'

(*b*) The leading symptoms of this disease (*vide* Report of Sleeping Sickness Commission, 1905) are 'Infection conveyed by a fly' (this corroborates statement mentioned in (*a*) introducing a specific organism) 'Fatana sanguinis bruninis. The fatana may be present without causing the disease, but in actual cases it is found in the blood. The disease begins with a dullness of the faculties, apathy, loss of mental and muscular activity which gradually increases. Generally it takes some years to run its cause to a fatal termination, although in some cases it is only a matter of months, but the increasing tendency to sleep over-rules everything, and eventually the sufferer sinks into a stupor from which he cannot be roused.' Bearing this in mind, I now come to the case of Lazarus, which to my mind is a typical case of sleeping sickness.

Case of Lazarus. Our Lord never pronounced him *dead*, using this word in the ordinary acceptance. When Our Lord heard of his friend's sickness, 'This sickness is not unto death,' and he apparently delayed his visit for two days, and he then told his disciples, 'Our friend Lazarus is fallen asleep, but I go to awake him out of sleep,' and the disciples' reply was: 'If he has fallen asleep he will recover' (see John XI).

Our Lord, when he arrived on the scene, found Lazarus had been in the tomb *four* days (John ii, 17). In Peake's Commentary, p. 756, I find the following: 'The "four days" are significant. The spirit was supposed to remain for three days near the body in the hope of being able to return; on the fourth day, when change set in, it departed.' Our Lord, on being met on arrival, again expresses no opinion of actual *death*; he said to Martha: 'Thy brother shall live again.' Martha believed in actual *death*, for she said of her brother, having been dead four days, 'By this time, Lord, he stinketh,' which was natural, seeing putrefaction and decomposition in the East come in a virulent form very soon after death, necessitating an early funeral; and yet when Lazarus appeared out of the tomb, 'bound hand and foot with a napkin round his face,' and he was loosened from his grave clothes, not a trace of decomposition or putrefaction was found in his grave clothes, although this must have been self-evident, not only to those who disrobed him, but to the lookers-on who witnessed the disrobement. If the proof of *death* is repressed to prove a *miracle*, why is such a necessary proof omitted. If I have established a *prima facie* case, the same arguments would in part apply to the raising

of Jairus' daughter and the widow of Nain's son. If again my arguments are correct, sleeping sickness (natural causes) is a simple answer to what is ascribed as a miracle and proves the simplicity and accuracy of the New Testament statements. One word more—I have no pretence of being a biblical expert. What little biblical knowledge I have is from reading elementary books recommended by the *Modern Churchman*. My sole object is a search for knowledge from some expert, which I earnestly hope will be forthcoming.

E. D. NEWNHAM-SMITH.

Ross-on-Wye.

## THE DEATH-WATCH BEETLE.

SIR,

The Forest Products Research Laboratory of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research has just issued a leaflet on the subject of the death-watch beetle and its ravages among old timber, and it has been stated with some show of authority that little is known of the pest and nothing at all of what can be done to check its ravages. I challenge this last assertion.

Crantock Church, near Cubert, Cornwall, was four years ago found to be badly attacked by the death-watch beetle, but the timber was treated with a certain chemical — which I do not feel disposed to advertise — and there has been no recurrence of this trouble.

At Patrington Church, near Hull, a fine example of ecclesiastical architecture many centuries old, the roof and other timbers similarly attacked are being similarly treated, the treatment having been perfectly successful on an ancient tithe-barn near by.

I am perfectly aware that till lately the death-watch beetle has been an insoluble problem, but it cannot be said to be so now.

G. B. J. ATHOE,
*Secretary.*

The Incorporated Association of Architects and Surveyors,
1 Wilbraham Place, S.W.1.
*29th April*, 1931.

## MORAL PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY.

SIR,

A Study Circle for the discussion of this subject will be held at St. John's Vicarage, 384 Clapham Road, S.W.9, on Tuesdays, May 5th, 19th, June 2nd, 16th and 30th, at 8.15 p.m. Subjects and speakers:—

May 19. 'Humanism and Morals.' Rev. F. I. L. REES, M.A., Vicar of Holy Trinity, Westminster.

June 2. 'Problems of Business.' H. J. HUTCHINSON, Esq., M.A., O.B.E., Board of Trade.

,, 16. 'Problems of Government.' To be announced.

,, 30. 'Problems of Sex.' DOUGLAS WHITE, Esq., M.D.

The Circle is open to all, whether members of the Union or not. No fees. Those who come are asked to read the relative parts of Lippmann's *A Preface to Morals* (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.).

T. J. WOOD,
*Organizing Secretary of M.C.U.*